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The apparent normative and implementation gaps within the international refugee protection 
regime suggest the need to reform its implementation and accountability processes. 
Increasingly, the focus is being shifted to local or domestic actors to attempt to address the 
challenges faced in realising refugee rights effectively. Among the key domestic 
accountability actors for the realisation of rights, are national human rights institutions 
(NHRIs). NHRIs are considered a bridge between the international and domestic human 
rights systems. NHRIs act as entities that facilitate the diffusion of international human rights 
norms and standards, including those with respect to refugee rights, into the national spheres.  
Notwithstanding this, there is paucity in empirical evidence within the refugee rights 
discourse on the role that NHRIs can play to promote the effective realisation of refugee 
rights. This study explores the role that NHRIs in South Africa and Kenya play in promoting 
and protecting refugee rights. It utilises a non-doctrinal and qualitative research approach, to 
examine the extent to which the NHRIs engage with refugee rights and to explore their 
capacity to do so effectively. It situates NHRIs within the nexus between international human 
rights law and international refugee law to frame the understanding for their role within the 
refugee protection regime.  
The findings indicate that the NHRIs in South Africa and Kenya that are compliant 
with the Paris Principles display significant engagement with refugee rights promotion and 
protection. As accountability mechanisms, they have contributed to the development and 
implementation of domestic refugee law and policy in accordance with international norms 
and standards. This has occurred despite the lack of an explicit refugee rights’ promotion and 
protection mandate, but they face barriers and challenges. Various underlying factors that 
impede their effectiveness to address refugee rights were identified. These included the socio-
political contexts within which they operate, capacity constraints and invisibility within the 
refugee protection regime. The socio-political challenges included xenophobia and the 
securitisation of the asylum space. These compounded organisational and operational 
weaknesses such as scarce specialist skills in refugee law, limited financial resources, and the 
absence of strategic and sustained partnerships for refugee rights protection. The overall 
absence of norms for NHRI engagement with refugee rights was identified as a contributory 
factor for the lack of a coherent approach for promoting and protecting these rights.   Possible 
avenues to enhance NHRI engagement with refugee rights were identified. For instance, 




UNHCR and regional institutions based on a clear understanding of an NHRI’s role as 
accountability mechanisms. For NHRIs, the imperative lies in building their capacity to 
address refugee rights to ensure a clear understanding of what the promotion and protection 
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1.1 Background and context of the study  
The most recent statistics from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) estimates the number of refugees and people in refugee-like situations in 
sub-Saharan Africa at approximately 6.3 million.1 South Africa and Kenya, which are the 
focus of this study, host large numbers of refugees and asylum seekers.  Kenya hosts over 
420,000 refugees and about 50,000 asylum seekers while South Africa hosts approximately 
90,000 refugees and over 184,000 asylum seekers.2 Given the fragility that the countries of 
origin continue to face, it is more likely that both South Africa and Kenya will continue to 
receive and host refugees and asylum seekers for a significant period of time.  
This is a situation that many host countries across the globe face.3 Thus, in the context 
of this global challenge to find a permanent solution to the refugee problem, there is renewed 
discourse on the need to reform the international protection regime for refugees.4  On-going 
debates focus not only on reforming the international protection regime itself, but also 
reforming its implementation to include a defined role for actors such as national human 
rights institutions (NHRIs).5  
                                                
1. UNHCR, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2018, (Geneva: UNHCR, 2019), accessed 10 January 2020, 
https://www.unhcr.org/5d08d7ee7.pdf,14. The UNHCR 2019 figures for refugee and asylum seekers will be 
made available in mid-2020.  
2. UNHCR, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2018, 66 and 67.  
3 UNHCR, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2018, “Protracted Refugee Situations,” 22-26. UNHCR 
estimates that 78 per cent of all refugees are in protracted situations. (22). In South Africa, refugees and asylum 
seekers from Somalia and DRC are in a protracted situation; in Kenya those from Somalia and South Sudan are 
deemed to be in a protracted situation. (22-23). 
4. See for instance Khalid Koser, Reforming the International Protection Regime: Responsibilities, Roles and 
Policy Options for Australia, (Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy 2016), 3. 
5 Khalid Koser, Reforming the International Protection, 3; Richard Carver, “A New Answer to an Old Question: 
National Human Rights Institutions and the Domestication of International Law,” Human Rights Law Review 
10:1 (2010) 1-32; Brian Gorlick, “Human Rights and Refugees: Enhancing Protection through International 
Human Rights Law,” New Issues in Refugee Research Working Paper 30 (2000) 23; Harvard Law School’s 
Human Rights Program, “The Role of National Human Rights Institutions in Detention Monitoring” (paper 




NHRIs are institutions established by States to specifically promote and protect 
human rights.6 The UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) was the first entity to 
consider the potential impact that NHRIs could have in realising human rights norms and 
standards.7 In 1946, the ECOSOC recommended that UN Member States consider creating 
entities to advance the work of the UN Human Rights Commission domestically.8 It was, 
however, not until 1993, following the adoption of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of 
Action (Vienna Declaration) as the outcome document of the World Conference on Human 
Rights, that attention focused on NHRIs.   
The Vienna Declaration identified NHRIs as integral components of an effective 
domestic implementation and monitoring framework for human rights and included some 
specific roles that NHRIs play that would influence such a process.9  The 1995 Beijing 
Declaration and Programme of Action (Beijing Declaration) also emphasised the importance 
of creating or strengthening national mechanisms tasked with promoting women’s rights and 
mainstreaming gender equality to ensure the realisation of the objectives of the Beijing 
Declaration.10 In addition, there are treaties that make specific provisions for NHRIs to be 
part of the domestic monitoring framework. These include the United Nations Convention on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) and the Optional Protocol to the UN 
Convention against Torture (OPCAT)11. The UN has also regularly through numerous 
resolutions, emphasised the necessity to include NHRIs in human rights processes.12  
                                                
6 OHCHR, National Human Rights Institutions: History, Principles, Roles and Responsibilities (Handbook on 
NHRIs) (Geneva: UN, 2010), 13-14. 
7 Anna-Elina Pohjolainen, The Evolution of National Human Rights Institutions: The Role of United Nations. 
(Copenhagen: Danish Institute for Human Rights 2006), 30-117. 
8 UN, “ECOSOC Resolution 9 (II), 21 June 1946,” UN, accessed 18 April, 2017, 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=E/56/REV.2   
9. UN, “World Conference on Human Rights: Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, A/CONF.157/23, 
1993,” UN, accessed 18 April, 2017, http://www.un-documents.net/ac157-23.htm 
10UN, “Beijing Declaration and Programme of Action, 1995,” UN, accessed 7 July 2017 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/beijing/pdf/BDPfA%20E.pdf. 
11 UN, “Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (A/RES/61/106),” UN, accessed 26 February, 
2018 http://www.un.org/disabilities/documents/convention/convention_accessible_pdf.pdf, Article 33 (2): UN, 




At the regional level, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Banjul 
Charter) in Article 26 requires States to establish and improve appropriate national 
institutions mandated to promote and protect human rights.13 Furthermore, the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the regional entity that oversees the 
implementation of the Banjul Charter, recognises NHRIs through the affiliate status. 14 This 
recognition allows NHRIs to participate directly in its work. Given these developments with 
respect to NHRIs, it could therefore be concluded that NHRIs ought to be constituent 
components of an effective human rights implementation framework, including one that 
encompasses refugee rights.  
1.2 Problem statement 
Refugees have been recognised as persons of concern throughout history.15 It was however, 
not until the League of Nations came into existence that there was the acknowledgement of 
the international responsibility to provide protection to refugees and to find lasting solutions 
for the refugee problem.16 Initially, international protection for refugees was limited to 
specific categories until 1951 when the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (1951 
Convention) was adopted and further amended in 1967 to expand the scope of the definition 
                                                                                                                                                  
Punishment (A/RES/57/199),” UN, Articles 18-20, accessed 26 February, 2018 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/OPCAT.aspx.  
12 Both the UN General Assembly and the Human Rights Council conclude resolutions relating specifically to 
NHRIs, and the UN Secretary General is required to report on the UN’s support to strengthening NHRIs’ 
capacity. See following reports A/HRC/10/54, A/HRC/4/91, A/HRC/13/44, A/HRC/7/69, E/CN.4/2006/101 and 
resolutions A/RES/70/163, A/RES/52/128.  
13 ACHPR, “African Charter on Human and People’s Rights,” ACHPR, accessed 16 November, 2017. 
http://www.achpr.org/instruments/achpr/. South Africa signed and ratified the treaty in 1996 and Kenya ratified 
it in 1992.  
14 ACHPR, “Resolution on the Granting of Affiliate Status to National Human Rights Institutions and 
specialized Human Rights Institutions in Africa - ACHPR/Res. 370 (LX) 2017,” accessed 10 November, 2017, 
http://www.achpr.org/sessions/60th/resolutions/370/. The ACHPR had previously adopted a similar resolution 
in 1998: Resolution on the Granting of Observer Status to National Human Rights Institutions in Africa 
accessed 10 November, 2017. http://www.achpr.org/sessions/24th/resolutions/31/  
15 UNHCR, An Introduction to International Protection, (Geneva: UNHCR, 2005), 5; S Prakash Sinha, Asylum 
and International Law (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), 5-35. 




of a refugee.17 Subsequent regional agreements such as the 1969 OAU [AU] Convention on 
the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (OAU Convention) expanded the UN 
definition, to include grounds for refugee recognition because of mass displacement.18  
Despite the existence of binding international agreements, the international refugee 
protection regime has not been successful in ensuring adequate protection for refugees and 
those seeking asylum.19 While the 1951 Convention plays an important part in the promotion 
and protection of refugee rights, there are problems relating to its normative framework and 
its application as the central source of international refugee law.20 For instance, in terms of 
normativity, the 1951 Convention does not provide a universal definition of ‘persecution’, 
which leaves individual States with ample room to determine the applicable content of the 
term.21 
This has inevitably resulted in political will being the basis for States’ implementation 
of the Convention, rather than human rights considerations linked to refugee protection.22 For 
example, recent State practice in dealing with large-scale forced migration crises such as the 
mass influx of asylum seekers into Europe, point to the dominance of major political 
concerns over States meeting their obligations under binding treaty law in the attempt to 
resolve refugee matters.23  Furthermore, while the 1951 Convention defines a refugee it does 
not provide the process to carry out the determination of this status.24 
                                                
17 Following the end of World War I, The League of Nations established various offices and mandates to deal 
with Russian refugees, persons displaced following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and those fleeing Nazi 
Germany. See Gilbert Jaeger, “On the History of the International,” 727-736; Article 1(2) of the 1967 Protocol 
removed the geographical and time limitations imposed by the refugee definition contained in Article 1(2) of the 
1951 Refugee Convention 
18 OAU Convention, Article I (2)  
19 Koser, Reforming the International Protection, 3   
20 Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, “The International Law of Refugee Protection,” in The Oxford Handbook of Refugee 
and Forced Migration Studies eds., Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, Gil Loescher, Katy Long and Nando Sigona, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 42-45; See discussion in Chapter 3 on the international refugee 
protection regime.  
21 Joan Fitz-Patrick, “Revitalising the 1951 Convention” Harvard Human Rights Journal 9 (1996), 240.  
22 Fitz-Patrick, “Revitalising the 1951 Convention,” 240 
23 Azfer Ali Khan, “Can International Law Manage Refugee Crises?” Oxford University Undergraduate Law 
Journal (2016), 61. All EU Member States are State Party to the 1951 Refugee Convention however the 




Another problem as Hathaway, North and Pobjoy point out, relates to implementation, 
as the 1951 Convention did not create a treaty body tasked with supervising the 
implementation of the treaty and thus hold States accountable for failures with respect to their 
protection obligations.25 Unlike other human rights treaties, no independent monitoring 
process exists to monitor compliance and provide a coherent interpretation of international 
refugee law across State Parties to the Convention.26  The term ‘implementation’ is used here 
to refer to individual State’s compliance with human rights standards and all initiatives taken 
by States and other actors to enhance respect for human rights and prevent violations.27 
Monitoring, as applied here, refers to the processes that seek to determine whether States are 
adhering to human rights standards.28 It involves systematically gathering information about 
the human rights situation in a country or region over time.29 The information gathered is 
                                                                                                                                                  
the Members’ commitment to their obligations under international law. For instance, the EU-Turkey deal signed 
in March 2015, which focused on forced relocation of “irregular Syrian migrants” from Greece back to Turkey, 
was criticised for the high risk that its implementation would not meet international norms including non 
refoulement.  
See Elizabeth Collett, “The Paradox of the EU-Turkey Refugee Deal,” accessed 25 January, 2018 
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/news/paradox-eu-turkey-refugee-deal: Despite the agreement being legally 
binding on EU Member States, the EU reported reluctance from groups of State to implement it arising from 
political differences and lack of political will to commit to addressing the refugee crisis in Europe. See Susi 
Dennison & Josef Janning, “Bear Any Burden: How EU Governments Can Manage the Refugee Crisis,” 
ECFR/167, April 2016, 2-3 http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/Bear-Any-Burden_Dennison-Janning.pdf ; The Turkish 
Government also declined to reform its refugee protection framework to comply fully with the 1951 Refugee 
Convention. See Vicky Stavropolous, “Refugee Protection in Turkey: Evaluating Needs and Challenges,” 
Chicago Policy Review, (January 2, 2017), accessed 25 January 2018. 
http://chicagopolicyreview.org/2017/01/02/refugee-protection-in-turkey-evaluating-needs-and-challenges/  
24Azfer Ali Khan, “Can International Law Manage Refugee Crises,” 59. 
25 James C. Hathaway, Anthony M. North and Jason M. Pobjoy, “Supervising the Refugee Convention: 
Introduction,” Journal of Refugee Studies. 26:3 (2013): 323-6. 
26 Hathaway, North and Pobjoy, “Supervising the Refugee Convention,” 323-6. 
27 Icelandic Human Rights Centre, “Implementation,” Icelandic Human Rights Centre: Human Rights Project, 
accessed 12 August 2020, http://www.humanrights.is/en/human-rights-education-project/human-rights-
concepts-ideas-and-fora/part-i-the-concept-of-human-rights/implementation  
28 OHCHR, OHCHR Training Manual on Human Rights Monitoring, (OHCHR: Geneva, 2011), 9; UN Women, 
“What is Human Rights Monitoring,” last edited December 21, 2011, 
http://www.endvawnow.org/en/articles/994-what-is-human-rights-monitoring.html; Dana Buhl, Ripple in Still 
Water: Reflections by Activists on Local and National-Level Work on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: 
Monitoring, (Institute of International Education: Washington, DC, 1996), accessed 12 August 2020, 
http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/edumat/IHRIP/ripple/chapter4.html#whatmonitor  
29 OHCHR, Training Manual on Human Rights Monitoring, 9; UN Women, “What is Human Rights 




then documented and disseminated with the aim of remedying human rights violations.30 For 
instance, treaty bodies monitor the implementation by reviewing periodic State reports, 
engaging in constructive dialogue with State representatives and issuing concluding 
observations, which States are required to implement.31 
With respect to the 1951 Convention, Article 35 requires the UNHCR to supervise the 
application of the provisions of the Convention. In contrast, the UNHCR’s founding mandate 
defines its role as one that facilitates and coordinates refugee protection.32 The UNHCR’s 
mandate does not grant it the authority to declare breaches of the 1951 Convention, nor does 
it provide for the UNHCR to authoritatively decide the meaning of the treaty.33 In addition, in 
several countries, the UNHCR has become the main implementer of the Convention leading 
to questions about its own supervision.34 Furthermore, Article 38 provides that should a 
dispute relating to “interpretation or application” of the Convention arise, the International 
Court of Justice can be approached to settle it.35 In practice, however, this provision has never 
been invoked.36 
Hathaway, North, Pobjoy, Byrne and Greim have proposed ways through which the 
implementation and monitoring challenges can be overcome by establishing new monitoring 
mechanisms for the 1951 Convention. The proposals include: setting up a Permanent Sub-
Committee on Review and Monitoring and a Special Rapporteur; or a UNHCR Advisory 
Committee tasked with issuing general comments and advisory opinions; creating a Refugee 
                                                
30 OHCHR, Training Manual, 9; UN Women, “What is Human Rights Monitoring,”; Dana Buhl, A Ripple in 
Still Water. 
31 Benjamin Mason Meier, Marlous De Milliano, Averi Chakrabarti and Yuna Kim, “Accountability for the 
Human Right to Health through Treaty Monitoring: Human Rights Treaty Bodies and the Influence of 
Concluding Observations, Global Public Health 13, no. 11 (2018): 1558-1576, DOI: 
10.1080/17441692.2017.1394480  
32 Hathaway, North and Pobjoy, “Supervising the Refugee Convention,” 323. 
33 Hathaway, North and Pobjoy, 323. 
34 Hathaway, North and Pobjoy, 323; Tamara Greim, “Experimentalist Governance and International Refugee 
Law: New Ideas for Supervising the 1951 Convention,” SSRN (2016): 20, accessed 10 June, 2017, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2949788.  
35 ‘Any dispute between the parties to this Convention relating to its interpretation or application, which cannot 
be settled by other means, shall be referred to the International Court of Justice at the request of any one of the 
parties to the dispute [.]’ 




Rights Committee tasked with receiving State reports and the publication of a ‘Refugee 
Watch’ Annual Report; or establishing an independent judicial commission capable of 
producing authoritative but non-binding opinions.37 Criticism of such proposals vary but 
include the requirement of a new protocol to the 1951 Convention to support the suggested 
reporting obligations for States and the likelihood of the UNHCR’s mandate being 
undermined by other structures should these be created.38  
In 2018, States adopted the Global Compact on Refugees, which includes the 
implementation of a comprehensive refugee protection framework.39 While this action may 
imply renewed commitment to finding a lasting solution to the refugee problem, this 
agreement and proposed further action are not binding. Its implementation will rest largely on 
political will, rather than meeting binding obligations for refugee protection, particularly as 
prescribed by international refugee law. 
The above-mentioned challenges coupled with other factors such as perpetual funding 
shortfalls for refugee protection, the resistance by States to share the burden and 
responsibility to protect have contributed to both the normative, and implementation gaps 
within the international refugee protection regime. 40   Despite arguments in favour of 
definitively addressing these gaps, there has not been any significant action by State Parties 
to solve the problem inherent in the 1951 Convention.41 The result is that regional 
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instruments, such as the OAU Convention, which provide broader legal protection, may be 
better tools for protecting refugees.42  
In addition, attention is now being given to other mechanisms in an attempt to address 
the normative and implementation gaps at both the international and domestic levels.43As the 
implementation of refugee law occurs at the domestic level, there are possibilities for local 
institutions such as CSOs and domestic legal entities such as NHRIs to influence the 
development of a domestic protection regime favourable to refugees. This may in turn 
influence outcomes at the international level. Despite this recognition of the role that NHRIs 
can play within the refugee protection framework, there is limited evidence to indicate that 
NHRIs have effectively contributed to the promotion and protection of refugee rights. This 
assertion forms part of the premise underlying this study.  
1.3 Rationale and significance of the study 
National human rights institutions, as discussed above, have been identified as one of the 
human rights mechanisms that could play a role in filling the normative and implementation 
gaps within the international refugee protection regime. However, there is limited evidence 
about NHRIs performing a role within the context of refugee protection.44 The existing 
research on NHRIs has focused largely on their nature, legal mandates, function, and general 
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effectiveness in promoting and protecting human rights as well as their role as the link 
between the international and domestic human rights frameworks.45  
Given that the refugee problem continues to persist and has increased in complexity, 
the recognition of the role of NHRIs within the refugee protection context and their potential 
to enhance the refugee protection regime warrants an understanding based on evidence.  This 
study explored the extent to which NHRIs in South Africa and Kenya have played a role in 
promoting and protecting refugee rights. In addition, this study explored the challenges these 
NHRIs face in fulfilling this role. It also identified opportunities for these NHRIs to enhance 
their engagement with the promotion and protection of refugee rights. The significance of this 
study is that it provides empirical evidence to support the argument that NHRIs should be 
considered integral components of efforts to advance refugee protection. This study also 
identified challenges or barriers to the NHRIs’ effectiveness and discerned opportunities to 
strengthen their capacities to influence positive outcomes for refugee protection. 
1.4 Aims, objectives and research questions 
This study explored the nature and extent of the role that NHRIs in South Africa and Kenya 
play within the refugee protection regime. The specific objectives of this study were:  
1. To identify the normative gaps in international and regional refugee law and 
institutional gaps within the refugee protection regime in order to highlight the 
potential that NHRIs could play within the refugee protection regime; 
2. To explore the extent to which NHRIs in South Africa and Kenya address refugee 
rights;  
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3. To identify the challenges and barriers that impact on NHRIs’ capacity to effectively 
promote and protect refugee rights in South Africa and Kenya; and  
4. To make recommendations for further research on NHRIs’ capacity to effectively 
promote and protect refugee rights in Africa. 
The main research questions that this study answered were:  
1. Do NHRIs in South Africa and Kenya have the capacity and capability to effectively 
promote and protect refugee rights?  
2. To what extent are NHRIs in South Africa and Kenya addressing refugee rights in 
their respective States? 
3. Are there any challenges or barriers that impact on the NHRIs’ responsibility to 
effectively promote and protect refugee rights in South Africa and Kenya 
respectively? 
4. How can the NHRIs in South Africa and Kenya strengthen their capacities to 
effectively promote and protect refugee rights?  
1.5 Scope of the study 
The units for this study were the three primary national human rights institutions in South 
Africa and Kenya. In the case of South Africa, these were the South African Human Rights 
Commission, the Commission for Gender Equality and the Office of the Pubic Protector 
(Ombudsman). In Kenya, these were the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, the 
National Gender and Equality Commission and the Commission on Administrative Justice 
(Ombudsman). This study focused on exploring the extent of their engagement with the 




1.6 Clarification of key concepts 
Asylum. Asylum is not defined in any international instrument.46 However, asylum is 
understood to be “the protection that a State grants on its territory or in some other place 
under the control of certain of its organs to a person who comes to seek it.” 47  
Asylum Seeker. Asylum seeker refers to a person who has left his/her country of 
origin and formally applied for asylum in another country but whose claim has not yet been 
concluded.48 Asylum seekers are those in need of international protection.49 UNHCR 
interprets its mandate to include asylum seekers as long as they meet the above criteria.50  
Refugee. International refugee law through the 1951 Convention (supplemented by 
the 1967 Protocol) provides a definition of a refugee (Convention definition). In the African 
context, the definition set out in the OAU Refugee Convention provides a broader definition 
for a refugee. It is the definition widely in use by African states in their domestic legal 
frameworks and the UNHCR applies it in its activities in Africa.51 The UN Convention 
defines a refugee as a person who: 
Owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the 
country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail 
himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being 
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outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is 
unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.52 
 
The OAU Refugee Convention in addition to including the Convention definition states: 
The term “refugee” shall also apply to every person who, owing to external 
aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order 
in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave 
his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his 
country of origin or nationality.53 
 
For purposes of this study refugee refers to those persons who have been defined as such 
through applicable international and domestic law. 
Refugee protection regime. The current refugee protection regime draws from general 
human rights principles, treaty and customary law obligations, national and regional 
jurisprudence and soft law such as the UNHCR’s Executive Committee’s conclusions.54 The 
primary actors are States and the UNHCR. 
National human rights institution. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights (OHCHR) and the Global Alliance of NHRIs (GANHRI) have adopted the view that 
an NHRI is a “body which is established by a Government under the constitution, or by law 
or decree, the functions of which are specifically defined in terms of the promotion and 
protection of human rights.”55  However, as Reif cautions, it may at times be necessary to 
look beyond the prevailing NHRI definitions when conducting human rights research by 
examining all horizontal accountability institutions in the State playing roles in human rights 
promotion and protection.56 This would enable one to “get a full picture of a State’s 
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implementation of and compliance with its international and domestic human rights legal 
obligations.”57  
Refugee rights.  This term is used broadly to include the rights of refugees and asylum 
seekers under international, regional and domestic law. These rights are distinct from 
migrants’ rights -  as noted by Feller, “refugees are not migrants … it is dangerous, and 
detrimental to refugee protection, to confuse the two groups, terminologically or 
otherwise.”58 
Non-refoulement. This principle prescribes broadly that no refugee or asylum seeker 
shall be returned in any manner whatsoever to any country where he or she would be at risk 
of persecution.59This principle forms an essential part of international refugee law and human 
rights protection and is a rule of customary international law.60  
1.7 Main assumptions 
The main assumptions that underpin this study include the following:  
1 That NHRIs were promoting and protecting refugee rights despite the absence of a clear 
recognition of their role within the international refugee protection regime;  
2 That the NHRIs with the broadest mandate would play a prominent role in advancing 
refugee rights; 
3 That strengthening NHRIs’ capacity to influence positive change for refugee protection 
at the domestic level would influence State responsibility for refugee protection at the 
international, regional and domestic levels. 
1.8 Research methodology 
The research methodology employed for this study is discussed in Chapter 5 of this thesis. 
This study employed a non-doctrinal legal research method to answer the research questions, 
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which related to NHRIs’ methods of operation within the context of refugee protection. This 
study utilised two research methodological approaches, namely: desk review (secondary data 
collection) and primary data collection (utilising a qualitative research design). Data from the 
desk review and primary data was used to determine the extent to which NHRIs in South 
Africa and Kenya were promoting and protecting refugee rights. The factors considered in the 
data analysis included: States’ international law obligations and the NHRIs’ mandates, 
including compliance with the UN Paris Principles relating to the status of national 
institutions (Paris Principles).61 The ethical considerations and the researcher’s positionality 
are presented in chapter 5.  
1.9 Preliminary literature review: Contextualising NHRIs within the refugee protection 
regime 
There is paucity of empirical research within the international refugee protection regime on 
the role of NHRIs. The available literature on international human rights law in general and 
NHRIs in particular, indicates that very few studies have been done about NHRIs beyond 
their evolution within the international human rights regime,62 the bridging role they play 
between the international human rights standards and their implementation at the domestic 
level,63 and assessments of their capacity to fulfil their roles.64 This dearth of evidence is not 
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surprising given that the traditional international refugee protection regime’s key components 
have been the Refugee Convention and its Protocol on the one hand and States and the 
UNHCR on the other.65 Where analysis on domestic refugee regimes exists, hardly any 
reference is made to NHRIs as components of an effective implementation regime despite the 
importance given to the oversight role that they play.66  
Within the African region, NHRIs have determined that the protection of refugee 
rights was a pertinent area for engagement. In 2007, African NHRIs held a conference on the 
protection of refugees, internally displaced persons and stateless persons. The conference 
outcome document, the Kigali Declaration set out concrete steps and identified specific tasks 
for NHRIs with regards to promoting and protecting refugee rights.67 There has however, not 
been any evaluation of the progress that African NHRIs have made to realise these 
commitments. This is despite a further study having found that migration and human rights 
was a priority thematic area for a significant number of African NHRIs.68  
Notwithstanding the afore-mentioned limited empirical evidence, there are strong 
arguments that support a defined role for NHRIs within the refugee protection regime. 
Gorlick and Khan argue that in the absence of a domestic or regional refugee protection 
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framework NHRIs are important actors in safeguarding refugee rights. 69  The authors 
examined how the Indian National Human Rights Commission’s activities contributed to the 
protection of particular groups of refugees despite the absence of domestic refugee law and 
the fact that India is not party to the 1951 Convention.70 They caution that the success of 
NHRI interventions and their resultant impact on the protection of refugee rights domestically 
rely on various intervening factors such as accessibility and caseload. However, they 
conclude that where an NHRI “enjoys an independence of process and procedure’ and has the 
requisite expertise, that NHRI can play an important role in ‘safeguarding and expanding 
legal protection of refugees.”71 
Ferris analysed the role of civil society and other human rights actors in resolving 
protracted refugee situations and argues that NHRIs can have a big impact in resolving such 
situations. 72  She suggests that NHRIs can monitor places of detention, address non-
refoulement, access to humanitarian assistance and solutions for protracted refugee 
situations.73 Ferris' analysis is similar to Gorlick and Khan's, as her analysis discusses the 
limitations placed on NHRIs due to the contextual challenges that NHRIs and other actors 
face when addressing refugee rights.74 For instance, she raises questions about the UNHCR’s 
dominant role within the refugee protection regime and how this reduces the impact that other 
actors such as NHRIs can have in promoting and protecting refugee rights.75  This analysis is 
important as it provides an overview of NHRIs potential – by citing examples of situations 
where NHRIs have intervened with respect to refugee rights - but also critiques NHRIs’ role 
by noting that many NHRIs are limited institutionally and may not be fully independent.  
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Furthermore, Jones in his critique of the refugee protection regime adopted by the 
UNHCR in South-East Asia, argues that refugee protection in that region relies less on the 
normative framework, as few States in the region have signed the 1951 Convention.76 
Instead, he argues that to fill the normative gap, refugee protection in Southeast Asia depends 
on a negotiated humanitarian protection space which has resulted in the emergence of a ‘law 
of asylum’ based on human rights instruments and institutions at both national and regional 
levels.77 These institutions, which include NHRIs, have filled the legal gap and are now an 
important means through which refugee rights in the region are being promoted and 
protected.  He concludes that effective strategies for refugee protection require the inclusion 
of such institutions. 
While there is acknowledgement that NHRIs face considerable institutional and 
contextual challenges, proponents of a redesigned refugee protection regime argue for the 
increased visibility of actors such as NHRIs. Gorlick in his work considering ways to 
enhance refugee protection through international human rights law, argues that it is necessary 
for the refugee protection regime to incorporate a broader approach by improving operational 
cooperation with actors such as NHRIs. 78 Similarly, Mortem in his analysis of the influence 
that human rights organisations have had on the creation of refugee regimes, suggests the 
need to create a bottom-up approach, which would encourage national actors such as NHRIs 
to actively feed into the international level by increasing collaboration between the two levels 
of protection. 79 In addition, Raustiala and Slaughter suggest that some of the most effective 
human rights regimes are those with links between international institutions and domestic 
                                                
76 Martin Jones, “Moving Beyond the Protection Space: Developing a Law of Asylum in South-East Asia,” in 
Refugee Protection and the Role of Law: Conflicting Identities, ed. Susan Kneebone, Dallal Stevens and Loretta 
Baldassar (New York: Routledge, 2014), 251-270. 
77 Martin Jones, “Moving Beyond the Protection Space,” 251-270. 
78 Brian Gorlick, “Human Rights and Refugees,” 23. 
79 Kjærum Mortem, 2002, “Human Rights Organisations and the Formation of Refugee Regimes,” in Global 




actors.80 This finding is important as NHRIs are seen as a link between the domestic and the 
international human rights levels.81  
Within the general human rights discourse, support for institutions such as NHRIs 
find expression in works of several authors. Jhabvala’s analysis on the challenges of 
implementing human rights treaties argues: “one of the fundamental tenets of the 
international protection of human rights is that they should be implemented domestically 
through local institutions.”82 Similarly, Simmons asserts: “domestic supervision [of human 
rights] is of far greater and more enduring significance for the promotion and protection of 
human rights than external machinery.”83 
Given the focus of this study, it is important to review some of the key literature 
available on NHRIs. As indicated above, the body of knowledge on NHRIs is wide and 
growing. However, this is limited in the context of this study but still significant in creating 
an understanding of NHRIs, especially the extent to which they can influence the diffusion of 
human rights norms at the domestic level. For instance, Cardenas provides a comprehensive 
overview of NHRIs across the globe including reasons for their creation, their institutional 
structures, the role that they play as agents for accountability for human rights and the 
benchmark to assess their effectiveness or lack thereof.84 Goodman and Pegram’s edited 
collection of essays on NHRIs, offers insights on NHRIs’ influence on State compliance with 
international human rights norms and how such compliance brings about social change.85 
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There is consensus among the authors of this collection about NHRIs’ overall importance in 
the promotion and protection of human rights.86  
In his chapter, Meyer argues that to determine the effectiveness of NHRIs requires a 
close look at the relationship that the NHRI has with other actors including those at the 
grassroots and those that are transnational or supranational.87 Further, the concluding 
assertion is that to effectively evaluate an NHRI’s performance or impact requires the use of 
a multi-dimensional approach.88 Such an approach requires a study of “the top-down and 
bottom-up engagements on the international level as well as both vertical impact on rights 
holders and civil society and horizontal engagement and impact with other government 
institutions on the domestic level.”89 These conclusions are useful for the development of the 
research methodology for this study. In addition, this body of work posits that the 
contribution that NHRIs make, no matter how small, is an indication that NHRIs are assisting 
in the entrenchment of global human rights standards.90  
Murray also provides an in-depth analysis of the experiences of African NHRIs within 
the international and regional human rights systems.91 While significant developments about 
the formal recognition of NHRIs within UN processes have occurred since her work was 
published,92 her study identifies important areas of concern for NHRIs. These include the 
development of a rigorous process for assessing an NHRI’s independence; a concise 
understanding of the specific role that NHRIs play and their responsibility as actors at the 
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international level; and developing a clear system for accountability of NHRIs.93 An 
evaluation conducted in 2015 of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights’ 
(OHCHR) support to NHRIs, identified some of these areas that Murray has pointed out as 
those that still require urgent attention to ensure NHRIs’ effectiveness as human rights 
actors.94 While Murray’s study does not address the specific role that NHRIs can play in 
advancing refugee rights, it provides important insights on the potential that NHRIs have to 
influence both the international and regional processes that relate to human rights generally 
and refugee rights in particular, on the condition that the areas of concern are sufficiently 
addressed.  
Steinerte in her contribution to an analysis of regional approaches to the protection of 
asylum seekers focuses on the activities of African NHRIs which range from influencing 
legislation, shaping refugee and asylum policy, strategic litigation, and monitoring places of 
detention.95 She highlights that developments at the international level may provide concise 
opportunities for NHRIs to engage comprehensively with the promotion and protection of 
refugees and asylum seekers.96 She argues that the coming into force of the Optional Protocol 
to the Convention Against Torture (OPCAT), which requires the creation of a national 
preventive mechanism (NPM) in line with the Paris Principles, is an opportunity that NHRIs 
can exploit to strengthen their role in safeguarding refugee rights.97 She suggests that Article 
4 of the OPCAT provides a very broad definition of the term “place of deprivation of liberty” 
which States are required to allow the national preventive mechanism access to.98 As such 
this broad definition would allow NHRIs, should they have this monitoring mandate, to visit 
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places where refugees and migrants may be detained - such as airports, refugee camps and 
immigration detention facilities.99  
She further suggests that since the national preventive mechanism mandate prescribed 
by the OPCAT has a wide scope, it provides the designated entity with the potential to make 
significant contributions to promoting and protecting refugee rights in places where they are 
deprived of their liberty.100 This is particularly important given the widespread practice of 
detaining refugees and asylum seekers.101Noteworthy is that many African NHRIs, even 
where no explicit provision exists in their mandate, have engaged in activities related to the 
prevention of torture and have developed tools and guidelines to support these efforts.102  
Another argument to consider when situating NHRIs within the refugee protection 
regime is the interaction between refugee law and human rights law and its implications for 
NHRIs. Scholarship and practice acknowledges this interaction and as Chetail notes, it is 
important to assess this relationship in order to determine the full range of States’ obligations 
and thus inform their practice towards refugees and asylum seekers.103 This thesis does not 
attempt to elucidate in detail the convergence between these two fields of international law 
nor consider arguments about which branch of law is complementary or secondary to the 
                                                
99. Steinerte, 103. 
100. Steinerte,104; Article 19 of the OPCAT states: 
The national preventive mechanisms shall be granted at a minimum the power: 
(a) To regularly examine the treatment of the persons deprived of their liberty in places of detention as 
defined in article 4, with a view to strengthening, if necessary, their protection against torture and other 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; 
(b) To make recommendations to the relevant authorities with the aim of improving the treatment and 
the conditions of the persons deprived of their liberty and to prevent torture and other cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment, taking into consideration the relevant norms of the United Nations; 
(c) To submit proposals and observations concerning existing or draft legislation. 
101. Alice Edwards, Back to Basics: The Right to Liberty and Security of Person and ‘Alternatives to Detention’ 
of Refugees, Asylum-Seekers, Stateless Persons and Other Migrants. (Geneva: UNHCR, 2011)  
102. For example: OHCHR, Asia Pacific Forum (APF) and Association for the Prevention of Torture (APT), 
Preventing Torture: An Operational Guide for National Human Rights Institutions (Geneva: OHCHR and APF, 
2010); APT, “The Role of National Human Rights Institutions in the Prevention of Torture and Cruel, Inhuman 
and Degrading Treatment or Punishment,” accessed 28 January 2018, https://www.apt.ch/content/files_res/nhri-
position-paper.pdf; NANHRI, Preventing Torture in Africa: Lessons and Experiences from National Human 
Rights Institutions  accessed 28 January 2018, http://www.nanhri.org/tag/association-for-the-prevention-of-
torture-apt/.  
103 Vincent Chetail, “Are Refugee Rights Human Rights? An Unorthodox Questioning of the Relations between 
Refugee Law and Human Rights Law,” in Human Rights and Immigration, ed. Ruth Rubio-Marín (Oxford: 




other.104 Rather, this is discussed with respect to the interpretation of NHRIs’ mandates and is 
pertinent in the discussions of categories of persons in need of protection as defined in Article 
1 (A)(2) of the 1951 Refugee Convention, in particular in the interpretation of the term 
“membership of a social group.”105 
With respect to NHRIs, they have evolved distinctly within the international human 
rights regime and are thus viewed through a traditional human rights lens, to the exclusion of 
refugee law or rights. As discussed in this chapter, NHRIS have recently begun being 
considered as critical actors, separate and distinct from NGOs and other civil society actors, 
with respect to the promotion and protection of human rights in general. They remain at the 
periphery of the refugee protection regime. However, the expansion of the understanding of 
refugee rights to include those derived from human rights instruments provides a basis for 
NHRIs to interpret their human rights mandates to include refugee rights and even broadly, 
migrants’ rights. Indeed, evidence from NHRI practice indicates that NHRIs across the globe 
are promoting and protecting migrants’ rights primarily through interpretation of their 
mandates broadly to encompass rights of all persons within a given State’s territory.106  
However, evidence also indicates that the focus is broad with few having systems in 
place to address refugee rights as distinct from other categories of migrants’ rights.107 This is 
perhaps reflective of the limited or the lack of specialist expertise on forced migration or 
refugee law within NHRI structures. This apparent or perceived lack of specialist expertise in 
refugee law is a challenge especially in the current refugee response context where there is a 
push within the political discourse, to view forced migration in terms of “regular” and 
“irregular” movement, which diminishes the fundamental notion of fear of persecution as a 
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reason for flight. This in turn results in the reluctance of States addressing protection needs 
that may arise among forcibly displaced groups classified as “irregular” migrants.108  
The second aspect of the discussion on the nexus between refugee law and human 
rights law and its implications for NHRIs is, as noted earlier, with respect to the grounds for 
persecution contained within the refugee definition. In terms of the refugee definition, the 
1951 Refugee Convention does not ascribe meaning to the content of the term “membership 
of a particular social group.”109 However, human rights law has influenced the development 
of the term to include gender and sexual orientation as encapsulating membership of a 
particular social group and therefore grounds for a refugee status claim.110 Furthermore, 
States have applied human rights norms to determine that certain forms of violence against 
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women such as rape, other forms of sexual violence and female genital mutilation constitute 
serious harm within the scope of persecution.111  
For NHRIs, especially those with a specialised mandate to promote and protect 
gender equality, this evolution of international refugee law to include a gendered view of the 
refugee experience and the persecutions that may arise on the basis of gender, provides a 
strong basis to advance the rights of refugee and asylum seeking women, girls and sexual 
minorities within the asylum process. Such efforts require an understanding of the 
intersectionality between the refugee/asylum status and other forms of vulnerability that 
particularly face refugees and asylum-seeking women, girls and sexual minorities.  
Kimberlé Crenshaw first proposed intersectionality as a theory to explore and explain 
the overlapping experiences of oppression and discrimination faced by African American 
women by virtue of their race and gender in a society characterised by every day, 
institutionalised racism and patriarchy.112 The theory is defined as “the interconnected nature 
of social categorizations such as race, class, and gender as they apply to a given individual or 
group, regarded as creating overlapping and interdependent systems of discrimination or 
disadvantage.”113 Thus, as Clare describes it: “Gender reaches into disability; disability wraps 
around class; class strains against abuse; abuse snarls into sexual orientation; sexual 
orientation folds on top of race (...) everything finally piling into a single human body.”
114  
The intersectionality theory has  transcended its critical race theory roots and has been 
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developed, adopted or adapted by other academic disciplines and discourses.115 It has also 
faced criticism including that it falls short of being a fully elaborated theory and that it fails to 
define its scope and reach.116 While it is important to note that as with all theories it has its 
strengths and shortcomings, a critical review of the challenges of its theoretical or empirical 
utilisation is beyond the scope of this thesis. Its importance in the context of this thesis is that 
it has since travelled beyond its initial theoretical premise and has found application in 
international human rights law and refugee law, in particular, in relation to women’s human 
rights, the rights of sexual minorities and marginalised groups.117  
Within the refugee discourse, Fiddian-Qasmiyeh describes intersectionality as:  
The recognition that experiences of displacement are framed by a range of 
intersecting and overlapping identity markers [or categories] (including gender, 
ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, and age), and also by a range of power 
structures (such as patriarchy, xenophobia, islamophobia, and homophobia). 
Importantly, the relative significance of these identity markers and related power 
structures shift across time and space, including in processes of displacement. This 
can help us understand –perhaps even predict –that individuals and social groups may 
be vulnerable to, or at risk of, different forms of violence [marginalisation and 
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exclusion] throughout different stages of their journeys to secure international 
protection.118 
Ultimately, intersectionality is principally concerned with how people experience their 
belonging to these categories and the related oppression or empowerment that may result.119 
As such, research within the intersectionality framework is often used as a means of giving a 
voice to oppressed or invisible groups.120 While there is still a gap in research on the 
application of intersectionality in the field of human rights,121 its use provides promise for 
NHRIs in their quest to develop strategic approaches to address systemic human rights 
violations, which often arise in the context of refugee rights.   
Thus, for NHRIs, the intersectionality theory provides an additional lens to 
comprehensively analyse the situation of refugees and asylum seekers, in particular women, 
girls, sexual minorities, persons with disability, and the elderly. This would then serve to 
better inform promotion and protection activities with respect to these categories of refugees 
and asylum seekers. The implications of the convergence between international human rights 
law and international refugee law will be discussed further in chapter 3 and will also be 
utilised in the analysis of the NHRIs’ activities in chapters 6 and 7.  
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1.10 Thesis outline  
This thesis comprises eights chapters. Its layout follows the general humanities and social 
sciences format for the structure of a thesis, that is, the introduction, the literature review, the 
methodology, the presentation, and discussion of the findings and then the conclusion.122 The 
thesis presents findings from South Africa and Kenya as discrete findings and not as a 
comparative study of NHRIs in these countries. The first chapter introduces the problem 
statement and presents the argument for a defined role for national human rights institutions 
within the refugee protection regime at the international, regional and domestic levels. It 
locates national human rights institutions within the argument for reforming the refugee 
protection regime and highlights their important role as agents for diffusion of human rights 
norms and standards at the domestic level. This chapter also elaborates on the purpose, scope 
and significance of the study as well as presents the aims, objectives and research questions 
of the study. In addition, it describes the research methodology employed for this study. 
Chapters two, three and four are based on the desk review. 
Chapter two critically reviews and discusses the theoretical and normative 
frameworks that underpin the evolution of NHRIs. It highlights the role that NHRIs as 
domestic actors can influence State compliance with human rights norms and standards and 
how such influence, can in turn, contribute to compliance with refugee law, norms and 
standards.  
Chapter three examines the international refugee protection regime, State 
responsibility and legally binding obligations. It discusses the normative and implementation 
gaps and identifies NHRIs’ as a bridging mechanism. This provides the contextual 
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background for discussion of their potential for demanding State accountability and 
advancing refugee rights.  
Chapter four provides an overview of the NHRIs in South Africa and Kenya. It 
considers their establishment and functioning, highlights their role within the respective 
domestic refugee protection regimes. This chapter also provides an overview of the 
respective domestic refugee protection regimes and identifies the challenges faced that 
impact on the realisation of refugee rights.   
Chapter five discusses the research methodology employed for this study. It provides 
the background for the discussion of the findings, which follows in chapter six and seven. 
Thus, chapter six discusses the findings with respect to the South African NHRIs and chapter 
seven discusses the findings in relation to the Kenyan NHRIs. Chapter eight presents specific 
conclusions that answer this study’s questions. Recommendations for further research are 
also proposed in this chapter.  
1.11 Conclusion  
This chapter has provided the context for this study. It has presented the arguments for 
reforming the international refugee protection regime to include defining a clear role for 
domestic actors including national human rights institutions within the protection regime. It 
has identified some of the key normative and implementation gaps within international 
refugee protection regime, including the need to view refugee rights as integral components 
of the human rights regime, to situate the argument for a heightened role for NHRIs within 
this regime. Furthermore, it has discussed the arguments that support a defined role for 
NHRIs within the human rights protection regime and the extent to which national human 
rights institutions can influence the diffusion of human rights norms at the domestic level. It 
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The Evolution of National Human Rights Institutions 
2.1 Introduction 
National human rights institutions have evolved rapidly within the international human rights 
system. Their rapid spread has generated interest in understanding their existence and their 
effectiveness as human rights actors. This chapter will critically review and discuss, the 
normative and theoretical frameworks that underpin the evolution of national human rights 
institutions. The first section discusses the definition of a national human rights institution. 
This provides an understanding of their nature and uniqueness as human rights actors. It then 
describes the overview of their historical evolution within the international human rights 
system. This is followed by a discussion on the Paris Principles as the normative framework 
that governs national human rights institutions. The chapter then presents the argument that 
norm-based theories provide a plausible avenue for explaining the spread, and possible 
impact of national human rights institutions. It argues that the socialisation theory is the 
possible theoretical framework for understanding national human rights institutions’ 
evolution and influence on compliance with human rights norms. 
2.2 Defining a national human rights institution 
A national human rights institution is a specific type of institution created to promote and 
protect human rights domestically.1 Although government-funded, national human rights 
institutions are required to function independently.2 They are often described as a bridge 
between international human rights obligations and domestic implementation.3 This is 
because national human rights institutions are in principle designed to oversee a State’s 
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compliance with its human rights obligations. Scholarly debate around the exact definition of 
national human rights institution abounds.4 However, there is neither a singular definition of 
a national human rights institution nor is there a standard prescription of what form and 
structure such institutions should take.5 This lacuna stems largely from the absence of a 
definition of an NHRI in the UN Paris Principles relating to the status of national institutions 
(Paris Principles), which provide the normative framework for establishing an NHRI. 
The widely used definition of NHRIs is one that has been adopted by the OHCHR and 
the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions (GANHRI), the representative 
body of NHRIs at the international level.  Their suggested definition of an NHRI is “a body 
which is established by a Government under the constitution, or by law or decree, the 
functions of which are specifically defined in terms of the promotion and protection of human 
rights.”6 Subsequent OHCHR and GANHRI practice, has led to the understanding that 
NHRIs are those institutions that have the broadest human rights mandate and are accredited 
with an A status.7 Alternative definitions include “a quasi-governmental or statutory 
institution with human rights in its mandate”8 or as suggested by Cardenas that an NHRI is 
“an administrative body responsible for protecting and promoting human rights 
domestically.”9  
Where there is a multiplicity of NHRIs within one State, the GANHRI has historically 
promoted the establishment and accreditation of a single NHRI, favouring the NHRI with the 
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broadest human rights mandate.10 In its General Observations adopted in May 2013, the 
GANHRI Sub-Committee on Accreditation acknowledged and encouraged “the trend 
towards a strong national human rights protection system in a State, by having one 
consolidated and comprehensive national human rights institution.”11 As a result, States such 
as the United Kingdom, which has three NHRIs accredited with the A status, remain the 
exception rather than the norm.12 
Reif, however, cautions against employing only a conservative definition of an 
NHRI.13 Some States have other national-level thematic human rights institutions involved in 
human rights promotion and protection such as equality bodies and children’s rights 
commissioners.  These institutions can also influence human rights outcomes, and need to be 
considered when conducting research on human rights especially within the domestic 
context.14 This study considers this. While both South Africa and Kenya have established 
national human rights institutions that are designated A-status (fully compliant with the Paris 
Principles), due regard is given to other State institutions with a human rights mandate - in so 
far as their work relates to the promotion and protection of refugee rights.  
 
2.3 Historical overview of the evolution of NHRIs  
Pohjolainen correlates the development of NHRIs within the international human rights law 
discourse with the gradual strengthening of the international human rights regime.15 She 
provides a detailed account of the evolution of NHRIs in three phases: introduction of the 
idea (1946-1978), popularization of the concept of NHRIs (1978-1990) and expansion of 
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NHRIs (from 1990 onwards).16 These phases were influenced by the adoption of three key 
UN resolutions. In 1962, the UN Commission on Human Rights adopted a resolution that 
recommended the establishment of national human rights bodies by States.17 These 
institutions would take the form of a national advisory body or local committees tasked with 
addressing human rights concerns.18 They would examine the human rights situation within 
their respective States, offer advice to the government, and promote a culture of human 
rights.19 This resolution built on the UN Economic and Social Council’s 1946 resolution, 
which encouraged States to establish local human rights committees to promote human rights 
norms.20 At that time, however, there was reluctance among the Member States to establish 
such institutions as many considered such matters domestic and at the States’ discretion. 21  
  In 1978, the UN Commission on Human Rights adopted a resolution on “national 
institutions in the field of human rights.”22 Its objective was to “provide a guideline for the 
structure and function of national institutions for the protection of human rights.”23 Following 
the resolution’s adoption, the UN held the first seminar on national institutions where 
Member States discussed the guidelines and shared information on existing national 
institutions, such as anti-discrimination commissions and ombudsman offices.24 This was the 
first gathering that used the term “national human rights institutions” and standardized the 
dual NHRI functions of promotion and protection.25 In the subsequent decade, following the 
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adoption of the 1978 resolution, the United Nations prepared a series of reports on the 
viability of national institutions as mechanisms for the promotion and protection of human 
rights.26  
The findings from these reports provided the basis for the 1991“UN International 
Workshop on National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights,” held 
in Paris.27 This workshop led to the drafting of guiding principles on national institutions for 
the promotion and protection of human rights.28 These were eventually adopted and endorsed 
by the UN as the “Paris Principles” in 1993.29 Thus, the 1990s proved seminal for NHRIs. 
The idea of setting up NHRIs as an essential component of the domestic human rights system 
became widely accepted. There was, however, no formal agreement on the definition of an 
NHRI or a standard model for the design of such institutions. As a result, States had and 
continue to have considerable autonomy to determine which institutional design best suits 
their particular context. This means that NHRIs vary significantly in design, role and 
operation across different States.30 This divergence in form and function also has implications 
for the potential and nature of their influence on human rights compliance. This is discussed 
below.  
NHRIs can be grouped into four broad categories or types: ombudsman, human rights 
commissions, human rights research institutes, and the hybrid institutions.31 The roots of the 
modern NHRI in terms of structure and mandate can be traced back to the classical 
ombudsman and the early commissions of inquiry.32 The classical ombudsman emerged in 
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27 GANHRI, “25th Anniversary of the Paris Principles,” accessed 9 February 2018, 
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28 GANHRI, “25th Anniversary of the Paris Principles.  
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Institutions. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2015), 5-6. 
31 Thomas Pegram, “Diffusion across Political Systems,” 732-737. 




Sweden in 1809 and centred on a single individual elected by Parliament.33 The Ombudsman 
was empowered to investigate and if necessary, prosecute grievances relating to legality and 
administrative fairness lodged against the government.34 A constitutional revision in 1974 
resulted in the inclusion of a human rights mandate within the Swedish Ombudsman’s 
functions35 Similarly across Europe, existing classical ombudsman institutions in Denmark, 
Finland, Norway and the Netherlands have had their mandates broadened to include human 
rights. 36 The modern variant of this model is the human rights ombudsman or hybrid model.  
In Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe, rather than having a multiplicity of 
institutions within a single jurisdiction, States tend to establish the so-called hybrid NHRI 
model.37 This model incorporates elements of both the ombudsman and human rights 
commission. These institutions undertake two roles: “to promote and protect human rights” 
and “to monitor government administration.”38 Its structure and composition usually 
resembles the classical ombudsman model.39 This institution usually has an express human 
rights mandate, an oversight over administrative fairness, and a legality function.40 It may 
also have jurisdiction over corruption and electoral monitoring.41 Such institutions also 
engage in other activities such as research and documentation, may perform an advisory 
function and conduct educational activities.42 The common powers include investigation and 
court-referral with others having prosecutorial authority and jurisdiction over private 
entities.43  
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The human rights commission is modelled around the classical commission of inquiry 
model.44 The classical commission is “a body established by government for a defined period 
to inquire into matters of public concern and to advise government on policy options.”45 The 
human rights commissions have a broad human rights mandate, which usually includes 
advisory, research, educational and investigative functions.46 They do not necessarily have a 
complaints handling function, though many possess this function.47 They are composed of 
members appointed by the executive or legislature.48 The human rights commission is the 
model that best fits the Paris Principles. 
There is, however, a wide spectrum within the human rights commission model.49 
Some models are vested with strong remedial powers to address individual complaints (such 
as the human rights commissions in Uganda, Namibia and Ghana).50  Others have more 
simplified functions and act as government advisory bodies or research institutes with a 
strong promotional human rights mandate (such as the NHRIs in France, Denmark, Germany 
and Norway).51 The latter NHRIs are normally referred to as research institutes or 
consultative commissions. They have an advisory or promotional human rights mandate but 
do not a protection mandate, as they do not have powers to investigate, or to handle 
individual complaints.52  
In Africa, the dominant NHRI model is the human rights commission.53 Nonetheless, 
the structures, functions and powers vary widely across countries. The two main NHRIs that 
are the focus of this study adopt the human rights commission model and are similar in 
structure and functions. These aspects will be elaborated on in Chapter Four of this thesis.  
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The diversity in function and structure of these institutions, adds to the complexity of 
understanding them. Practice at the international level indicates an increasing reliance on the 
GANHRI’s accreditation process to determine which national human rights institution 
“qualifies” as such.  According to Reif, the GANHRI’s accreditation process gives 
preferential status only to national-level human rights commissions and human rights 
ombudsman institutions.54 This is to the exclusion of other national institutions with similar 
functions.55 This process, she argues, is used to implement the GANHRI’s gatekeeping role, 
which has implications for NHRIs’ participation and oversight functions at the international 
level.56 It also influences the notion of institutional effectiveness.57  
The GANHRI’s accreditation process implies that compliance with the Paris 
Principles indicates that an NHRI is functionally and structurally effective, and thus best 
suited for human rights promotion and protection. This may not necessarily be the case, as 
factors such as political and social context may influence an NHRI’s effectiveness. The Paris 
Principles do not provide for such considerations in assessing NHRIs.58 In addition, the 
exclusion of other national or local human rights bodies from the international human rights 
processes, may limit the understanding of a State’s implementation of and compliance with 
its human rights obligations.59 It may also raise contradictions of formal recognition in the 
case where international human rights mechanisms encourage the establishment of such 
thematic institutions.60  
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2.3.1 NHRIs in Africa and refugee rights’ promotion and protection 
In Africa, the rapid spread of national human rights institutions occurred from the 1990s 
onwards.61 The trajectory of the evolution of NHRIs in Africa is closely linked to the 
renewal, in the 1990s, of the consideration of human rights as integral to political processes.62 
In addition, donor support for the creation of such institutions as part of political reforms 
served to provide further impetus to African governments to establish NHRIs.63 Regardless of 
the political agenda behind the creation of the NHRIs in Africa, their existence was linked to 
the promotion and protection of human rights broadly and not with specific rights or group 
rights.  
In fact, there is a normative basis for the establishment of NHRIs in the region. 
Article 26 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights stipulates that States Parties 
shall "allow the establishment and improvement of appropriate national institutions entrusted 
with the promotion and protection of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the present 
Charter."64 This was reinforced by the formal inclusion of NHRIs within the African human 
rights architecture through the African Commission’s 1998 resolution on the Granting of 
Observer Status to National Human Rights Institutions in Africa (NHRI resolution).65 The 
resolution was adopted on the basis of Article 45(1)(c) of the African Charter, which enjoins 
the African Commission to work with such institutions.66  
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The NHRI resolution noted the “importance of the role of national institutions in the 
promotion and protection of human rights and in creating public awareness in Africa with 
regard to the institutional defence of human rights.”67 The adoption of this resolution allows 
NHRIs to attend the African Commission’s sessions, to participate in relevant discussions 
and submit proposals to it.68 In return, NHRIs are required to submit a biennial activity report 
and assist the African Commission in promoting and protecting human rights at the national 
level.69 Despite this express basis for interaction, the relationship between the African 
Commission and NHRIs is perceived as open but has not evolved substantively beyond 
granting the affiliate status.70  
One of the primary reasons is the absence of clarity about the role and relationship 
that the affiliate status confers upon NHRIs.71  This has led to ambiguity in the manner of 
interaction between the African Commission and NHRIs.72 There are other challenges such 
as the availability of resources, the lack of clarity on the role that NHRIs should play in the 
State reporting process either at the State report drafting stage or when the State comes under 
review, and the lack of understanding of the regional mechanism itself, to name a few.73 An 
in-depth analysis of these is beyond the scope of this thesis, save to say that these will have a 
bearing on how effectively NHRIs can engage at the regional level on any human rights 
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issue. It is, however, important to note that within the context of this thesis, the African 
Commission created a special mechanism for refugee rights promotion. This is the Special 
Rapporteur on Refugees, Refugees, Asylum Seekers, Internally Displaced Persons and 
Migrants in Africa.74 A discussion on the opportunities that this special mechanism presents 
for NHRIs will be presented in chapter 3. 
In terms of form and structure, there is diversity among NHRIs in Africa that reflects 
the broad range that is evident in other parts of the globe. NHRIs in Africa are established 
constitutionally, through a legislative act or by decree. Similarly, their mandates vary widely 
with differences in the breadth of their mandates and the powers vested upon them. For 
instance, the Ugandan Human Rights Commission has the powers to convene a human rights 
court to adjudicate complaints while most other NHRIs offer recommendations.  Some 
jurisdictions in Africa have a multiplicity of national institutions or other governmental 
organs set up to advance group rights or other specified rights.  
Few NHRIs in Africa have been established with a mandate that includes explicit 
reference to promote and protect specific rights such as socio-economic rights or group 
rights.75 What is pertinent within the scope of this thesis is the extent to which African 
NHRIs apply their mandates to the promotion and protection of refugee rights. While there is 
paucity in empirical evidence about NHRIs in Africa and the advancement of refugee rights, 
two studies were identified that provide an overview of their engagement. A study on the 
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status of African NHRIs found that two NHRIs included in the sample of nine had identified 
either refugee rights or migrants as an emerging area of work.76  
Furthermore, an analysis of the mandates of eastern and southern Africa NHRIs found 
that only the National Human Rights Commission of Rwanda (NHRC) has an explicit 
mandate to promote and protect the rights of refugees77 and that the Zimbabwe Human Rights 
Commission (ZHRC) has an explicit mandate with respect to the prevention of torture in 
refugee camps.78 However, despite the apparent lack of explicit mandates, several NHRIs 
have formally designated either “refugees” or “migrants” as a thematic area of work or have 
undertaken activities with respect to these categories of persons and others such as “asylum 
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77 Charles M Fombad (ed.), Compendium of documents on National Human Rights Institutions in eastern and 
southern Africa, (Pretoria: Pretoria University Press, 2019), 586, 592-593, 598. This explicit function was 
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seekers” and “stateless persons.”79 The Malawi Human Rights Commission has also extended 
its role in torture prevention to include monitoring refugee camps.80 
While the studies cited above do not fully interrogate the refugee rights’ work 
undertaken by the NHRIs, the evidence they provide indicate that their mandates have either 
explicitly or implicitly included considerations for the importance of promoting and 
protecting refugee rights. This is despite having been established to focus on the rights 
considered to fall neatly within the scope of traditional international human rights law. 
Interestingly, the Zimbabwean Human Rights Commission is the only NHRI in the study that 
has the explicit protection of refugee rights within its founding legislation.81 The Rwandan 
NHRC’s mandate was amended twice to include and further expound on its responsibility 
with respect to refugee rights’ promotion and protection.82 Therefore, it may be useful to 
examine if having an explicit refugee rights’ mandate has a direct impact on an NHRI’s 
effectiveness on promoting and protecting these rights.  
There are challenges with this as there is a dearth of literature on the measurement of 
the impact that NHRIs may have on the promotion and protection of human rights in 
general.83 The large body of work on NHRIs generally reports on activities undertaken or the 
role that NHRIs could play given their mandates and performance expectations as drawn 
against the Paris Principles. Therefore, while it is encouraging that there are NHRIs in Africa 
with explicit mandates for the promotion and protection of refugee rights, it is difficult to 
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determine if this has a higher degree of impact on the realisation of refugee rights without 
conducting an empirical evaluation.84  
Nonetheless, with the presence of an explicit mandate for refugee rights’ promotion 
and protection, one can assume that the NHRI would be better placed to allocate necessary 
resources to the promotion and protection of refugee rights. Assuming also that the 
operational context allows the NHRI to engage with these rights, then there is a higher 
likelihood that these rights would have a prominent place on the NHRI’s agenda.85 In turn, 
this may determine the extent to which the NHRI engages with these rights at the domestic, 
regional and international levels to influence the advancement of refugee rights.86  
The crux of this thesis is that if NHRIs can influence positive outcomes for State 
obligations with respect to refugee rights at the domestic levels, then given their position as a 
link between the domestic and international human rights levels, they may play a critical role 
within the regional and international processes and mechanisms with respect to refugee 
rights. Thus, the perception of the role that NHRIs can play needs to be viewed with a two-
pronged lens - one that considers a top-down implementation processes and the other that 
considers the bottom-up implementation process.  The process through which NHRIs 
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2.4 Paris Principles: The normative framework for NHRIs 
The normative framework governing national human rights institutions derives from the Paris 
Principles. It is the Paris Principles that provide NHRIs part of their legitimacy within the 
international human rights framework.87 The Paris Principles provide a broad normative 
framework for the status, powers and functioning of NHRIs. These are classified along four 
categories: competence and responsibilities, composition and guarantees of independence and 
pluralism, methods and operation and principles regarding the status of quasi-judicial 
competence.88  
The Paris Principles are a set of recommendations and are not legally binding on 
States. However, since their adoption, they have gained substantial political and legal 
authority.89 This is due to the extent to which they have been widely accepted and promoted 
at the international, regional and national levels.90  At the international level, the UN has 
since the late 1980s adopted annual resolutions to encourage Member States to establish and 
strengthen NHRIs in line with the Paris Principles.91 One of the most significant was the 2015 
UN General Assembly resolution on national institutions for the promotion and protection of 
human rights.92 This resolution called for the formal recognition, in all UN processes and 
mechanisms, of NHRIs that are compliant with the Paris Principles.93 
Within the UN, the treaty bodies have also played an important role in giving the 
Paris Principles legitimacy. Treaty bodies have regularly recommended that States establish 
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national institutions, in compliance with the Paris Principles, to ensure the effective 
implementation of treaty obligations.94 For instance, the Committee on the Elimination of 
Racial Discrimination (CERD) adopted “General Recommendation 17 on the establishment 
of national institutions to facilitate the implementation of the Convention.”95 It recommends 
that States should “establish national commissions or other appropriate bodies… taking the 
Paris Principles into account.”96 The Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC) adopted a 
comprehensive General Comment on national institutions in 2002.97 The General Comment 
elaborated the application of the Paris Principles in the context of the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child.98  
The Committee in its interpretation of Article 4 of the Convention deems the 
establishment of NHRIs as part of the State’s treaty obligations.99 The Comment stipulates 
further, that such institutions should be established in compliance with the Paris Principles.100 
Treaty bodies such as the Human Rights Committee (HRC) and the Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) have also developed formal 
relationships with NHRIs.101 These include formal working methods, formal cooperation 
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papers or statements on engagement with NHRIs that are complaint with the Paris Principles. 
These documents set out the role of NHRIs in their independent capacity in the work of the 
respective treaty body and recognise that their role differs from yet remains complementary 
to that of States and CSOs.102  
The reference to the Paris Principles in recent human rights treaties has also enhanced 
their legitimacy and provided a more nuanced legal standing.103 The Optional Protocol to the 
International Covenant Against Torture (OPCAT), is the first international legal instrument to 
require the creation of a national institution (referred to as a National Preventive Mechanism 
(NPM)) to ensure State compliance with the treaty obligations.104 The Protocol in Article 18 
(4) urges States to give due regard to the Paris Principles when creating the NPM.105 
Furthermore, the characteristics of the national preventive mechanism that the Protocol 
obliges States to establish are also outlined in the Paris Principles.106 Similarly, the 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) requires States to consider the 
Paris Principles when “maintaining, strengthening, designating or establishing an 
independent mechanism to promote, protect and monitor implementation of the 
Convention”.107  
For NHRIs, compliance with the Paris Principles may determine their membership 
within their international and regional networks. These networks have been established to 
promote their role and to build their capacity to effectively discharge their mandates.108 The 
GANHRI adopted compliance with the Paris Principles as a criterion for membership, which 
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is granted on a hierarchical basis based on compliance. Through a procedure of accreditation 
conducted by its Sub-Committee on Accreditation, NHRIs are granted a status. This status 
reflects the extent of their compliance with the Paris Principles. An institution is granted A-
status if it is deemed to be fully complaint with the Paris Principles. NHRIs in partial 
compliance are awarded B-status and are granted an observer status. Those that do not 
comply do not receive an accreditation status and they do not have any privileges within the 
GANHRI. The A-status not only grants an institution the right of membership, it also 
guarantees the right to vote. Within the UN processes, A-status national human rights 
institutions can also participate in sessions of the Human Rights Council. With the adoption 
of the 2015 UN General Assembly NHRI resolution, the opportunities for formal engagement 
with all the UN processes, beyond the human rights mechanisms, will further open up spaces 
for A-status NHRIs to engage.109  
The NHRI regional networks have varied requirements for membership. The Asia 
Pacific Forum of National Human Rights Institutions (APF) has a stringent inclusion process. 
The APF requires compliance with the Paris Principles before membership can be 
considered.110 The Network of African National Human Rights Institutions (NANHRI) on the 
other hand, is less stringent in its membership criteria. Membership is open to an institution, 
which fits the UN definition of an NHRI, irrespective of its accreditation status.111 Despite 
the differences in the membership criteria, the regional networks strive to promote 
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2.5 Norm dynamics: A theoretical framework for understanding the emergence 
and spread of NHRIs  
As outlined above, the Paris Principles and the concept of NHRIs have become widely 
known and accepted within the international human rights regime and can thus be considered 
a “norm.” A norm is defined as “a standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given 
identity.” 112 There is no single theory that has been applied to understand why NHRIs have 
become a norm within the international human rights regime. However, there is a growing 
body of work postulating various theories to explain the evolution and rapid spread of 
NHRIs. These theories are drawn largely from the study of norms, using inter-related 
international relations theories such as constructivism, institutionalism, compliance and 
socialisation.113 These theories will be described briefly below. This will be followed by a 
detailed discussion on the socialisation theory as the theoretical framework for understanding 
the evolution of national human rights institutions.  
According to Reus-Smit, constructivism “focuses on ideas of norms, the development 
of structures and the relationship between actors and these structures as well as how identity 
influences actions and behaviour amongst and between actors.”114 It also articulates how 
norms determine an actor’s attributes.115 Thus, constructivism looks at “how norms develop, 
who promotes these norms, and who sets up different norms from the ones currently 
set.”116 A key concept in constructivism is “internalisation” which is defined as the point at 
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which a norm is so deeply ingrained that it is taken for granted.117 Constructivism focuses on 
persuasion as the process through which internalisation occurs.118  
Institutionalism theory has a number of variants but common within the theory is sets 
of formal rules, norms and beliefs which organizations and individuals are expected to 
follow.119 The means through which institutions exert influence to cause change differs 
widely.120 One school of thought (new institutionalism) suggests that normative pressures 
influence organizations.121 These influences are either external or internal and may be overt 
or subtle. Change due to these influences may occur through coercion, mimicry, or 
conformance.122 The change that occurs is simply accepted or is scrutinised and deemed 
appropriate. As with other norm-based theories, the end stage is internalisation. This is when 
the accepted norm is taken for granted. 
Compliance theory, as its name suggests, attempts to explain why States comply with 
international obligations. According to Delcourt, there are four main arguments that have 
been put forward to explain State compliance with international law, norms, and standards.123 
The managerial model suggests that States comply because they view the international 
system from a cooperative problem-solving approach.124 States thus comply because they are 
persuaded to “adhere to a dynamic created by the regime to which they belong.”125 In the 
legitimacy model, compliance lies in States’ perception of the inherent qualities of the rules 
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particularly as they relate to fairness.126 States comply through a process of reflexive 
interaction.127 This leads to the general perception that the law is fair because it allocates 
resources in an equitable fashion and the actors have equal access to law making.128 
According to Guzman, the reputational model argues that State compliance occurs because of 
fear of sanctions and the high value that States place on reputation.129 He describes the 
transnational theory as one, which posits that compliance is due to the internalisation of 
international legal rules.130 As transnational entities interact, patterns of behaviour and norms 
emerge.131 These norms are then adopted, resulting in their assimilation within a State’s 
domestic legal institutions, thereby leading to compliance.132  
An important actor that compliance theory considers in the compliance process is that 
of domestic institutions. Slaughter laid the groundwork for the discussion on the role of 
domestic judicial institutions in compliance with international law.133 She suggests that 
independent judicial institutions may influence compliance through empowering citizens to 
legally challenge governments’ action or inaction.134 They also have the authority to evaluate 
government practice against existing law, as they base their rulings on legal principles.135  
NHRIs, as domestic actors, can play a similar role in influencing State compliance with 
international obligations.  
The socialisation theory is based on the socialisation process. Siegal defines this as 
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“the process by which people learn to adopt the norms, values, attitudes and behaviour 
accepted and practiced by the on-going system."136 The socialisation process results in the 
complete acceptance of the norm such that it becomes taken for granted (internalisation).137 
The socialization process occurs through a variety of mechanisms.138 Once internalisation 
occurs, the norms become difficult to change and the benefits of compliance are calculated in 
abstract social terms, rather than concrete consequential terms.139  
Socialisation theory argues that behavioural change in a State, and the conditions 
under which such change occurs, are influenced by normative rather than coercive factors -
and is perhaps the most relevant in the discussion on national human rights institutions.140 It 
proposes distinct theories or processes through which the international system exerts 
influence on the State. These are persuasion and acculturation.141 Both persuasion and 
acculturation theories assume that States are social entities. As such, their identities are 
shaped by the institutionalised norms, values and ideas of the social environment in which 
they operate.142 However, the process through which the international system influences 
States differs significantly between these two theories.  
Acculturation refers to the “general process by which actors adopt the beliefs and 
behavioural patterns of the surrounding culture.”143 Unlike persuasion, acculturation is not 
necessarily an active process. The actor perceives that an important group holds a certain 
                                                
136 Johnston, “Treating International Institutions,” 495.  
137 Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics,” 887-917. 
138 Finnemore and Sikkink, 904. 
139 Finnemore and Sikkink, 895-896, 898, 904. 
140 Julie Meritus, “Evaluating NHRIs: Considering Structure, Mandate and Impact,” in Ryan Goodman and 
Thomas Pegram, Human Rights, State Conformity and Social Change: Assessing National Human Rights 
Institutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 85-89. 
141 These are the dominant approaches to norm diffusion but there is no consensus on the processes within the 
field due to underlying ideological differences. For instance, constructivists focus on persuasion; other theorists 
argue that this includes coercion (Pegram) or social influence (Johnston) or a combination of two or more of 
such processes (Goodman &Jinks). These processes are in turn influenced by micro-processes for instance for 
acculturation proposes copying, emulation, inspiration or mimicry.  
142 Julie Meritus, “Evaluating NHRIs: Considering Structure,” 85-89.  
143 Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks, “How to influence States: Socialisation and International Human Rights 




belief and due to material costs and benefits, decides to subscribe to that belief or position.144 
Therefore, acculturation does not actually involve agreeing with the merits of the norm, and 
may thus result in outward conformity without private acceptance or corresponding changes 
in practice.145 Goodman and Jinks conclude that the acculturation process is neutral and as a 
result, “under different conditions, it may yield normatively attractive, unattractive or 
ambiguous results.”146  
Persuasion, on the other hand, “involves the inculcation of norms so that the one side 
ends up convinced of the truth, validity or appropriateness of the norm, belief or practice.”147 
Persuasion, unlike acculturation, is an active process of engagement between and among 
actors. It is characterized by “argument and deliberation in an effort to bring about 
change.”148 According to Goodman and Jinks, in the persuasion theory, international law 
“influences State behaviour through processes of social learning and other forms of 
information conveyance.”149 Goodman and Jinks argue that “persuasion is not simply a 
process of manipulating exogenous incentives to elicit desired behaviour from the other 
side.”150 It requires active engagement with the other actor until change in behaviour or 
attitude occurs.151 Thus, persuaded actors accept and internalize the new norms and ideas and 
make adjustments in order to comply with the new norms.152 In this process there is no overt 
coercion that occurs, rather the “actors actively assess the content of the particular message 
and change their minds.”153  
Finnemore and Sikkink, in their work on the influence of norms, elaborate on the 
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persuasion process by proposing a three-stage process through which norm influence 
occurs.154 This three-stage process is referred to as the norm life cycle. The first stage they 
identify is norm emergence.155 In this stage, a norm is introduced by what they term norm 
entrepreneurs.156 Norm entrepreneurs are “individuals (or organisations or States) who are 
dissatisfied with the existing social context and advocate different ideas about appropriate 
behaviour from platforms that give their ideas credence.”157 These platforms could be 
conferences and workshops. The norm entrepreneurs try to persuade a sufficient number of 
States (norm leaders) to embrace new norms.158 At the point which a critical mass of States 
adopt a norm, then the norm will be deemed as accepted.159 Thus the second stage, 
Finnemore and Sikkink argue, is characterised by norm leaders attempting to socialize other 
States to follow the norm. This process is referred to as a norm cascade.160 Simply stated, the 
norm cascades (diffuses) through the rest of the States and becomes rapidly and widely 
accepted.  
Different processes for the diffusion of a norm include acculturation and persuasion as 
discussed above.161 Even though the mechanisms for norm acceptance may vary, the result is 
that norms shape the behaviour of States. The third stage is the extreme of a norm cascade, 
“where norms become so widely accepted that they are internalized by actors and achieve a 
“taken-for-granted” quality that makes conformance with the norm almost automatic.”162 At 
this point, the norm is accepted almost without question.  
The above discussion on the norm life cycle provides a suitable framework with 
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which to explain the spread of national human rights institutions. Stage one, which deals with 
norm emergence, began in the 1940s with the adoption of the ECOSOC resolution that 
encouraged States to consider establishing national committees for human rights. This stage 
stretches through the 1980s. During this period, there were occasional deliberations on 
NHRIs. The UN adopted intermittent resolutions, reports and recommendations for States to 
consider establishing NHRIs. The norm entrepreneurs (the UN, NGOs and the few States 
with existing NHRIs) were persuading other States about the favourability of adopting 
national mechanisms to support the implementation of international human rights norms and 
standards. Thus, following the 1978 seminar on NHRIs mentioned above in the NHRI 
evolution process, a handful of States adopted NHRIs. 
The UN (mainly ECOSOC and the Commission on Human Rights), Member States, 
and non-governmental organisations, acting as norm entrepreneurs, continued to push the 
idea for the adoption of NHRIs by States. The tipping point, resulting in the norm cascade, 
occurred in 1993 following the adoption of Paris Principles and the Vienna Declaration and 
Programme of Action. The catalyst was the 1991 UN Workshop on NHRIs in Paris where the 
Paris Principles were drafted. As such, the 1990s was characterised with the rapid expansion 
of NHRIs across all regions. For example, in 1990, only one State adopted an NHRI 
(Namibia) compared to the period between 1991 and 1993 where eighteen States adopted 
NHRIs.163 The current number stands at 123 NHRIs.164  
The internalisation process can also be deemed to have occurred. For instance, the 
Paris Principles and NHRIs are commonly referred to in UN processes, resolutions and 
reports. Treaty bodies now also rely on information from NHRIs when considering State 
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compliance with international legal obligations.  UN processes and mechanisms have 
formalized their relationship with national human rights institutions, and almost as a given, 
consider it imperative to work closely with NHRIs. Recently concluded human rights treaties 
refer to the Paris Principles, and thus NHRIs, as the standard for the establishment of 
domestic oversight bodies.  
 
2.5.1 NHRIs and State compliance  
The socialisation theory can also be applied to explain NHRIs’ influence on human rights 
compliance. Through a complex interplay of influencing mechanisms, NHRIs can contribute 
to the socialisation process of human rights norms within the State. The impact of such a role 
on State compliance (and eventual implementation of human rights) may be direct or indirect 
and may vary, depending on whether the mandate is protective or promotional or both.165 
From the promotion aspect, Goodman and Pegram suggest that national human rights 
institutions can influence change in two ways. They can deepen the diffusion of international 
human rights norms by acting as domestic “receptor sites” for the transmission to occur-
where receptor sites are institutions or structures which interact with the international system 
and transmit information from the international system to domestic actors.166 They can also 
serve as agents in the translation of international norms in a manner that reflects national 
contexts.167  
Cardenas argues that NHRIs can achieve these through exercising their promotional 
mandate through the following means.168 As institutions situated in the nexus between the 
international human rights system and the domestic level, NHRIs can, through persuasion, 
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bring State actors to an understanding that human rights compliance is appropriate.169 
Activities NHRIs engage in to promote human rights may contribute to this. Such activities, 
Cardenas suggests, may include agenda setting, where human rights issues are placed on 
local and national agendas and public awareness activities.170 Cardenas concludes that such 
human rights promotion activities serve to legitimate human rights norms and dissuade from 
norm violations.171  
At the State level, NHRIs can provide human rights training to State officials to 
promote an understanding of the appropriateness of human rights compliance, and in turn 
lead to a change in State practices.172 NHRIs can also serve as intermediaries in the 
translation of global norms in a manner that reflects the domestic context.173 By targeting 
civil society or ordinary people, Cardenas argues that NHRIs can, as mobilizing agents, 
embed human rights norms in every day social practices which may in turn lead to rising 
demands and claims for human rights protection.174   
NHRIs’ protective mandate can also be utilized to improve a State’s compliance with 
its human rights obligations. For instance, Cardenas suggests that NHRIs can through fact-
finding, generate evidence of human rights violations. Such information can then be 
presented to the international human rights mechanisms to apply pressure on a non-
complying State to remedy the violations.175 Additionally, NHRIs can use the international 
and regional human rights mechanisms to pressure States to comply with international human 
rights norms.176 They can also, through the individual complaints handling procedure, 
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demand State accountability where human rights are violated.177 Furthermore, Cardenas 
suggests, that NHRIs can assist human rights victims in seeking legal redress and they may 
participate in legal proceedings including litigation and contribute to the overall development 
of human rights jurisprudence.178 NHRIs can therefore contribute, both directly and 
indirectly, to State compliance with and implementation of human rights norms and 
standards.  
The socialisation theory discussed above would thus support the argument that NHRIs 
can influence the implementation of international refugee law norms and standards at the 
national level through activities undertaken in accordance with their promotional and 
protection mandates. In addition, NHRIs may inform the development of refugee law through 
their participation, as accountability mechanisms, at international and regional levels.  
 
2.6 Conclusion 
As outlined in this Chapter, NHRIs feature uniquely in the international, regional and 
domestic human rights landscapes. They serve a bridging role between international norms 
and their domestic implementation. Their rapid global expansion acknowledges the important 
role that they can play in promoting and protecting human rights at all levels.  The role that 
NHRIs can play also rests on the understanding that domestic change and reform cannot 
happen without human rights norms and standards being embedded within State structures. It 
is precisely the understanding of norms, and how they influence change, that may provide an 
understanding of why NHRIs exist in such numbers today and the extent and processes 
through which they influence change to promote States’ compliance with international 
obligations, including those that relate to refugee rights.  
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Chapter 3 
An Overview of the International Refugee Protection Regime: Implications for National 
Human Rights Institutions  
3.1 Introduction 
The international refugee protection regime has evolved to include a myriad of legal 
instruments, institutions and mechanisms. In its infancy, it was merely a series of agreements, 
which confirmed States acceptance to cooperate to deal with refugees. It has evolved to 
include binding obligations on States to protect refugees and guarantee them specific rights. 
The UN has been the primary actor in promoting refugee protection. However, the process of 
implementation of its key legal instruments has revealed normative and implementation gaps 
that hamper the effective protection of refugee rights. This has resulted in calls for the 
revitalisation of the protection regime. It is within this context, that a role for NHRIs can be 
justified.  
Thus, having previously discussed the nature and evolution of NHRIs, this chapter 
provides the background for considering the role of NHRIs within the refugee protection 
regime. It first provides the historical evolution of the international protection regime from 
the League of Nations to the UN. It outlines States’ obligations as well as refugee rights and 
duties under the 1951 Convention. The UNHCR’s mandate and responsibilities are then 
considered. The chapter then discusses the key features of the African refugee instrument and 
its contribution to the normative development of refugee protection.  
A discussion on the relationship between human rights and refugee protection 
follows. This includes an exploration of the opportunities that international and regional 
human rights mechanisms present for refugee protection. The focus at the regional level will 
be on the African human rights mechanisms, given the topic of this thesis. The chapter then 
outlines the key normative and implementation gaps that impede the effectiveness of the 





refugee protection regime is explored throughout the chapter.  
3.2 Historical background: The League of Nations 
The foundations of the international refugee protection regime can be traced back to the 
League of Nations (the League).1 The League’s legal and institutional actions with respect to 
refugees initially focused on Russian and Armenian refugees, but broadened with the 
emergence of newer refugee categories in the 1920s and 1930s.2 In 1921, it appointed the 
first High Commissioner for Refugees, Dr Fridjthof Nansen, who was tasked with providing 
material assistance and legal and political protection to Russian refugees.3 Upon his death in 
1930, the League appointed a series of High Commissioners and created various successive 
institutions to continue his work.  
The League also concluded various non-binding agreements, referred to as 
“arrangements,” that sought to standardise legal protection primarily for Russian and 
Armenian refugees.4 These arrangements included the international recognition of the League 
of Nations’ travel documents provided to refugees. These documents were the functional 
equivalent of national travel documents and were commonly known as the ‘Nansen 
passport.”5 In 1928, the League adopted a set of minimum standards for the recognition and 
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treatment of Russian and Armenian refugees (the1928 Arrangement).6 Though not binding, 
this was the initial agreement to standardise a range of rights for refugees.7 
In 1933, the League adopted the Convention Relating to the International Status of 
Refugees. This was the first binding and comprehensive legal framework for refugees. It 
codified most of the rights covered under the 1928 Arrangement.8 Though limited in its 
scope, it offered refugees legal protection and guaranteed some basic civil and economic 
rights.9 Crucially, it was the first instrument to oblige States to respect the principle of non-
refoulement, a right that is now considered fundamental to refugee law.10 It also guaranteed 
refugee rights, either absolutely, or in equal terms with citizens of the State party.11 An 
additional convention seeking to provide meaningful protection to refugees from Germany 
was adopted in 1938.12 This was the “Convention concerning the Status of Refugees coming 
from Germany.”13 It mirrored the provisions of the 1933 Convention but included two new 
provisions. The first provision was Article 15, which promoted the resettlement of refugees 
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outside of Europe.14 The other was Article 25, which provided States with the option of 
renouncing the treaty without notice. These two provisions were included in an attempt to 
increase States’ willingness to accept refugees and provide them with similar standards of 
care as those applicable to nationals.15 Article 15’s importance lies in the establishment of the 
notion of resettlement in “third countries” as a viable option for the long-term protection of 
refugees. This principle is still promoted by the UNHCR.16  
As Hathaway points out, the early refugee agreements had their limitations but 
provided an important basis for the development of the current international refugee 
protection regime (and international human rights law).17 Normatively, they introduced two 
key concepts. The first was the idea of voluntary acceptance of international supervision of 
State compliance with human rights norms and standards.18 The second was the substance of 
human rights guaranteed to aliens.19 In sum, through the series of agreements, States 
expanded the general principles of the international law concerning aliens, to meet the needs 
of refugees,20 including for instance, waiving reciprocity and guaranteeing basic civil and 
socioeconomic rights.21 The 1951 Refugee Convention and regional refugee instruments 
build upon these contributions. The League of Nations’ work predates any informal or formal 
discussions on the influence that national institutions may have on the promotion and 
protection of the rights of refugees. However, there were hints that States needed to consider 
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the role of other State organs, other than foreign ministries in advancing the League’s overall 
goals.22  
3.3 The United Nations and the protection of refugees 
The UN replaced the League of Nations in 1945 and took over refugee protection. In 1947, 
the UN created the International Refugee Organisation (IRO) to deal with Second World War 
refugees in Europe.23 The IRO had a three-year mandate and was tasked with addressing 
every aspect of the refugee problem, which included registration, status determination, 
repatriation, resettlement and legal and political protection.24 However, it became clear that 
the comprehensive nature of its work could not be completed within the mandated period.25 
Therefore, in 1949, the UN General Assembly resolved to replace the IRO with the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).26 The UNHCR was established initially 
for three years as the UN General Assembly’s subsidiary organ.27 In 1950, it became a 
permanent entity when the UN General Assembly adopted its statute and initiated the process 
of drafting the 1951 Refugee Convention.28  
3.3.1 The 1951 Refugee Convention 
The 1951 Refugee Convention was initially drawn up to protect refugees from Europe, but 
was then expanded through the 1967 Protocol, to include all other refugees without the 
geographical and temporal limitations.29 It covers three main issues: the basic refugee 
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definition, the terms of cessation of refugee status and exclusion from the refugee status;30
 
the 
legal status of refugees in their country of asylum, their rights and duties, including the right 
to non-refoulement;31
 
and States’ obligations, including cooperation with the UNHCR.32  
The substantive rights in the 1951 Refugee Convention were derived mostly from the 
1933 Refugee Convention and the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights.33 In 
addition to the core protection of non-refoulement (Article 33), the 1951 Refugee Convention 
prescribes protections for refugees.34 Article 8 exempts refugees from the application of 
exceptional measures, which might otherwise affect them on the basis of their nationality. 
Article 9 preserves the right of States to take provisional measures, on exceptional grounds, 
against a particular person who might be determined to be a refugee. However, such action is 
limited to national security reasons. The Convention also guarantees freedom from penalties 
for illegal entry (Article 31) and freedom from expulsion except on grounds of national 
security or public order (Article 32). Other rights under the Convention include 
administrative assistance (Article 25) and travel and identification documentation (Articles 27 
and 28).  
The Convention also grants refugees a range of civil and socioeconomic rights. These 
include freedom of association (Article 15), right to work (Articles 17 & 18), right to access 
courts (Article 16) and rights to housing, education, and social security (Articles 21, 22, 23 & 
24). The Convention proposes, as a minimum standard, that refugees should receive at least 
that treatment which is accorded to other non-citizens generally. It also enshrines the 
principle of non-discrimination in Article 3.   
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3.3.2 The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and refugee protection 
The UNHCR is described as the guardian of the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 
Protocol.35 It is primarily tasked with providing international protection to refugees (and 
other persons within its competence)36 and to seek permanent solutions to their problems.37 It 
has both direct and indirect mandates. Its direct mandate stems primarily from its Statute and 
from resolutions of the General Assembly or the Economic and Social Council. It should be 
noted that while these resolutions extend the UNHCR’s functional responsibilities, they do 
not directly impose obligations on States.38 
The UNHCR also derives its mandate from international refugee and human rights 
law. For instance, Article 35 of the 1951 Refugee Convention and Article 2 of its 1967 
Protocol define a supervisory role for the UNHCR. At the African regional level, the 
UNHCR derives this role through Article 8 of the 1969 African Refugee Convention. From 
international human rights law, it derives an indirect mandate from provisions such as 
Articles 22 and 45 of the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child and Article 11 of the 
1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness.39  
The UNHCR’s early work was primarily legal and technical - focusing on protection 
of refugees rather than providing material assistance.40 It protected refugees by “identifying 
them, issuing travel documents, assisting in obtaining recognition of their various legal 
statuses (such as marriage and property) and advocating for precise guidelines for handling 
recognized refugees.”41 It had envisaged that this role would eventually be ceded entirely to 
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States. Today, because of the change in the context, and the nature and flows of 
displacement, UNHCR’s work focuses heavily on assisting large groups of people rather than 
to individual refugees. In many situations, individual determination of refugee status has 
become impractical.42  
The UNHCR is governed by the Executive Committee (EXCOM), which is an 
intergovernmental body currently consisting of one hundred and two States.43 The EXCOM 
meets annually in Geneva to discuss budgetary and organisational matters and prevailing 
refugee protection concerns.44 In terms of the latter, the EXCOM adopts Conclusions on 
International Protection.45 While these are not legally binding on States, they do have 
persuasive authority.46 However, the extent to which these Conclusions influence positive 
State behaviour with respect to refugee protection is debatable.  
If taken within the context of monitoring State implementation of international 
refugee law, an immediate challenge is that of independence. EXCOM is not an independent 
expert mechanism, as it comprises States.47  Not all EXCOM members are party to the 1951 
Convention or its Protocol, yet one of its primary tasks is to establish the content of refugee 
protection as envisaged by the 1951 Refugee Convention.48 As the UNHCR is governed by a 
group of States, it is thus accountable to these States.  
Furthermore, UNHCR’s funding is primarily from voluntary contributions from States 
with only one per cent of its funding derived from the UN’s core budget to cover the costs of 
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administrative functions.49 The UNHCR does not determine its budget. Rather, the EXCOM 
does this through the Conclusions. These conclusions on the UNHCR’s budget are binding 
and may therefore, limit the UNHCR’s capacity to determine how to spend its funds. In 
addition, most States earmark their contributions to the UNHCR.50 As a result, its activities 
are implemented under heavy influence of State interest, which has led to the curtailment of 
the UNHCR’s important role of ensuring compliance with international refugee law.51   It is 
thus difficult to construe or perceive the UNHCR as an independent monitoring body. 
Additional challenges with UNHCR’s role within the refugee protection regime are explored 
below.  
Notwithstanding the above, the UNHCR plays an important role in international 
refugee protection. It operates within a complex and dynamic context that is heavily 
influenced by States and limited in resources. Yet, it has made important strides to advance 
refugee protection. For example, the UNHCR promoted the understanding of refugee 
protection within a human rights context. This has opened up avenues for protection of 
refugees (and other forcibly displaced persons) beyond the traditional refugee framework. 
The UNHCR has also contributed to the development of other international and regional 
instruments and declarations on refugee protection. It also remains a key actor in the 
development and implementation of refugee law at the domestic level. In addition, it 
influences the development of standards for refugee protection through the EXCOM’s 
Conclusions. These are adopted by consensus by States, thereby reflecting a commonly 
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agreed upon understanding of standards for refugee protection. Therefore, they have a 
normative influence on the refugee protection regime as they direct UNHCR’s practice.52 
They also aim to influence and guide State conduct.53    
Despite its influence in promoting refugee protection through a human rights lens, 
there is limited evidence both in terms of research and practice, that the UNHCR has pursued 
national human rights institutions as key actors in advancing refugee protection. This may be 
due to several factors. As discussed in chapter 2, NHRIs which are traditionally viewed 
through a human rights lens, and evolved as such, did not receive substantive consideration 
within the UN processes until the 1970s i.e. almost two decades after the signing of the 1951 
Refugee Convention and a few years after the conclusion of its 1967 Protocol.  
In addition, within the UN architecture, NHRIs’ guardianship rests with the Office of 
the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) through its National Institutions and 
Regional Mechanisms Section (NIRMS). This positioning of NHRIs within the UN may have 
influenced the focus on the issues traditionally viewed to fall within the scope of international 
human rights law rather than broadly to also include the UNHCR’s work.54 This is also 
reflected in the fact that the UNHCR’s annual consultations, have been held for over three 
decades with NGOs and civil society, but with no formal inclusion of NHRIs..55   
The result is that NHRIs are peripheral actors and their engagement with the UNHCR 
at global and country levels is not systematic and might not yield the optimal results to ensure 
effective promotion and protection of refugee rights. For instance, the EXCOM, mentioned 
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above, which precedes the UNHCR’s annual consultations, provides an avenue through 
which NHRIs can play a significant role in encouraging State compliance with reporting. The 
apparent lack of engagement with NHRIs in that process is a missed opportunity for NHRIs 
at both the international and domestic levels. NHRIs may also occupy a peripheral role, as 
they may possibly be viewed as lacking the specialist expertise on refugee rights 
characteristic of many other organisations that exist in this field.56 
 
3.4 The Global Compacts on Refugees and Migration 
The Global Compacts on Refugees (GCR) and the Global Compact on the Safe, Orderly and 
Regular Migration (Global Compact on Migration), are the outcomes of a UN-led process to 
determine avenues for the international community to effectively respond to migration, 
whether forced or voluntary. The two Compacts are complementary but non-binding and 
their implementation relies on global consensus through a multi-stakeholder approach.57 The 
Global Compact on Refugees (GCR), which is the blueprint for States’ responsibility sharing 
for refugees and asylum seekers, is silent on NHRIs. In contrast, the complementary compact 
to the GCR, the Global Compact on for the Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (Global 
Compact for Migration or GCM), includes NHRIs as key partners in its implementation.58 
The Global Compact on Migration follows the emerging normative trend to promote 
independent human rights institutions such as NHRIs as a monitoring mechanism.59  For 
example, the GCM proposes that NHRIs would monitor migrants’ access to basic services 
and that they would play a vital role in preventing, detecting and responding to racial, ethnic 
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and religious profiling of migrants by State authorities.60 The GCM also envisages a key role 
for NHRIs in addressing systemic challenges related to intolerance, xenophobia, racism and 
all other multiple and intersecting forms of discrimination.61 While the GCR and GCM have 
been conceived as complementary, with the assumption that their implementation would 
draw from both processes where overlaps occurred,62 in the context of this thesis, the 
challenge identified is linked to the inclusion of NHRIs in one process and absence of a 
defined role for NHRIs in the other process. As such, would this influence the NHRIs focus 
on migration rights broadly at the expense of refugee rights?  
The reported NHRI activities seem to indicate that this is the case. The GANHRI and 
NHRIs across the globe have embarked on the process of operationalising their role with 
respect to the GCM at the expense of the GCR - in other words, the rights of migrants and not 
the rights of refugees. For instance, the GANHRI conducted a baseline survey to determine 
the extent to which NHRIs worked on migration issues. This survey failed to capture NHRIs’ 
work on refugee rights. According to the GANHRI, the focus of the survey was on human 
rights issues of migration and not on asylum and refugee-related aspects as these fell within 
the purview of another compact (the GCR). However, this survey would have served an 
important basis to determine the extent to which NHRIs addressed refugee rights and in turn 
inform a strategic approach to implementing the compacts.  
At the African regional level, the NANHRI’s migration programme, as will be 
discussed in chapter 6 and 7, focuses on NHRIs’ role in addressing irregular migration within 
the context of the Global Compact for Migration.  The inclusion of the objective on 
monitoring refugee rights was a compromise and the agreed intervention with respect to 
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refugee rights was only with respect to immigration detention.63 Therefore, while the specific 
areas noted for NHRI responsibility within the Global Compact for Migration apply equally 
to refugees and asylum seekers, the subsequent NHRI practice, seems to reinforce a 
separation rather than synergising efforts to address migrants’ rights and refugee rights. 
 
3.5 Refugee protection in Africa: The 1969 Refugee Convention and the African human 
rights system 
Within the African region, the refugee rights regime is governed primarily by the 1969 
Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Protection (The 1969 Refugee 
Convention). The 1969 AU Refugee Convention was influenced heavily by the 1951 
Convention and was drafted with assistance from the UNHCR.64 It incorporates the 
provisions of the 1951 Refugee Convention65 but adds to the grounds for the recognition of a 
refugee. Article I (2) provides that: 
The term “Refugee” shall also apply to every person who, owing to external 
aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order 
in either part [or] the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to 
leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside 
his country of origin or nationality. 66 
 
The UNHCR, in theory, employs both definitions in its operations in Africa.67 However, in 
practice, both the UNHCR and States often recognise refugees in Africa only under Article 
1(2), even though Article 1(1) may equally apply.68 This, according to Sharpe, “is due to the 
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relative ease in applying the 1969 Refugee Convention’s Article 1(2) in situations of mass 
influx that often characterize refugee movements in Africa.”69  
Sharpe provides an in-depth analysis on the significant contributions that the 1969 
Refugee Convention has made to the content of refugee law.70 In sum, these normative 
contributions relate to: the refugee definition, the concept of asylum, the content of non-
refoulement and concepts of responsibility sharing, temporary protection and voluntary 
repatriation. The 1969 Refugee Convention, as mentioned above, broadened the definition of 
a refugee. This definition was subsequently included in the Cartagena Declaration, the soft 
law source of refugee protection for the Americas.71 This additional refugee definition also 
underlies the UNHCR’s argument for a broadened interpretation of the refugee definition to 
take account of situations of mass displacement.72  
In terms of the right to asylum, the 1969 Refugee Convention urges States to grant 
asylum and to do this as a peaceful and humanitarian act.73 It further requires States not to 
view the granting of asylum to refugees as an unfriendly act by other States. This provision 
was expanded upon in Article 12(3) of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(African Charter), which provides that “every individual shall have the right, when 
persecuted, to seek and obtain asylum in other countries in accordance with the laws of those 
countries and international conventions.”74  
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The 1969 Refugee Convention also broadened the principle of non-refoulement both 
in terms of content and application. Unlike the 1951 Refugee Convention, the 1969 Refugee 
Convention provision on non-refoulement does not have a provision on exclusion on the basis 
of national security. The principle enshrined in Article 2(3) states: “No person shall be 
subjected by a Member State to measures such as rejection at the frontier, return or expulsion, 
which would compel him to return to or remain in the territory where his life, physical 
integrity or liberty would be threatened…”75 Thus, as Rutinwa asserts, non-refoulement 
applies to “both non-rejection at the borders, non-return and even to persons who are still in 
places where they fear harm.”76  
The Convention also formalized three other fundamental concepts of refugee law. 
These are responsibility sharing, temporary protection and voluntary repatriation. 77  African 
States recognized that the refugee burden would be disproportionate, simply due to an 
“accident of geography.” In recognition of this, the 1969 Convention provides in Article 2(4) 
that:  
Where a Member State finds difficulty in continuing to grant asylum to refugees, such 
Member State may appeal directly to other Member States and through the OAU, and 
such other Member States shall in the spirit of African solidarity and international co-
operation take appropriate measures to lighten the burden of the Member State 
granting asylum.  
 
The Convention does not spell out what “appropriate measures” entails but this is understood 
to mean regional resettlement, financial assistance and political responsibility sharing.78 
Several States have invoked this Article. In the 1970s and early 1980s, due to pressure from 
the South African apartheid regime, some southern African states were forced to evacuate 
South African refugees from their territories and had them resettled in other African 
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countries.79 The UNHCR has also resettled refugees under this Article. In the early 1960s, the 
UNHCR airlifted Rwandan refugees from the then Congo Kinshasa to Tanzania due to 
serious insecurity problems the refugees faced in their country of first asylum.80  
Article 2(5) further states: “Where a refugee has not received the right to reside in any 
country of asylum, he may be granted temporary residence in any country of asylum in which 
he first presented himself as a refugee pending arrangement for his resettlement in 
accordance with [Article 2(4)].” This captures the notion of temporary protection.81 The 
UNHCR has since developed guidelines for States, with respect to the extension of temporary 
protection in situations of mass influx directed primarily at States that are not party to the 
refugee conventions.82   
Moreover, the 1969 Refugee Convention is the only legal instrument that articulates 
the voluntariness of refugee repatriation.83 This core principle of refugee law is stated in 
Article 5(1): “The essentially voluntary character of repatriation shall be respected in all 
cases and no refugee shall be repatriated against his will.” Article 5 goes on to elaborate the 
principles and the procedures of implementing voluntary repatriation including mandating 
“countries of asylum,” “countries of origin,” “voluntary agencies and international and 
intergovernmental organisations” to assist refugees with the process of return.   
The 1969 Refugee Convention is also silent on the role of national institutions in the 
promotion and protection of refugee rights. However, within the African context, and as 
discussed in Chapter 1, the entity tasked with the promotion and protection of human rights is 
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the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Commission). The African 
Commission was created under Article 30 of the African Charter on Human and People’s 
Rights (Banjul Charter). In addition, the Banjul Charter, in its Article 26, requires States to 
establish and improve national institutions mandated to promote and protect human rights.84 
Thus, the Banjul Charter formally recognises a role for institutions such as NHRIs and 
provides a legal basis for the African Commission to formally work with NHRIs including 
within the context of refugee rights’ promotion and protection. This is by virtue of its role of 
overseeing the implementation and interpretation of the Banjul Charter and its protocols, 
including with respect to those articles that specifically relate to refugee rights, and the 
promotion of the implementation of the 1969 Refugee Convention. While the regional 
framework locates NHRIs clearly within the human rights regime, there is limited evidence 
of substantive engagement between the ACHPR and NHRIs either with respect to the 
promotion and protection of human rights broadly or specifically, with respect to refugee 
rights. This is discussed below.  
3.5.1 The African Commission and NHRIs: Opportunities for the promotion and 
protection of refugee rights  
The regional level provides opportunities for refugee rights promotion and protection 
primarily through the African Commission. Other regional mechanism that could provide 
opportunities for refugee rights promotion and protection are the African Committee of 
Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (Committee of Experts) and the New Merged 
Court (through the amalgamation of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(African Court) and the African Court of Justice).85 The African Commission, the Committee 
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of Experts, and the African Court have all addressed refugee rights matters.86 It is, however, 
the African Commission that has engaged more frequently and substantively on refugee 
related matters including through the creation of the mandate of a Special Rapporteur on the 
Rights of Refugees, Asylum Seekers and Internally Displaced Persons (Special Rapporteur) 
and signing a memorandum of understanding with the UNHCR to facilitate the promotion of 
refugee rights within the region.87  
There are other entities within the African Union that have a mandate for refugee 
rights promotion and protection, but these operate distinctly from the African Commission 
and this has led to an incoherent approach for advancing refugee rights at the regional level.88 
Viljoen, Odunkalu and Sharpe have identified this and other challenges that the AU and its 
mechanisms face, primarily due to legal and institutional weaknesses.89 An analysis of these 
challenges is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, the existence of these institutions and 
mechanisms within the regional refugee protection regime requires reference to them. This 
section will focus on the African Commission and its mechanisms with respect to refugee 
rights since it is the only entity, which has formally recognised NHRIs within its processes.  
The relationship between the African Commission and the African NHRIs is 
facilitated primarily through the regional NHRI network - NANHRI. For instance, it is 
through NANHRI that NHRIs have negotiated their recognition before the African 
Commission. It is also through NANHRI that NHRIs coordinate their participation at the 
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African Commission’s public sessions. The NANHRI has also developed guidelines for 
NHRIs to support their engagement with the regional mechanisms.90 While the guidelines do 
not specifically address engagement in terms of refugee rights promotion and protection, they 
provide a succinct approach, which if implemented by NHRIs, would result in better 
engagement between them and the regional mechanisms and processes.  
The African Commission offers specific avenues, which remain substantially under 
explored by African NHRIs.91 These are its public sessions, mentioned above, and its special 
mechanisms. The interaction between the African Commission and the NHRIs is governed by 
the resolution on the granting of affiliate status to NHRIs (Resolution ACHPR/Res.370 (LX) 
2017) and its rules of procedure as revised in 2020. The resolution as discussed in chapter 2, 
affords NHRIs legal standing before the African Commission.92 It sets out the criteria for 
granting the status and the responsibilities that arise for NHRIs once accorded the affiliate 
status. It is through this affiliate status that NHRIs can participate in the work of the African 
Commission and its mechanisms, including attendance at its public sessions.  
During the African Commission’s public sessions, the NHRIs with an affiliate status 
can address any human rights issue of concern including demanding State accountability for 
violations of refugee rights.93 The NHRIs can also propose items for the agenda (subject to 
the Commission’s Bureau’s final approval) and address those issues during the public 
sessions.94 NHRIs are also required to report on their activities and can utilise this function to 
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raise issues of concern to the African Commission. Crucially, both the updated affiliate status 
resolution and the rules of procedure have widened the scope of human rights institutions 
recognised by the African Commission to include specialised human rights institutions. This 
would include institutions such as the gender commissions and ombudsman. 
Of note is that the Commission adopts country-specific as well as thematic resolutions 
specifically on refugees and displaced persons during its sessions.95 The Commission has also 
made concluding observations about areas of concern as well as the need for action in respect 
of the protection of refugee rights.96 However, the Commission lacks a mechanism to follow 
up on its recommendations and concluding observations.97 This is a gap that NHRIs can fill 
as they perform a similar function within the UN mechanisms and processes, with respect to 
State reporting and follow up on recommendations or concluding observations. Importantly, 
the African Commission revised its rules of procedure at its 27th Extra-Ordinary Session to 
require the transmission of its concluding observations on State reports to NHRIs whose 
States were under review.98 This amendment to the rules of procedure was done precisely to 
enhance the NHRIs’ role in following up with the African Commission’s recommendations.99 
The African Commission also has a special procedure i.e. the Special Rapporteur on 
the Rights of Refugees, Asylum Seekers and Internally-Displaced Persons.100 The creation of 
this mandate has contributed to the African Commission’s promotional activities with respect 
to refugee rights and those of IDPs within the region.101 There are critiques about the value of 
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the mandate. For instance, Naldi and D’Orsi conclude that the mandate has had limited effect 
and that the Commission should reconsider its role.102 Viljoen argues that the special 
procedure mandates, in general, take away from the Commission’s limited resources and 
detract from its core protective function.103 In addition, Sharpe found that the current focus is 
not on refugees and asylum seekers, but is rather on IDPs, nationality and statelessness, 
noting here that the mandate as provided for in its enabling resolution refers only to activities 
with respect to “refugees, asylum seekers and internally displaced persons.”104 The 
UNHCR’s relationship with the mandate has also evolved to focus entirely on issues related 
to nationality and statelessness and not on refugees and asylum seekers as had been indicated 
in its MOU with the African Commission.105  
With respect to NHRIs, the Special Rapporteur has a comprehensive mandate that 
includes the requirement to “cooperate and engage in dialogue with Member States, National 
Human Rights Institutions… in the promotion and protection of the rights of refugees, asylum 
seekers and internally displaced persons.”106 The Special Rapporteur is tasked with 
evaluating States’ compliance with international refugee rights norms and standards; 
providing recommendations to encourage better protection of refugee rights, conducting 
country visits and assessing human rights conditions including in refugee camps or situations 
of forced displacement.107 In addition, the Special Rapporteur can receive information, 
including from NHRIs, on cases or situations concerning the persons within their mandate. 
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The mandate holder is also empowered to conduct promotional activities, including in 
cooperation with other stakeholders, on rights of persons who fall within their mandate. Thus, 
NHRIs can engage directly with the Special Rapporteur, including when the mandate-holder 
undertakes their activities.   
However, a review of the Special Rapporteurs’ activity reports revealed scant 
reference, if at all, to NHRIs.  Out of nine publicly available reports, only two Special 
Rapporteur’s activity reports make any specific recommendations to NHRIs. Two other 
reports refer to the mandate-holder participating in a NHRI conference. There is no specific 
reference or indication that the Special Rapporteurs have considered NHRIs as key partners 
when undertaking their activities. 
As indicated earlier, there are challenges that hamper the constructive engagement 
between the African Commission as the custodian of the African human rights treaties and 
NHRIs as one of the implementation conduits. Nonetheless, the discussion above highlights 
important ways through NHRIs can engage substantively with the mechanisms and processes 
in place. Also, the African Commission has displayed goodwill towards working with 
NHRIs. Beyond adopting the NHRI resolution and incorporating them within its rules of 
procedure, the African Commission has also contributed to the development of some 
modalities for engagement with NHRIs in various thematic areas. These include in the 
prevention of torture, in the follow up with implementation of its recommendations and 
access to information for Africa.108  
In addition, numerous former NHRI Commissioners have served or currently serve as 
Commissioners in the African Commission, thereby precluding notions that NHRIs may be 
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unfamiliar actors for human rights promotion and protection in Africa.109 Should further 
clarity on the modalities for substantive engagement be determined, especially with the 
Special Rapporteur on Refugees, NHRIs could make important contributions to the 
promotion and protection of refugee rights. In turn, this would influence the development of 
clearer channels for engagement between the domestic and regional levels with respect to the 
realisation of refugee rights and contribute to the development of norms for NHRI 
engagement with refugee rights.   
 
3.6 Human rights and refugee protection 
International human rights law provides a complementary protection framework for 
refugees.110 Indeed, Chetail argues that the interactions between the two fields of 
international law “have become so intimately interdependent and imbricated that it is now 
virtually impossible to separate one from the other.”111 Arguing further, he asserts that 
international human rights law has become the primary basis for protecting refugees.112 The 
evidence supporting these arguments comes primarily from interpretation of State obligations 
for refugee rights protection by treaty bodies - in the absence of a proper monitoring 
mechanism for the 1951 Refugee Convention.113 It is from this complementary protection 
that additional legal obligations are derived with respect to refugee rights.114  
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The jurisprudence and reports from treaty bodies indicates that they are increasingly 
considering refugee issues.115 Besides reviewing individual communications, the treaty 
bodies are also taking into account refugee concerns when reviewing States parties' reports. 
In addition, through the General Comments, they are interpreting treaty provisions to include 
protection of refugee rights. For instance, the Human Rights Committee (HRC) affirmed that 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) obliges States to implement 
its provisions without discrimination between citizens and aliens.116 It further held that States 
were legally required to extend the Covenant rights to all persons within their territories, 
including asylum seekers and refugees.117 The HRC has also interpreted Article 7, which 
prohibits torture, to contain an inherent element of non-refoulement.118 Furthermore, the HRC 
has considered refugee and asylum policies in relation to the ICCPR either specifically or 
generally.119 It has, for instance, found violations under Article 9 (arbitrary detention).120 It 
has also reviewed States’ refugee policies under Article 7 to ascertain compliance with non-
refoulement and compliance with various other articles with respect to refugees and asylum 
seekers.121    
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The Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment (CAT) has a specific provision dealing with refoulement and provides one of 
the most direct means for refugees and asylum seekers through which to claim protection 
from a treaty body. Article 3(1) states: “No State Party shall expel, return (refouler) or 
extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he 
would be in danger of being subjected to torture.” Hence, the Convention’s treaty body, the 
Committee against Torture (CAT) regularly reviews States’ refugee policies to ensure 
compliance with Article 3.122 Importantly, the CAT has through the individual 
communications procedure, provided relief for asylum seekers threatened with 
refoulement.123  
The Committee on the Rights of the Child has also considered refugee matters 
relating to children. It recently found that Denmark had violated Articles 3 and 19 of the CRC 
with respect to an asylum-seeker child faced with the threat of female genital mutilation if 
returned to Somalia.124It has also issued Concluding Observations to States on the situation of 
refugee and asylum seeker children and encouraged ratification of the two international 
refugee instruments.125  
The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) 
issued a “General Comment on gender-related dimensions of refugee status, asylum, 
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nationality and statelessness of women.”126 This was to ensure that States applied a gender 
perspective when determining refugee status. The General Comment also introduced sex and 
gender as additional grounds of persecution and sets specific gender-sensitive standards for 
the asylum process.127  CEDAW has also issued Concluding Observations encouraging 
ratification of the international refugee instruments and the adoption of laws and regulations 
relating to the status of asylum-seekers and refugees in line with international standards. 128 
NHRIs regularly submit reports to the treaty bodies and in the case of the three treaty 
bodies mentioned above, have a formal working relationship that extends beyond 
reporting.129 These reporting and engagement processes serve to facilitate demands for 
accountability where States fail to meet their obligations, and to encourage implementation of 
human rights obligations at the domestic level. McAdams argues that merely acknowledging 
a nexus between refugee law and human rights law is not sufficient to guarantee 
comprehensive rights for refugees and asylum seekers. 130  It is necessary that States, over and 
above submitting themselves to Refugee Conventions, domesticate international human rights 
obligations.131 Thus, by encouraging, demanding or advocating for the implementation of 
human rights obligations at the domestic level, NHRIs can bridge the protection gap that may 
exist with respect to refugees and asylum seekers.  
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Additionally, certain human rights treaties provide explicit protection measures for 
refugees, while in others such protection is implied.132 Several regional human rights 
instruments provide protection measures for asylum seekers and refugees. For instance, 
within the European Union (EU), there is a Common European Asylum System consisting of 
treaty provisions, regulations and directives that are binding on EU Member States.133 In the 
Americas, the 1969 American Convention on Human Rights establishes the right to seek 
asylum in its Article 22(7).134 The Inter-American human rights system has also been cited as 
a possible model for integrating principles of both refugee law and human rights for the 
protection of refugees and asylum seekers.135 In Asia, the Association of Southeast Asia 
Nations (ASEAN) adopted the non-binding ASEAN Human Rights Declaration in 2012.136 
The Declaration recognises, in its Article 16, the “right to seek and receive asylum in another 
State in accordance with the laws of such State and applicable international agreements.”137  
In Africa, some of the human rights instruments have provisions explicit to refugees 
and asylum seekers. Article 23 of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the 
African Child stipulates special measures for protection of asylum seeking and refugee 
children, as well as, internally displaced children.138 Articles 4(2)(k), 10(2)(c) & (d) and 
11(3) of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of 
                                                
132 For a detailed discussion of how specific human rights standards can be utilised to determine refugee status 
see James C. Hathaway and Michelle Foster, The Law of Refugee Status, 2nd Edition, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2014). 
133 Mirjana Stankovic, Compedium of International, Regional and National Legal Instruments on Forced 
Migration, The World Bank Group, May 2017. 
134 American Convention on Human Rights.  
135 David James Cantor and Stefania Eugenia Barichello, “The Inter-American human rights system: a new 
model for integrating refugee and complementary protection?’ in International Journal of Human Rights 17, 
Issue 5-6 (2013): 689-706. https://doi.org/10.1080/13642987.2013.825077. See also Refugee Law Initiative, 
Comparative Regional Approaches to Refugee Protection, accessed 4 May, 2018, 
https://rli.sas.ac.uk/research-projects/pushing-boundaries/comparative-regional-approaches-refugee-protection. 
136 ASEAN Member States are: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam, accessed 8 May 2018, http://asean.org/asean/asean-member-states/. 
137 ASEAN, “ASEAN Human Rights Declaration,” accessed 8 May 2018 http://asean.org/asean-human-rights-
declaration/. 
138 ACHPR, African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the African Child. (Entered into force November 29, 





Women in Africa are specific to refugee women.139 Furthermore, the African Charter through 
Article 12 (3) grants the right to asylum.140 This has been invoked directly in relation to 
refugee claims.141  
In addition, other international and regional human rights mechanisms are now 
playing an important role in enhancing accountability for refugee protection. This also serves 
to reinforce the relationship between international refugee law and international human rights 
law.142 At the international level, the Commission on Human Rights (replaced by the Human 
Rights Council in 2006) formally recognized the role of these mechanisms through resolution 
1998/49.143 This resolution requested all UN bodies and agencies to provide the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights “with information on the situation of refugees and displaced 
persons, for appropriate action in consultation with, the High Commissioner for Refugees.”144 
The Commission on Human Rights further endorsed the UNHCR’s participation at treaty 
body sessions and granted the High Commissioner for Refugees standing before the 
Commission.145 
At the African regional level, the African Commission has both a protection and 
promotional mandate. It is mandated to receive both inter-State and individual 
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communications and has considered refugee matters.146 It has also utilised its broad 
promotional mandate to undertake activities in relation to refugees, asylum seekers and 
displaced persons.147 The Commission considers States reports and has exercised its powers 
to call for State adherence to Convention standards of protection for refugees and asylum 
seekers.148 In addition, the Commission convenes conferences or seminars on refugee 
matters, builds working relationships for enhancing refugee protection on the continent and 
undertakes research.149 The Commission also adopts country-specific and thematic 
resolutions on refugees, to draw attention to their plight and to highlight the need for States to 
extend special measures of protection to refugees.150  
To supplement its role further, the Commission created the office of the Special 
Rapporteur on the rights of refugees, asylum seekers, internally displaced persons and 
migrants.151  As a result, issues pertaining to refugees and asylum seekers have been given 
greater visibility within the African human rights system. The Commission also signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding with the UNHCR with the intention to enhance the 
protection of the rights of refugees in Africa.152Additional mechanisms that can play an 
important role include the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the African 
Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child. While these institutions have 
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laid the groundwork for refugee protection within Africa, the effective protection for refugees 
through these institutions remains limited - largely due to institutional and implementation 
weaknesses.153 In addition, there is limited evidence to indicate that these mechanisms and 
procedures engage substantively with NHRIs.154 
As noted earlier, treaty bodies have played an important role in strengthening the 
protection of refugees, as well as the development of the inter-relationship between human 
rights and refugee law. Their jurisprudence, Concluding Observations and General 
Comments are also important for refugee protection where a State in not party to a specific 
refugee instrument, but is party to a human rights instrument. However, there are challenges 
that these mechanisms face that may limit the extent to which they can contribute to the 
refugee protection.  
For instance, the CAT, which has dealt with the largest number of asylum-related 
claims, and has thus contributed immensely to jurisprudence relating particularly to non-
refoulement and prohibition of torture, is overburdened and underfunded.155 Therefore, as 
Gorlick concludes, it may be unable to deal with claims effectively and expeditiously, to the 
detriment of vulnerable individuals and the integrity of the human rights system.156 There are 
also procedural and evidentiary issues that may arise that could hinder the development of 
human rights law and refugee law.157 Other human rights mechanisms face similar 
challenges. Perhaps the most compounding challenge is that the treaty bodies do not have the 
specialist expertise in refugee law and jurisdictional mandate to interpret the 1951 
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Convention.158 Therefore, their role while important may be that of a stopgap measure as 
suggested in this conclusion from an expert workshop sponsored by UNHCR:159  
It is a narrow interpretation of the 1951 Convention, which is driving, rejected asylum 
seekers to human rights treaty bodies, and there would be no need for asylum seekers 
to have recourse to CAT and other such mechanisms if States honoured the spirit of 
their obligations under the refugee instruments.160  
 
Focus then should be on enhancing ways to change policy and practice at the domestic level, 
as this is where international norms and standards are given effect. This provides important 
possibilities for national human rights institutions and based on the discussion above, NHRIs 
can creatively utilise human rights law to enhance the effective realisation of refugee rights. 
 
3.7 Challenges: Normative and implementation gaps 
Discussions on the challenges of international refugee law have been on-going for decades. In 
1983, the UNHCR noted that the principles of international protection needed to be "strongly 
reaffirmed, effectively implemented and, where necessary, further developed."161 
Commenting in 1997, Hathaway one of the leading refugee law scholars, declared 
international refugee law to be in a state of crisis and proposed ways through which it could 
be enhanced.162 However, beyond the increased use of human rights mechanisms for refugee 
protection, there has been limited development to strengthen the international refugee 
protection regime. The result is that both normative and implementation gaps within 
international refugee law remain. Some of the main gaps are discussed below.  
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3.7.1 Normative gaps 
The scope of application of the 1951 Refugee Convention remains persons whose claim for 
protection is based on persecution on the five grounds contained in Article 1. These are race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, and political opinion.163  The 
Convention is silent on the content of these grounds. It is also does not provide a definition 
for “persecution”. The absence of the meaning of some of its key terms has rendered some of 
its provisions ambiguous.164 State practice has led in some instances, to narrow or 
inconsistent interpretation of the Convention’s provisions because of such ambiguities.165 The 
consequence is that persons fleeing their countries, and who may be in need of international 
protection, are excluded from such protection.166  
The circumstance under which forced displacement occurs has changed significantly 
since the Convention was drafted. Forced displacement more often occurs because of conflict 
or generalised violence that may not necessarily include a “well-founded fear of 
persecution.”167 There is also difficulty in claiming protection based on environmental or 
natural disasters.168 Yet, there are increasing numbers of people who are forcibly displaced 
across borders due to environmental causes.169 Moreover, there are cases where refugee status 
has been granted on claims on grounds not included in the Convention definition. These 
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include on grounds of gender-based violence such as female genital mutilation,170 and sexual 
orientation and gender identity.171 Women have also been recognized in some cases as 
belonging to a particular social group and can claim refugee status accordingly.172 However, 
these cases are few and are based on a State’s discretion in the interpretation of the refugee 
definition.173  
To a certain extent, the African refugee protection regime does fill these gaps. The 
African regime provides standards of treatment for refugee women and children as vulnerable 
groups, through provisions in the region’s key human rights instruments.174 The 1969 
Refugee Convention also fills the normative gap for persons fleeing situations of generalized 
violence, which is not covered under the 1951 Convention.  
The 1951 Convention is also silent on the treatment of asylum seekers, as it does not 
cover the right of asylum. It only applies to those who have qualified as refugees. As Turk 
and Dowd point out, it does not cover the process of admission to territory or access to 
asylum procedures, even though some of its fundamental protections apply to asylum 
seekers.175 States have to define these processes based on their own interpretation. This has 
also resulted, as mentioned above, in States having a wide discretion in determining who 
qualifies for refugee status. For instance, a number of States have refused to accept into their 
territories asylum seekers who arrive by boat.176 States have argued that the 1951 Convention 
only applied once the asylum seeker had arrived within the territory of a State party.177 This 
narrow interpretation of the Convention’s provisions is a growing trend. Many States are 
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adopting restrictive measures to deal with refugees and asylum seekers.178 Such measures are 
often justified under the pretext of national security concerns with little regard to Convention 
obligations or the character of the Convention.179  
In addition, the Convention does not provide standards for realization of durable 
solutions.180 To date, the 1969 AU Refugee Convention remains the only source of hard law 
on voluntary repatriation, local integration and resettlement.181 In the absence of such legal 
standards, “States have forcibly returned refugees to their countries of origin without any 
guarantees as to their treatment upon return.”182 Additional normative gaps include, inter alia, 
that the convention does not address general non-discrimination, immigration detention, and 
the right to family life and burden sharing.183  
3.7.2 Implementation gaps 
Under international human rights law, treaty bodies play the primary supervisory and 
enforcement role to promote State compliance with treaty provisions. This is done through 
examination of State party reports submitted to the relevant treaty body. This system has 
evolved to include important oversight roles for the other mechanisms such as the special 
Procedures, and the Human Rights Council. However, as mentioned briefly in Chapter 1, the 
1951 Refugee Convention did not establish an independent expert supervisory body to 
oversee its implementation or receive individual complaints.184  
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The supervisory role was mandated to the UNHCR under Article 35 of the 
Convention. It obliges States party “to co-operate with UNHCR, or any other agency of the 
UN which may succeed it, in its exercise of its functions, and shall in particular facilitate its 
duty of supervising the application of the provisions of this Convention.”185 The UNHCR has 
however, not given full effect to this role.186 For example, it has not provided an 
interpretation of its supervisory role as prescribed under Article 35.187 It has also not 
developed a conceptual framework on what its supervisory role entails.188 Thus, there are no 
guidelines for States on the content of their obligation to “facilitate” the UNHCR’s 
supervision of the two treaties.  
Barutciski suggests that the UNHCR’s reluctance to give full effect to Article 35 rests 
largely on States’ reservation to submit to a rigorous supervisory international mechanism.189 
He argues that this is largely due to States’ perception that refugee protection can affect 
fundamental aspects of territorial sovereignty.190 He further notes that the UNHCR often has 
to collaborate with States, which are reluctant hosts.191 As such, the UNHCR has focused on 
a diplomatic approach to reach political consensus on international refugee protection, to the 
exclusion of a confrontational approach that a fully operationalized Article 35 may present.192   
Additionally, there are no time frames for States’ periodic and regular reporting about 
the implementation of the Convention, or the condition of refugees within their territories. 
While the UNHCR formally requested information from State parties in 1990, the response 
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was poor with only 23 State Parties responding by the 31 December 1991 deadline.193 The 
UNHCR has not made additional requests despite the adoption of subsequent EXCOM 
conclusions and Commission on Human Rights’ resolutions on State reporting under Article 
35.194  
Furthermore, the UNHCR does not have the mandate to sanction States when they 
adopt laws that contravene or fail to incorporate international refugee norms and standards,195 
for instance, determining asylum seekers to be “illegal” in contravention to Article 31 of the 
Convention.196 The UNHCR has at times raised concerns and issued statements criticising 
such laws or State (in) action, but not in a consistent manner.197 Furthermore, unlike some 
treaty bodies, the UNHCR does not have the authority to handle complaints concerning non-
compliance with the either the 1951 Refugee Convention or its protocol.198 The UNHCR may 
bring such matters to the attention of its Executive Committee, the Human Rights Council, 
the ECOSOC or the General Assembly.199 However, the conclusions or resolutions that may 
result, are not binding on States.200 It remains up to the States to determine the level, if any, 
of compliance.  
At the international level, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) may provide a 
possible avenue for enforcement. Pursuant to Article 65 of the ICJ Statute, the UNHCR can 
approach the ICJ for an advisory opinion related to the interpretation of provisions of the 
1951 Refugee Convention. However, the UNHCR has never requested such an opinion from 
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the ICJ.201 Alternatively, States can bring a dispute to the ICJ that relates to the interpretation 
of application of the Convention. This is provided for under Article 38 of the 1951 Refugee 
Convention. Article 38 has yet to be invoked by any State.202 At the African regional level, 
the African Commission and the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights offer possible 
avenues for enforcement of refugee law.203   
Another key challenge with the international refugee law framework is that UNHCR 
does not have the mandate to authoritatively decide on the meaning of the treaty.204 The 1951 
Refugee Convention does not provide a mechanism to develop new standards.205 The 
EXCOM is the only body at the international level that pronounces on standards.206 
Nevertheless, as discussed above, these are not binding on States. This gap has led States to 
develop principles that do not necessarily reflect the humanitarian and human rights character 
of refugee protection.207  
Terms such as “safe third country” and “first country of asylum” have been adopted. 
For instance, such terms are being utilised without a clear basis under international refugee 
law within the EU to check the number of refugees arriving within the EU.208 In some 
instances, the adoption of such measures has led to violations of the Convention.209 The EU 
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also adopted a limitation to the definition of a refugee to mean third country nationals.210 As 
such, EU Member State nationals cannot claim to be a refugee as the refugee status within the 
EU is limited to persons from non-EU Member States.211 International refugee law does not 
provide for such limitation.212 The UNHCR has done little to prevent States from 
implementing such practices, and has in some instances assisted States to implement or 
pursue such measures.213 
Additionally, both the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol have not been acceded 
to all States. As at February 2020, forty-seven countries were yet to become parties to one or 
both treaties.214 This means that the basic legal instruments for international refugee 
protection are yet to become universally applicable. Some African countries are only party to 
the 1969 Refugee Convention and therefore, are only bound by the regional instrument.215 
However, non-ratification of either treaty does not imply that States cannot protect refugee 
rights in practice. The problem that arises is that the State is not obliged to comply with the 
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minimum international refugee law standards, and it may have fewer incentives to give such 
standards domestic effect.  
The UNHCR is mandated to encourage the ratification of refugee instruments, but 
there has been little success, particularly in Asia including the Middle East.216 According to 
the UNHCR, the three countries hosting some of the largest refugee populations are in Asia, 
but none is party to either one of the refugee treaties.217 Thus, the effectiveness of the 
domestic refugee frameworks may be severely limited in these States. Generally, these States 
accept asylum seekers because of porous borders.218 The UNHCR, where present, then has to 
negotiate an agreement with the State to determine how it can provide international 
protection and assistance to refugees and asylum seekers.219 Besides support from the UN 
agencies and other humanitarian actors, such States would have to determine how to provide 
support to refugees and asylum seekers. However, because of the mass influx of asylum 
seekers into Europe, there is now renewed interest among States for responsibility sharing for 
refugees.220  
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In the case of Jordan, the EU concluded an agreement, referred to as the Jordan 
Compact, to assist Jordan with hosting refugees and asylum seekers.221 This agreement has 
been criticised for its limited consultation with refugees, humanitarian agencies, and civil 
society organisations.222 Nevertheless, it provides a basis for consideration of multi-
stakeholder responsibility sharing arrangements for refugees.223 At the international level, the 
Global Compact on Refugees aims at ensuring effective responsibility sharing among UN 
Members States regardless of their ratification of the Refugee Conventions.224 Its primary 
limitation is that it is not binding on States, but rather reflects a consensus on how to improve 
the refugee situation. It includes an emphasis on promoting refugee self-reliance.225  
From the above discussion, it is apparent that the challenges with implementation of 
treaty obligations, often cited with respect to human rights treaties, equally apply to the 1951 
Refugee Convention. This is both in terms of State compliance with treaty obligations and 
interpretation of the content of the obligations. It is in this regard that NHRIs can play an 
important role with respect to encouraging State compliance with the Refugee Conventions 
within the opportunities provided by treaty bodies.  
The Human Rights Committee in its General Comment 31 provides an important 
basis for this to occur. General Comment 31 sets out the nature of the general legal obligation 
imposed on States Parties. It provides that “the enjoyment of Covenant rights is not limited to 
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citizens of States Parties but must also be available to all individuals, regardless of nationality 
or statelessness, such as asylum seekers, refugees, migrant workers and other persons, who 
may find themselves in the territory or subject to the jurisdiction of the State Party.”226 Thus, 
on the basis of this interpretation of States’ obligations under the ICCPR, NHRIs can through 
domestic engagement with the State, shadow reporting and other modalities of engagement 
with the HRC, pay particular attention to advocating for the effective realisation of refugee 
rights.  
Despite having traditionally focused their activities on the promotion and protection 
of human rights broadly, there are examples of NHRIs that consider refugee protection 
essential to their functions. There are good practices from the field, which interestingly 
feature NHRIs from the Asia Pacific, the region with the highest number of States that are not 
party to the Refugee Conventions or many human rights treaties. For example, the Australian 
Human Rights Commission (AHRC) has since its inception in 1980, dealt with refugee 
matters.227  
The AHRC has attributed its engagement on refugee matters to Australia’s restrictive 
policies on refugees and asylum seekers and the resultant challenges.228 Of particular 
concern, is the use of detention for all asylum seekers in contravention to Article 31 of the 
1951 Refugee Convention.229 The AHRC has, for instance, found that the Australian 
government’s detention of child asylum seekers contravened the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child and deemed other asylum detention practices arbitrary and contrary to the 
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International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.230 Its findings led to the amendment to 
Australia’s Migration Act and changes to the detention of asylum seekers.231  
The Malaysian National Human Rights Commission (SUHAKAM), which is 
empowered only to protect constitutional rights, has treated the protection of refugee rights as 
a fundamental aspect of its activities.232 Despite Malaysia not being party to either of the 
Refugee Conventions or most of the core human rights treaties, SUHAKAM has successfully 
argued that Malaysia has international human rights obligations.233 For example, it has argued 
that the principle of non- refoulement is customary international law and hence, applies to 
Malaysia despite its failure to ratify the refugee conventions.234 It also argues that the 
principle of non-discrimination in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights protects the 
rights of refugees.235 In addition, it applies the CRC and CEDAW, to which Malaysia is 
party, as additional grounds for the protection of refugee rights.236 It has also succeeded in 
securing access to places of detention for the UNHCR.237  
The National Human Rights Commission of India (NHRC) has consistently engaged 
in the protection of refugee rights in India.238 This is despite the absence of a formal legal 
framework for refugees in India. Its interventions have mostly been through the complaints 
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handling function discharged through the courts or through investigations.239 Issues that the 
NHRC dealt with included the right to life and liberty, illegal detention and improvement of 
conditions of encampment for refugees.240  
Several African NHRIs have also actively contributed to refugee protection. These 
include the Commission of Human Rights and Administrative Justice of  (CHRAJ), the 
Uganda Human Rights Commission (UHRC), the South African Human Rights Commission 
and the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights Commission.241 Their activities have 
comprised policy development, legislation drafting, visiting places of detention and strategic 
litigation.242 These activities indicate awareness among NHRIs of the need to engage in 
refugee protection. It also highlights their potentially pivotal role in the promotion and 
protection of refugee rights and the rights of other vulnerable groups.  
Other implementation gaps result from the manner in which the UNHCR operates. 
The UNHCR has transformed from an institution that primarily provided international 
protection to refugees, to one that provides humanitarian assistance.243 As a result, its 
presence in countries of origin to provide humanitarian aid has increased considerably.244 
States have driven this shift in UNHCR’s role by urging the organisation to provide 
international assistance in a manner, which will reduce movements out of territories.245 
Consequentially, in regions with large refugee crises, the UNHCR is now the means through 
which assistance to displaced persons is delivered on the ground.246 This humanitarian work, 
though sanctioned by both States and the UNHCR, is operationalized beyond its mandate.247 
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This role is formally mandated to the UN Office of the Coordinator of Humanitarian 
Affairs (OCHA), but UNHCR is now commonly considered the lead humanitarian agency 
within the UN system.248 Organisations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) also have competence to effectively deal with internal displacement and may be 
better placed to maintain the values of independence, neutrality, and impartiality.249 The re-
orientation of UNHCR’s function has also resulted in UNHCR being the primary 
implementer of international refugee protection at the domestic level. This essentially means 
that UNHCR is effectively supervising itself, thus posing an ethical and legal dilemma.250 
 
3.8 Additional opportunities for NHRIs  
NHRIs have traditionally focused their activities in promotion and protection of human rights 
broadly in tandem with their evolution within the traditional international human rights 
framework. Thus, the pattern of engagement with the promotion and protection of refugee 
rights varies widely, with some NHRIs actively engaged in such matters, to others having 
minimal or ad-hoc engagement. On the one hand, the limited engagement with refugee issues 
can be attributed to the NHRIs’ structure and the prioritisation of limited resources to address 
broader human rights concerns.251 For instance, in terms of structure, refugees and other non-
citizens are unlikely to be aware of, or to have access to the complaints-handling function, 
common among NHRIs.252 As will be discussed in chapters 6 and 7, refugee protection also 
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tends to be highly politicised at the domestic level, and NHRIs may be reluctant to engage 
substantially on such matters.253 There are developments at the international and regional 
levels that attempt to heighten the role of NHRIs in the promotion and protection of refugee 
rights.  
At the international level, NHRIs could potentially have their mandates expanded to 
deal with places of detention through the Optional Protocol to the Convention Against 
Torture (OPCAT). The OPCAT, in Article 18(4) envisages a role for NHRIs through the 
National Preventive Mechanism (NPM). The NPM is required to monitor State compliance 
with CAT. It includes the requirement that the NPM conducts regular visits to all detention 
places, including immigration detention facilities.  
The inclusion of this article in the OPCAT is due to NHRIs’ substantive contribution 
to the drafting of the OPCAT and to torture prevention efforts globally.254 It also provides 
NHRIs with the opportunity to contribute to norms and standards with respect to immigration 
detention for refugees and asylum seekers, given the normative gap that exists. Several 
NHRIs have been designated as NPMs, and have thus had their mandates widened to deal 
directly with immigration detainees, who may include refugees and asylum seekers.255 In 
addition, in Africa, the Zimbabwean and Rwandan NHRIs have explicit mandates with 
respect to monitoring refugee camps and immigration detention facilities respectively.256 The 
primary NHRIs in South Africa and Kenya that are included in this study also monitor places 
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of detention. They have both played key roles in highlighting and remedying violations of 
rights of refugees and asylum seekers in places of detention.257  
At the regional and national levels, NHRIs are increasingly dealing with conflict and 
the resultant displacement.258 This has led to the emergence of a normative framework for 
NHRI engagement in situations of conflict and with refugee protection. In 2015, NHRIs 
adopted two important declarations. The first was the Kyiv Declaration for NHRIs working in 
conflict.259 It sets out specific areas of engagement for NHRIs in conflict and post-conflict 
situations including in promoting and protecting refugee rights. The second was the 
“Belgrade Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Refugees and 
Migrants.”260 It identifies areas for engagement for NHRIs including “inspecting places of 
detention or other refugee holding centres; combating xenophobia and increasing public 
awareness on refugee rights; and coordinating refugee-related activities regionally and 
internationally.”261   
In Africa, NHRIs adopted in 2007, the “Kigali Declaration on Refugees, Internally 
Displaced Persons and Stateless Persons (Kigali Declaration).” It outlines three sets of 
recommendations for each of the vulnerable groups. With respect to refugees, it proposes 
NHRI measures relating to prevention, protection, and the search for durable solutions.262 In 
addition to these guiding frameworks, NHRIs also have opportunities to enhance refugee 
protection through interaction with international and regional human rights mechanisms.  
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The evolution of the international refugee protection regime outlined in this chapter, presents 
a protection regime that is behest with numerous challenges. From its infancy, it has been 
characterised by the pursuit of national interests and reluctance by States, to fully commit to 
the responsibility of sharing the refugee burden. The result is that the primary institution for 
international refugee protection, the UNHCR, is plagued with legal and institutional 
challenges that impede its capacity to effectively deal with international refugee protection. 
However, this must also be viewed within the context that it operates in. For instance, the 
nature of refugee flows has changed significantly from the 1920s when international 
protection was initially conceived. States have also shifted their consideration of refugee 
protection from a humanitarian character, to that of national interest, which has little regard 
for complying with international legal obligations.  
Therefore, the opportunities presented by a reconceptualization of refugee protection 
in human rights terms, are useful in the attempts to remedy both the normative and 
implementation gaps that exist. It is within this nexus that NHRIs may have a pivotal role. 
Examples of NHRI practice in refugee protection show promising results on their capacity to 
hold States accountable for violations or inaction.  The emergence of a normative framework 
for NHRIs in this regard, will also be useful for their systematic engagement within the 









General overview of NHRIs and the domestic refugee protection regimes in South Africa 
and Kenya 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides an overview of the national institutions established for the promotion 
and protecting of human rights in South Africa and Kenya. It traces their legislative 
frameworks and discusses their mandates in order to provide an understanding of their role in 
advancing refugee rights. The chapter also presents and overview of the domestic refugee 
regimes in both South Africa and Kenya and discusses the key challenges faced in the 
promotion and protection of refugee rights in the respective countries. The specific role that 
the NHRIs have played within the domestic refugee protection regimes will be analysed in 
chapter 6 and 7.  
4.2 The NHRIs in South Africa 
There are three primary NHRIs in South Africa. These are the South African Human Rights 
Commission (SAHRC), the Commission for Gender Equality (the Gender Commission) and 
the Office of the Public Protector (Public Protector). These institutions are among several 
independent institutions entrenched in Chapter Nine of the 1996 South African Constitution 
described as “institutions supporting constitutional democracy” or “Chapter Nine” 
institutions.1 The South African National Assembly recently initiated consultations to 
consider the amalgamation of some of the Chapter Nine institutions to create a single human 
rights body entitled the South African Commission for Human Rights and Equality.2 The 
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primary aim is to consolidate resources and reduce duplication of work.3 These three NHRIs 
participate in the Forum of Institutions Supporting Democracy (FISD) which was created, 
following the review of Chapter Nine institution activities, as a mechanism to enhance 
cooperation, collaboration, resource sharing and to reduce duplication of activities where 
mandates of these institutions overlapped.4 The importance of the opportunities that this 
forum presents for these three NHRIs within the context of refugee rights promotion and 
protection will be explored in chapter 6. 
 
4.2.1 The South African Human Rights Commission  
The South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) was initially established under the 
1993 interim Constitution5 in 1995 and inaugurated in March 1996 under the Human Rights 
Commission Act 54 of 1994. Section 184 (1) of the 1996 Constitution provides the SAHRC 
with a general mandate to promote, monitor and assess the observance of human rights in 
South Africa. Section 184(1)(a) requires the SAHRC to "promote respect for human rights 
and a culture of human rights"; section 184(1)(b) requires the SAHRC to "promote the 
protection, development and attainment of human rights"; and in terms of section 184(1)(c), 
the SAHRC must "monitor and assess the observance of human rights in the Republic."6 The 
SAHRC’s has powers as defined in Section 184(2). These are: 
(a) To investigate and to report on the observance of human rights  
(b) To take steps to secure appropriate redress where human rights have been 
violated 
(c) To carry out research and  
(d) To educate.7 
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The Constitution also assigns the SAHRC a specific function in relation to socio-economic 
rights. Section 184(3) states that, "each year, the Human Rights Commission must require 
relevant organs of state to provide the Commission with information on the measures that 
they have taken towards the realization of the rights in the Bill of Rights concerning housing, 
health care, food, water, social security, education and the environment."8 
These functions and powers are supplemented further by those contained in the South 
African Human Rights Commission Act No. 40 of 2013 (SAHRC Act), which replaced the 
1994 enabling legislation (Human Rights Commission Act).9 The SAHRC’s additional 
mandate is derived from other pieces of legislation. These are: the Promotion of Access to 
Information Act No. 2 of 2000 (PAIA) which empowers the SAHRC to monitor and report 
on the implementation of the right of access to information10 and the Promotion of Equality 
and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act No. 4 of 2000 (PEPUDA) which empowers the 
SAHRC to monitor the right to equality in collaboration with the Gender Commission.11 Both 
the SAHRC and the Gender Commission enjoy the right of appearance in Equality Courts 
and are appointed as members of the Equality Review Committee.12  
The SAHRC Act also enumerates the Commission’s composition and mode of 
operation including the appointment of its Commissioners. Section 13 of the SAHRC Act 
expounds on the SAHRC’s powers and functions. Most of the content of the SAHRC Act 
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reflects the minimum standards prescribed by the Paris Principles.13 Indeed, the 2013 
SAHRC Act provides a stronger basis for the SAHRC’s compliance with the Paris Principles 
than its enabling Act of 1994.14 For instance, the 2013 SAHRC Act departs from the previous 
legislation in providing a direct mandate for the SAHRC to monitor the implementation and 
compliance with international and regional human rights norms and standards.15 While the 
SAHRC had undertaken this role since its inception, its authority to do so was implied.16 This 
provides the SAHRC with a direct mandate to monitor State compliance with international 
and regional refugee law. 
In addition, in terms of the appointment of Commissioners, the SAHRC Act sets the 
number of Commissioners of the SAHRC to eight while previously the number of 
Commissioners appointed to office was upon the discretion of the President.17 The HRC Act 
of 1994 provided only for a minimum of five Commissioners.18 Therefore, the SAHRC’s first 
term from 1995 to 2002 had eleven Commissioners but this number was reduced to six in the 
second term (2002 to 2009).19 This provision has strengthened the composition requirements 
of the SAHRC in line with the Paris Principles.20  
The SAHRC also has quasi-judicial powers. Section 13(3) of the SAHRC Act 
provides that the SAHRC is competent to “investigate on its own initiative or on receipt of a 
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complaint, any alleged violation of human rights…” and to “bring proceedings in a 
competent court or tribunal in its own name, or on behalf of a person or a group or a class of 
persons.”21The SAHRC has considerable powers (within the limits of the law) to gather 
information as set out in Sections 15 and 16 of the SAHRC Act.22 These include the power to 
subpoena witnesses, to enter and search premises and to attach and remove articles of 
relevance to its investigations. These powers provide the SAHRC with the requisite legal 
means to effectively pursue its investigations and to address more systemic human rights 
violations.23  
The SAHRC discharges what is referred to as the “protection” mandate primarily 
through the complaints-handling process. It utilises its complaints-handling function as the 
means to “securing redress, advancing constitutional jurisprudence and serving as amicus 
curiae.”24 However, one of the more pressing challenges is the lack of powers of 
enforcement. This may have resulted in the lack of implementation of many of its findings 
and recommendations.25 This is a challenge often cited by NHRIs across the globe and a view 
held by observers such as Carver, who notes: “one of the biggest factors leading to a loss of 
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credibility and public legitimacy by NHRIs is an inability to give their recommendations the 
force of law.”26 
The SAHRC has largely been seen as credible even though there have been questions 
about its independence from the ruling political party’s influence.27 It has struggled with 
finding a balance between being reactive and proactive and striking a balance between being 
complaints-handling driven versus focusing on priority human rights issues.28 This is evident 
in its approach to handling refugee rights as will be discussed in chapter 6, wherein the 
SAHRC has identified the rights refugees and asylum seekers as a priority rights issue, but 
has struggled with implementing a strategy that would address the systemic issues that foster 
the violation of rights for this category of persons. 
As elucidated above, the SAHRC has a broad human rights mandate but does not 
have a specific mandate to promote and protect the rights of refugees and asylum seekers or 
other categories of migrants. In practice, and as discussed in chapter 6, this has not hindered 
its engagement with refugee rights’ promotion and protection. The SAHRC has interpreted its 
mandate broadly on the basis that the Constitution requires the protection of the rights of all 
persons in South Africa.29 This argument, as Pegram asserts, is supported by NHRI advocates 
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who perceive a broad and unrestrictive human rights mandate as essential - particularly in the 
context of rising xenophobia against migrants, refugees and asylum seekers.30 
 
4.2.2 The Commission for Gender Equality  
The Commission for Gender Equality (Gender Commission) is, as with the SAHRC, an 
independent institution entrenched in Chapter Nine of the 1996 South African Constitution.31 
It is a specialised national human rights institution tasked with the promotion of gender 
equality. The Gender Commission was initially established by the 1993 interim Constitution 
and as stated above, its establishment was reaffirmed by the 1996 Constitution. Its enabling 
legislation was enacted by Parliament in 1996.32 It therefore has both a constitutional and 
legislative mandate. 
Its constitutional mandate derives from Section 187 of the 1996 Constitution, which 
states that the Gender Commission “must promote respect for gender equality and the 
protection, development and attainment of gender equality.”33 It also provides that the Gender 
Commission has powers including the power to monitor, investigate, research, educate, 
lobby, advise and report on issues concerning gender equality.34 Its legislative mandate 
derives from the Commission on Gender Equality Act No. 39 of 1996 (CGE Act) and the 
Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000.  
The Gender Commission’s powers and functions are very similar to those of the 
SAHRC, except of course with the focus being on promoting and protecting the respect for 
gender equality. It has not been accredited by the global NHRI network, GANHRI, despite it 
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generally meeting the elements of an effective NHRI as prescribed by the Paris Principles.35 
While discussions have been undertaken with the SAHRC to determine the modalities of the 
Gender Commission pursuing accreditation, no formal arrangement has yet been concluded.36 
A key challenge is that the Gender Commission does not have a broad mandate as 
provided by the Paris Principles in paragraph 2 under the Competence and Responsibilities 
section.37  Notwithstanding, GANHRI may still consider an application for accreditation 
should certain conditions be met.38 The Gender Commission has also struggled with 
credibility due to operational and institutional challenges it has faced since its 
establishment.39 These factors may have played a role on the extent to which the SAHRC and 
the Gender Commission collaborate substantively, even where mandates overlap.  
As a specialist NHRI, the Gender Commission can play a significant role in 
promoting and protecting the rights of those refugees and asylum seekers who face 
vulnerabilities due to gender. For instance those who are particularly vulnerable to gender –
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based violence and sexual exploitation and those who are highly marginalised not only due to 
gender but also as a result of other factors such as being a sexual minority, elderly or being a 
person with disability.  
4.2.3 The Office of the Public Protector 
The Office of the Public Protector (Public Protector) is also a constitutional and legislative 
body. It is entrenched in chapter nine of the 1996 Constitution. The Public Protector is 
mandated to investigate “any conduct in state affairs…that is alleged or suspected to be 
improper or to result in any impropriety or prejudice” and to report on the findings of its 
investigation and “take appropriate remedial action” where it determines misuse of power.40 
Its legislative mandate derives primarily from the Public Protector Act 23 of 1994.41 In 
international terms, the Public Protector is considered an ombudsman and is a member of the 
international association of ombudsman institutions, the International Ombudsman Institute 
(IOI).42 It is however, not accredited by the global NHRI network, the GANHRI-though a 
significant number of ombudsman institutions hold dual membership with the IOI and the 
GANHRI.43  
The Public Protector does not have an explicit human rights mandate, but the 
complaints it handles often involve the infringement of a human right.44 The Public Protector 
refers infringements that are indicative of systemic human rights violations, to the 
commissions, and may conduct joint investigations and other activities with the other 
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commissions.45 The Public Protector has enjoyed a relatively high level of credibility since its 
establishment.46 However, the current Public Protector is faced with questions about her 
competence to hold the office.47 There is also limited evidence to indicate a systematic 
approach to collaboration amongst the three institutions.48 The Public Protector has a 
significant role to play within the refugee protection regime given its mandate to investigate 
maladministration and corruption. As will be discussed in the section below, the challenges 
faced within the South African refugee protection regime stem primarily from the failings 
within the Department of Home Affairs (DHA), the state organ tasked with the 
implementation of the Refugees Act. There is limited evidence available that indicates that 
the Public Protector has intervened with the DHA to address the systemic challenges that 
affect the DHA’s functioning generally or specifically with respect to access to rights for 
refugees and asylum seekers. The Public Protector’s role will be discussed in detail in chapter 
6. 
4.3 The refugee protection regime: South Africa 
South Africa employs an urban refugee policy, thus does not operate any refugee camps.49 
The South African government does not provide any social assistance to refugees and asylum 
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statement-public-protector-human-rights-commission-to-intervene-in-the-alexandra-crisis, accessed 26 January, 
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32. 
49 The SA local governments have on occasion established temporary shelters on the outskirts of major urban 
areas to house foreign nationals, regardless of status, who had been displaced by xenophobic violence such as 
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seekers as these categories of persons are not by law, restricted from enjoying any of the 
rights afforded to South African citizens, with the exception of the right to vote. This 
generous protection regime however, belies the reality that many refugees and asylum 
seekers face when accessing the rights they are entitled to. This is due in part to the failure of 
the government to effectively implement the existing laws and policies resulting in challenges 
of access to basic rights for refugees and asylum seekers. 50 These challenges have a historical 
basis.   
In 1994, South Africa hosted almost 92,000 refugees.51 When the Refugees Act of 
1998 (Refugees Act) came into force in 2000, the number of refugees had dropped to 
approximately 15,000 and asylum seekers were 15,000.52 The latest UNHCR statistics 
indicate that the number of refugees is 89,285 and asylum seekers are 184,203.53 Prior to 
1998, there was no refugee specific legislation in place in South Africa. Following the end of 
Apartheid, South Africa acceded to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its Protocol as well as 
the AU Refugee Convention in 1996.54 This provided part of the legal basis for the adoption 
of a legislative framework specifically for refugees and asylum seekers. In the absence of 
specific commitments to international refugee law and domestic legislation for refugees, the 
UNHCR had signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the South African 
apartheid-era government in 1991.  
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Africa’s Refugee Reception Offices.  
51 UNHCR, Statistical Yearbook, 2017. 
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53 UNHCR, Global Trends Report, 2018. UNHCR’s data is sourced primarily from the South African 
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This MOU officially recognised a role for the UNHCR in South Africa and served as 
the legal basis for protecting refugee rights.55  However, the agreement was limited in scope 
and focused on returnees and Mozambican refugees.56 The MOU stated, “…this Agreement 
embodies the basic conditions under which the UNHCR shall…carry out its mandated 
functions in favour of returnees….”57 The Agreement only provided protection to 
Mozambican refugees who resided in South Africa.58 The UNHCR implemented the 
voluntary repatriation of those refugees who opted to return to Mozambique while those who 
remained in South Africa were regularised.59  
However, the UNHCR’s role grew when South Africa began to formally deal with 
other groups of refugees in 1993 when it concluded a subsequent Basic Agreement. This 
Agreement was signed because the South African government was “willing to apply 
internationally accepted principles pertaining to the protection and treatment of asylum 
seekers and refugees.”60 It forms the substantive basis of the UNHCR’s operations in South 
Africa, which focus on coordination with Government and advocacy for refugee protection.61 
It was also one of the key official reference points for South Africa’s refugee policy prior to 
the enactment of the Refugees Act of 1998.62  
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In the absence of refugee specific legislation, the Aliens Control Act, despite its 
problematic provisions, provided the legal basis for processing asylum claims.63 This Act was 
found to be ‘manifestly unsuitable for the purpose of refugee protection.’64 The Act only 
controlled the admission, residence, work and exit of foreign nationals, but did not recognise 
persons in need of protection nor accord any rights to asylum seekers or refugees.65 In 
addition, many aspects of the legislation were found to be unconstitutional in light of the 
1996 Constitution.66 The Aliens Control Act was eventually repealed in 2002 by section 54 of 
the Immigration Act 13 of 2002 as amended by Act 19 of 2004.67  
In 1995, following a request from the South African government, the UNHCR drafted 
the initial version of the first piece of legislation on refugee matters in South Africa.68 It took 
another three years of consultation with civil society, refugee law experts, the SAHRC and 
the Gender Commission before the final draft Refugees Bill was presented before Parliament 
in 1998.69 This was finally adopted as the Refugees Act 130 of 1998 and entered into force in 
April 2000. In the interim period between 1998 and 2000, the Aliens Control Act continued 
to serve as the basis for administering the asylum process despite several of its provisions 
having been rendered null and void due to their unconstitutionality.70 
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A series of regulations that the Department of Home Affairs (DHA) issued before the 
adoption of the Refugees Act, attempted to bridge the gap between South Africa’s then 
immigration law (under the Aliens Control Act) and international law obligations and norms 
with respect to refugees.71 These too had their limitations, for instance, they did not provide 
for a process of review or appeal of decisions taken with respect to asylum applications or the 
refugee status determination process.72 
In addition to the Refugees Act, the Immigration Act (as amended by the Immigration 
Amendment Act of 2011) (the Act) also recognises asylum seekers.73 The Act allows for the 
issuance of an asylum transit visa at ports of entry for persons who claim to be asylum 
seekers.74 In terms of the Act, a person who claims asylum has five days within which to 
apply for asylum at a specific Department of Home Affairs’ office known as a “Refugee 
Reception Office.”75 Should a person fail to do so, that person becomes an illegal foreigner 
and may be deported.76    
4.3.1 The Refugees Act, 1998 
The Refugees Act establishes a refugee protection system that is rooted in the norms and 
standards as prescribed by international and regional refugee law and underscored by the Bill 
of Rights in chapter two of the 1996 Constitution.77 The Act established Refugee Reception 
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Offices (RRO), which facilitate the administration of refugee management. The RROs are 
tasked with issuing permits to refugees and asylum seekers. Its officials also conduct the 
eligibility and refugee status determination interviews.78 It also outlines the system of review 
and appeals conducted through the Standing Committee on Refugee Affairs (Standing 
Committee) and the Refugee Appeals Board (RAB) respectively.79  
In addition, the Act outlines the rights and duties of refugees and asylum seekers, 
which include access to documentation, right to remain in the country and right not to be 
unlawfully arrested or detained.80 It also contains specific provisions for unaccompanied 
children and for persons with disabilities.81 Importantly, it protects refugees and asylum 
seekers from refoulement.82 The Act is supplemented by regulations that stipulate the details 
for implementing the refugee status determination process.83 
The Refugees Act defines a refugee in accordance with both the 1951 Refugee 
Convention and the 1969 OAU Refugee Convention in its section 3 (a) and 3(b) respectively. 
“Gender” was included as specific grounds for persecution in its definition following the 
amendment to the Act in 2011.84 This has pertinent implications for the role of the Gender 
Commission within the context of addressing the gendered aspects of asylum. The inclusion 
of this broader definition overcomes the limitations for protection that may arise from the 
persecution-based definition contained in the 1951 Refugee Convention.85 This is paramount 
in the context of the causes of displacement and flight in many parts of Africa, which are 
usually due to conflict.86   
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The Act includes as a third category for a refugee, that is, either a spouse or a 
dependant of a refugee.87 Thus, an applicant may qualify indirectly as a refugee if he or she is 
a dependant of the principal applicant for refugee status. The Act in Section 35 provides for 
the prima facie recognition of refugees in the event of a mass influx.88 Such recognition is at 
the discretion of the Minister and may be granted on a conditional basis.89 The Act also 
contains provisions on the exclusion, cessation and withdrawal of refugee status.90  
Section 27 through to 34 of the Act set out the rights and duties of refugees and 
asylum seekers. Refugees and asylum seekers enjoy the same range of rights as South 
Africans except those rights limited to citizens.91Any conditions placed on them during the 
asylum process must also be in accordance with the Constitution or international law.92 The 
Act guarantees refugees the right to seek employment, to basic health care and the right to 
basic education.93 It is worth noting that evidence shows that both refugees and asylum 
seekers in South Africa, face significant challenges in accessing the rights to health and basic 
education.94 The Refugees Act has been amended by the Refugees Amendment Act 11 of 
2017, subject to the promulgation of the Refugees Amendment Act’s regulations and 
commencement of previous amendments to the Refugees Act passed in 2008 and 2011.95 The 
key amendments contained in the Refugees Amendment Act, 2017 are the removal of the 
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automatic right to work and study for asylum seekers.96 The amendment act is silent about 
how asylum seekers would meet their basic needs and may provide the basis for the South 
African government to implement an encampment policy.97  
In terms of refugee status determination, the Act sets out a detailed system for 
processing asylum applications. The Directorate of Refugee Affairs within the Department of 
Home Affairs (DHA) is responsible for the asylum process in South Africa. The Directorate 
also provides the administrative support to the Refugee Appeals Board, which considers all 
appeals where applications for refugee status have failed. It is also responsible for policy 
formulation and implementation and thus advises the Refugee Reception Offices on all policy 
matters. In South Africa, the UNHCR does not play an active role in the refugee status 
determination process, which is in stark contrast to the situation in Kenya.  
Under the regulations of the Refugees Act, an application for asylum seeker must be 
made in person at a refugee reception office.98 Once a person indicates the intention to seek 
asylum, that person will be issued with a temporary non-renewable permit valid for five 
days.99 This permit is issued under Section 23(1) of the Immigration Act (Section 23 Permit). 
An asylum seeker must then avail themselves for an initial interview (referred to as an 
eligibility interview) conducted by a refugee reception officer (officer). The officer will then 
issue a temporary asylum seeker permit, with a date for a full refugee status determination 
(RSD) hearing. This temporary permit is issued under Section 22 of the Act (Section 22 
Permit) and is valid for 6 months. A refugee status determination officer then conducts the 
interview and decides if the asylum seeker qualifies for refugee status.  
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If the refugee status is granted, the refugee is issued with a permit (Section 24 permit) 
and thereafter a refugee identity document. An appeal may be lodged with the Refugee 
Appeals Board (RAB) where an asylum seeker’s application is denied.  In theory, the asylum 
seeker has access to an interpreter, and may submit their statement for purposes of the 
interviews in a language of their choice. However, practice indicates that access to 
interpretation services is not always guaranteed.100 The asylum seeker also has access to the 
UNHCR and may obtain legal advice. The laws and regulations generally require that the 
status determination interview takes place within 30 days (one month) and that a decision be 
issued within 180 days (six months) of launching an application.101 The prescribed refugee 
status determination process is straightforward. However, in practice, the refugee status 
determination process is fraught with challenges as discussed below. 
4.4 Key challenges within the refugee protection regime in South Africa 
The Refugees Act provides a protection framework that is comprehensive and reflects 
international norms and standards. Most of the subsequent amendments and promulgation of 
its regulations strengthened the Act and clarified roles and responsibilities for those tasked 
with administering the Act. Crucially, the Refugees Act removed the ad-hoc manner in which 
South Africa had been providing protection to refugees and asylum seekers.102 However, 
numerous studies have identified the implementation challenges that the asylum process in 
South Africa has faced since the adoption of the Refugees Act.103  
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Persistent challenges of corruption, poor decision-making, mismanagement, asylum 
application backlogs, illegal detention, harassment, lack of recognition of legal documents, 
delays in decisions, and xenophobia have had a serious impact on effective protection.104This 
has led to the suggestion that the asylum system exits only in name.105 The challenges faced 
are categorised as either administrative or relate to the implementation process and are 
discussed below.  
4.4.1 Administrative challenges 
The Department of Home Affairs (DHA) has faced persistent administrative obstacles since 
South Africa committed itself to meeting its international obligations with respect to refugees 
and asylum seekers. As discussed above, the lack of a proper legal and policy framework 
resulted in the handling of asylum matters in ad-hoc manner. By the time the Refugees Act 
had been adopted in 1998, South Africa had already recognised over 22,000 refugees, in the 
absence of a concise protection framework. However, the transition from the Aliens Control 
Act regime to the Refugees Act was not properly planned for, thus resulting in a backlog of 
cases.106 The DHA has to date, not been able to effectively address the backlogs.107 This has 
resulted in perennial delays in the processing of asylum and appeals, recognition of refugees 
and issuance of requisite legal documents, which many refugees and asylum seekers need to 
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avoid facing harassment, illegal detention and challenges with accessing basic rights 
guaranteed to them.108  
The issuance of the Section 23 permit to persons who declare their intent to apply for 
asylum at the time of entry into South Africa, provides them with a legal status. It is assumed 
that the asylum seeker would within five days, be able to access a Refugee Reception Office, 
in order to apply for asylum. The Refugee Reception Offices were initially established in 
Johannesburg, Cape Town, Pretoria, Port Elizabeth, Durban and Musina. The Department of 
Home Affairs closed the Johannesburg, Cape Town and Port Elizabeth offices between 2010 
and 2012, which has made it difficult for asylum seekers to formally apply for asylum within 
the stipulated time frame.109 The closure of the offices has limited access to asylum for 
refugees and asylum seekers.110 The closure of the offices has also had a direct bearing on the 
backlog of cases at all levels of the asylum process including the renewal of refugee permits. 
The Department has been ordered to open these offices but has consistently ignored all court 
orders.111  
The delays in obtaining official documents have also been attributed to the lack of 
sufficient human resources within the Department of Home Affairs and inadequate 
equipment to process the applications. These have compounded the backlog. The result of the 
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delays is that asylum applications take years to be finalised instead of the mandated 
maximum period of six months. According to its most recent Asylum Report, the UNHCR 
indicates that the Department of Home Affairs still needs to process approximately 700,000 
section 22 cases (initial eligibility interview).112 There is also a large number of pending 
appeals which the Department estimates at over 258 000.113 
In addition, over 1200 cases are under review following a ruling by the High Court 
that rendered appeals null and void as they had been heard by a Refugee Appeals Board that 
was improperly constituted.114 These figures do not include those seeking renewal of their 
permits.115Without proper and valid documentation, asylum seekers face challenges accessing 
health care, education, financial facilities, harassment from the police and illegal detention.116  
In 2001 and 2006, the Department of Home Affairs together with the UNHCR implemented a 
backlog project, which assisted in reducing the caseload, but not in the management of new 
cases.117 Therefore, the underlying challenges were never addressed and the backlog in the 
asylum process was not eliminated. For instance, the Department of Home Affairs reported in 
2007 that despite efforts to reduce the backlog, it had grown by thirty per cent from 76,000 to 
144,000.118  
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In 2015, the UNHCR and the South African government agreed to develop yet 
another backlog project to address the outstanding appeal cases.119 The project was scheduled 
to run for three years, concluding in 2019.120 However, the proposed project was not 
implemented due to capacity and financial constraints. According to the Department of Home 
Affairs, discussions have been reopened with the UNHCR to develop and finance a 
comprehensive case management system to overhaul its inefficient case management 
processes.121  
The asylum process in South Africa has been plagued with systemic corruption for 
years.122 This has been widely reported on in the media and has been acknowledged by the 
Department of Home Affairs, including in its presentations to Parliament.123 The United 
States’ report on the state of human rights in South Africa has since 2009 to date, identified 
corruption as one of the challenges that refugees, asylum seekers and migrants in general 
face, when dealing primarily with the Department of Home Affairs and the South African 
Police Services (SAPS).124 Other international reports have also highlighted the problem with 
corruption within the South African asylum process.125  
Several studies have been conducted to identify the degree of the pervasiveness of 
corruption within the asylum process. For instance, in 2003, the Community Agency for 
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125 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Submission by the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees for the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights’ Compilation Report- 
Universal Periodic Review: South Africa, November 2011, http://www.refworld.org/docid/4ed724952.html; 
Human Rights Watch, ‘Human Rights Watch, World Report, 2007- South Africa, January 2007, 





Social Enquiry conducted a baseline study of refugees and asylum seekers that included 
questions about corruption at the Johannesburg, Cape Town, Pretoria, and Durban refugee 
reception offices.126 The survey of 1500 refugees and asylum seekers found that despite the 
Department of Home Affairs not prescribing any fees for services rendered to refugees and 
asylum seekers, applicants were asked to pay at various stages of the asylum application 
process.127   
In 2011, the African Centre for Migration and Society administered two surveys at the 
refugee reception offices – one targeting new asylum applicants and the other targeting 
applicants who had undergone status determination interviews.128 In total, 1417 refugees and 
asylum seekers participated in the survey.129 The findings showed that approximately a 
quarter of respondents were asked for money while queuing, and seven per cent to eight per 
cent experienced corruption once inside the office. The survey also noted that the highest 
levels of corruption (40%) occurred while queuing for services at the Pretoria Refugee 
Reception Office.130  
In 2015, Lawyers for Human Rights and the African Centre for Migration and Society 
found that thirty per cent of refugees and asylum-seekers experienced corruption at the 
refugee reception offices with the highest incidence (51%) at the Pretoria Refugee Reception 
Office. In addition to these studies, the Public Protector published a report on unlawful 
conduct at the Braamfontein Refugee Reception Office in Johannesburg.131 Additional 
studies by a CSO, Corruption Watch and Amit indicate that the Department of Home Affairs 
has done little to implement strategies that would eradicate systemic corruption within the 
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Cited in Roni Amit, Queue Here for Corruption, 13 
127Community Agency for Social Inquiry, ‘National Refugee Baseline Survey 
128 Roni Amit, No Way In.  
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Department.132 A few officials have been dismissed and arrested for taking bribes, but no 
measures have been implemented to effectively address corruption within the asylum process. 
In a briefing to Parliament, the Department of Home Affairs contended that changes to the 
Refugees Act, through the Refugees Amendment Act 2017, would also provide procedural 
measures to address corruption within the asylum process.133 The Department of Home 
Affairs launched an anti-corruption campaign in 2015, known as Operation Bvisa Masina 
(Clear the Rot), which according to the Department has led to the arrest of eighty-six 
government officials.134 There was neither any information available on how many of the 
arrests related to officials dealing with refugee and asylum seeker matters nor how many of 
those arrested have been convicted.  
A study by Corruption Watch on the impact of corruption on the asylum process, 
found that the measures that Department of Home Affairs had put in place, including 
Operation Bvisa Masina, were inadequate to effectively deal with corruption.135 In particular, 
the anti-corruption measures did not take into account the vulnerabilities and fears that 
refugees and asylum seekers expressed.136 Refugees and asylum seekers who participated in 
this study claimed that they would not report corruption through the Department of Home 
Affairs’ channels due to fear of reprisal, fear of the effect on their application or status 
determination and fear of providing their personal details to the Department.137 In addition, 
this study found that information on corruption reporting was either not available or not 
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prominently displayed and was not available in a language readily understood.138   
Related to the administrative challenges within the system are the legal challenges 
that have arisen due to the improper application and implementation of the Refugees Act. 
Various courts have ruled against the Department’s (and other Government Departments’) 
interpretation of the Refugees Act including with respect to the refugee status determination 
process, detention of refugees and asylum seekers and rights due to refugees and asylum 
seekers.139 Illegal detention, in particular, features prominently as a lived experience for 
many refugees and asylum seekers.140  
4.4.2 Xenophobia in South Africa 
Xenophobia can be defined as “hostility against foreigners in a given population, which can 
include attitudes, prejudices and behaviour that reject and exclude persons, based on the 
perception that they are outsiders or foreigners to a community, society or national 
identity.”141 Xenophobia poses a huge challenge for migrants in general in South Africa.142 
Remarks by public officials claiming that migrants are responsible for high levels of crime in 
South Africa contribute to the xenophobic attitudes towards many migrants regardless of 
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status.143 The xenophobic attitudes prevalent throughout South Africa have led to outbreaks 
of violence against migrants, resulting in the loss of lives, destruction of property, and loss of 
livelihoods.144  
The SAHRC’s investigation into xenophobic violence in 2008 found that non-
nationals were often subject to “intense discrimination and hostility from local communities - 
because South Africans blamed them for unemployment, access to housing and other 
economic goods and taking their women.”145  In addition, a study on violence against foreign 
nationals found that not only did a number of such crimes contain elements of xenophobia, 
but also that the reality of impunity for such crimes supported the development of 
xenophobia.146  
For refugees and asylum seekers who fall under a different protection framework 
from other migrants, xenophobia impacts on their ability to access the rights they are entitled 
to. For instance, the SAHRC recently noted that xenophobia is one of the main challenges 
preventing refugees and asylum seekers from accessing basic services that they are entitled 
to.147 The SAHRC found that a major challenge with dealing with xenophobia was the high 
level of impunity for crimes committed against non-nationals.148 The Institute of Security 
Studies also argues that part of the problem with addressing xenophobia has been that many 
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political leaders legitimise rather than challenge xenophobic attitudes.149 Where policy and 
legislative processes have been initiated, these have been slow in development. 150 The State 
has thus made limited progress in addressing xenophobia. 
At the policy level, the South African government adopted the National Action Plan 
to Combat Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance (NAP) in 
2019.151 Initial consultations to draft the NAP began in 2001 shortly after the conclusion of 
the World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related 
Intolerance, which was held in Durban the same year. The drafting process, however, took 
over 15 years to finalise. In May 2018, the Department of Justice and Constitutional 
Development introduced the Prevention and Combating of Hate Crimes and Hate Speech Bill 
to Parliament.152 This was after a decade of campaigning spearheaded by lesbian, gay, 
bisexual, transsexual and queer (LGBTQ) activists.153 While these are positive strides in 
creating a legal and policy framework to address xenophobia, it has taken the State a 
considerable amount of time to take these steps. It is also still too early to determine the 
impact that the law and policy will have in addressing xenophobia in South Africa.  
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4.5 The NHRIs in Kenya 
Kenya has established three primary national human rights institutions that are similar in 
structure and function as those in South Africa. These are the Kenya National Commission on 
Human Rights (KNCHR), the National Gender and Equality Commission (NGEC or Gender 
Commission) and the Commission on Administrative Justice (CAJ). All three institutions 
have constitutional and legislative mandates. The Kenyan parliament recently initiated 
consultations to re-establish the institution envisaged in the 2010 Kenyan constitution, the 
Kenya National Human Rights and Equality Commission (KNHREC).154 This commission 
had all the powers and functions of the KNCHR, the Gender Commission, and the CAJ, but 
the Kenyan parliament chose to operationalise Section 59(4) of the Constitution, which gave 
it the authority to enact legislation that would restructure the KNHREC into two or more 
separate entities.155 Subsequently in 2011, Parliament passed three Acts creating three 
Commissions: the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (successor to the KNCHR 
of 2002), the National Gender and Equality Commission (successor to the National 
Commission on Gender and Development) and the Commission on Administrative Justice.156  
All three commissions derive their primary functions from Article 59 (1) of the 
Constitution but their respective enabling statutes are expounded on their specific mandates. 
Therefore, all have a human rights mandate but for instance, the KNCHR does not have a 
mandate on matters relating to equality and non-discrimination of ‘special interest groups.’157 
The term ‘special interest groups’ is not defined but is understood to include “minorities and 
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marginalised persons, women, persons with disabilities, and children.”158 In its 2016 Report 
on the status of equality and inclusion in Kenya, the Gender Commission indicated that 
special interest groups were children; the youth; women; people with disabilities; older 
members of society; and minorities and marginalised groups.159 The KNCHR includes 
migrants under this group.160 The terms “minorities” and “marginalised” have not explicitly 
included refugees or asylum seekers.161 This has perhaps limited the extent to which rights of 
groups who are considered marginalised such as refugees, asylum seekers, migrants, sexual 
minorities and the internally displaced have been addressed by the commissions. The lack of 
clarity may on the other hand provide a wider scope for interpretation in terms of defining the 
groups of persons who would qualify as marginalised or minorities.162 
In addition, the demarcation of the mandates is not necessarily as clear in practice. For 
instance, the KNCHR handles matters relating to sexual minorities, a category that would 
arguably fall under the mandate of the Gender Commission, as it is tasked with addressing 
gender equality and non-discrimination. The KNCHR has developed a comprehensive action 
plan to address sexual orientation and gender identity rights and partners with the regional 
network of African NHRIs (NANHRI) in the implementation of the rights-related activities 
focusing on sexual orientation and gender identity.163 There is no evidence to indicate that 
either the KNCHR or the network of African NHRIs undertakes this work in collaboration 
with the Gender Commission. On the other hand, the Gender Commission and the KNCHR 
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have a close working relationship with respect to the rights of indigenous persons in 
Kenya.164  
There are overlaps in the mandates of the three commissions but there is no clear 
strategy in place to ensure effectiveness in the promotion and protection of rights when 
overlaps occur. The discussions for the merger of the three NHRIs are yet to be concluded.  
However, the KNCHR is in favour of a merger, while the Gender Commission and 
Commission on Administrative Justice are opposed to the proposal, citing the threat to the 
independent functions that each commission performs.165 
4.5.1 The establishment of the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights 
The idea of the promotion and protection of human rights in Kenya by a specialised body was 
introduced in 1992 during Kenya’s re-transition into a multi-party political system.166 The 
promotion of such a specialised body developed in three distinct phases: pre-2002, between 
2002 and 2010; and post-2010. Each phase is marked respectively by the adoption of a 
presidential decree, legislative act and the adoption of a new constitution.  
The first phase resulted in the creation of the Standing Committee on Human Rights. 
This was followed by the creation of the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights by 
an Act of Parliament. The final phase was the creation of the Kenya National Human Rights 
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and Equality Commission through the adoption of a new constitution in 2010 and its 
subsequent split into three distinct institutions, which included the Kenya National 
Commission on Human Rights. These phases are discussed below. 
 
The Standing Committee on Human Rights (1995-2002) 
In 1995, the President of the ruling party, the Kenya African National Union, established the 
Standing Committee on Human Rights (SCHR or Committee). This was later changed into a 
parliamentary committee in 1996.167 The SCHR was empowered to investigate complaints of 
human rights violations, abuse of power and violations of fundamental rights and freedoms 
set out in the Kenyan Constitution.168 It had the duty to educate the public and to raise the 
public awareness of human rights and freedoms.169  
The SCHR consisted of ten committee members working on a part-time basis.  
However, the Committee had limited independence and powers as it was controlled by the 
Executive.170 Its work was also hampered by limited financial and human resources.171 As 
such it was criticised as having had limited influence on the human rights agenda in Kenya at 
that time.172 Nonetheless, the Committee issued several private reports to the Executive and 
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published its first public report in 1998.173 The report consisted of a general overview of 
human rights laws and definitions, as well as information on human rights abuses.174  
The Committee largely focused its work on highlighting prison conditions in Kenya. 
It dealt with issues such as torture and ill-treatment, health services in prisons and prisoners’ 
welfare.175 In addition, the SCHR educated the public on human rights and put pressure on 
the Government to implement police reform.176 It also coordinated the development and 
initial implementation of the National Action Plan on Human Rights (NAP), following up on 
the recommendations from the 1993 Vienna Conference on Human Rights.177 Crucially, the 
SCHR, noting the limitations of its status, powers and limited autonomy, drafted the bill that 
eventually led to the establishment of its successor, the Kenya National Commission on 
Human Rights.178 The SCHR laid important groundwork for the KNCHR with respect to 
prevention of torture and ill-treatment and addressing human rights abuses perpetrated by the 
police. These continue to be primary areas of work of the current KNCHR including with 
respect to refugee rights. 
 
The Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (2002-2010) 
The Kenya National Commission on Human Rights was established in 2002 through the 
Kenya National Commission on Human Rights Act.179 Its establishment led to the dissolution 
of the SCHR in 2002. There were broad consultations during the drafting of its founding 
legislation. The SCHR together with the Kenyan Attorney General consulted with the 
OHCHR, local civil society, and representatives from the Ugandan Human Rights 
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Commission and the South African Human Rights Commission when drafting the bill.180 The 
resultant mandate reflected the minimum standards set out in the Paris Principles. This was 
confirmed by GANHRI when it accredited the KNCHR with an A status in 2005, only two 
years following the commencement of its duties.181   
The KNCHR was a vast improvement on the SCHR in terms of composition, mandate 
and practice.182 It was a statutory body with guarantees of independence, pluralism and 
security of tenure.183 It was accountable to Parliament and had a broad human rights 
mandate.184 It also had well-defined quasi-judicial powers.185 It was established during a 
democratic transition in Kenya and it initially received a high-level of political support, as 
there was a general political will to promote a human rights agenda.186 The KNCHR had a 
broad mandate that provided it with a strong basis to promote and protect the refugee rights. 
It was tasked with the promotion and protection of the rights of any person, it had the 
authority to visit places of detention, to ensure compliance with international human rights 
treaties and to perform any other functions it deemed necessary for the promotion and 
protection of human rights.187  
The Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (2010-present) 
In 2010, Kenya adopted a new Constitution, which entrenched a national human rights 
institution referred to as, the Kenya National Human Rights and Equality Commission.188 
However, parliament in terms of Section 59(4) passed legislation that created the Kenya 
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National Commission on Human Rights. The KNCHR has the competence to promote and 
protect human rights pursuant to Article 59(2) and Article 252 of the Constitution of Kenya 
read together with Section 7, 8 of the KNCHR Act. It retains the broad mandate granted to its 
predecessor and which meet the minimum standards prescribed by the Paris Principles. While 
it is mandated to work in close collaboration with the Gender Commission, it cannot receive 
and investigate complaints related to equality and freedom from discrimination.189 Nor can 
the KNCHR report on compliance with international and regional obligations relating to the 
rights of groups protected under the law relating to equality and non-discrimination.190  
The KNCHR Act details the Commission’s composition, methods of operation and an 
open and transparent process of the appointment of Commissioners. The appointment process 
gives due regard to the principle of equality. It states in Section 11(13):  
“In shortlisting, nominating or appointing persons as chairperson and members of the 
Commission, the selection panel, the National Assembly and the President shall 
ensure that not more than two-thirds of the members are of the same gender, shall 
observe the principle of gender equity, regional and ethnic balance and shall have due 
regard to the principle of equal opportunities for persons with disabilities.”191 The Act 
provides for the appointment of five Commissioners, who serve only one six-year 
term and must be full-time.”192  
 
The KNCHR’s powers are provided for in Section 252 of the Constitution and Sections 26-28 
and 31of the KNCHR Act. It has considerable powers including the power to adjudicate on 
matters relating to human rights.193 It also has the powers to investigate complaints, issue 
summons, to subpoena witnesses, to enter and search premises and to attach and remove 
articles or importance to its investigations.194 The KNCHR is viewed as a credible institution 
but has been severely affected by a lack of political goodwill and financial and human 
resource constraints. This resulted in the undermining of its leadership, delays in the 
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appointment of new Commissioners when vacancies occurred and challenges in 
implementing programmes.195  
The KNCHR’s mandate does not expressly provide for the promotion and protection 
of refugee rights. However, in practice, the KNCHR has, similarly to the SAHRC, interpreted 
its mandate to include the promotion and protection of refugee rights. As a result, it has 
engaged in a variety of promotion and protection activities to advance these rights. Its role 
within the Kenyan refugee protection regime will be discussed in chapter 7.  
 
4.5.2 The National Gender and Equality Commission (Gender Commission)  
The Gender Commission derives its mandate from the Constitution and through its enabling 
legislation. It was established in accordance with Article 59 of the Constitution as part of the 
Kenya National Human Rights and Equality Commission (KNHREC). However, as 
mentioned above, the National Assembly opted to operationalise Section 59(4) of the 
Constitution, which gave the option of splitting the KNHREC into two or more separate 
entities.196  
The Gender Commission has a broad mandate to promote and to protect the principle 
of equality and freedom from discrimination. It is the institution tasked with ensuring the 
State’s compliance with its international and regional obligations relating to equality and 
freedom broadly and those relating to women, persons with disabilities, children and 
minorities or marginalised groups.197 Its overall functions are quite similar to those of the 
KNCHR except to the extent that they focus on promoting and protecting equality. It has the 
powers to investigate any violations of the principle of equality and freedom from 
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discrimination.198 It has additional powers to adjudicate on matters within its mandate, issue 
summons and to enter, search and seize articles relevant to its investigations.199 
Its Act also prescribes the criteria for the appointment of Commissioners, which 
mirrors that of the KNCHR Act.200 The selection and appointment process is independent, 
detailed and transparent.201 Both Acts provide for full a complement of five Commissioners, 
who can only serve a six-year term on a full-time basis.202 All Commissioners’ tenure of 
office is guaranteed and removal from office must be done in accordance with the 
Constitution.203 
Though its mandate is not as broad as that of the KNCHR, most of the provisions 
contained in its founding and enabling legislation reflect the minimum standards set by the 
Paris Principles. It has discharged both its promotion and protection mandate including 
through research, publication of reports and developing tools for promoting equality, 
including a model law on sexual and gender-based violence, and a performance and 
monitoring and evaluation toolkit on gender and equality mainstreaming. However, there is a 
dearth in scholarly literature on the functions of the Gender Commission and how it gives 
effect to its mandate.204 Nonetheless, the abundant literature on the gender inequalities that 
refugees and asylum seekers face including those who are sexual minorities provide a basis to 
analyse the role that a specialised NHRI such as the Gender Commission can play within the 
refugee protection regime.  Thus, the Gender Commission can potentially contribute to 
mitigating gender inequalities and discrimination experienced by refugees and asylum 
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seekers.  The Gender Commission would also be an important institution in promoting an 
intersectional approach to addressing inequality and discrimination that refugees and asylum 
seekers face. This role will be discussed in chapter 7.  
4.5.3 The Commission on Administrative Justice 
The Commission on Administrative Justice (CAJ), also known as the Office of the 
Ombudsman, is the third constitutional body established under Article 59 (4) of the 
Constitution. The recommendation to establish an Office of the Ombudsman was initially put 
forward in 1971 through a commission of inquiry into poor service delivery in the Kenyan 
public sector.205 While this recommendation was never implemented, subsequent 
recommendations by the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission and national policy documents 
led the President to establish the Public Complaints Standing Committee (PCSC) in 2007 as a 
Department within the Ministry of Justice.206 The PCSC was mandated to enquire into 
allegations of misuse of office, corruption, and unethical conduct, breach of integrity, 
maladministration, delay, injustice, discourtesy, inattention, incompetence, misbehaviour, and 
inefficiency or ineptitude against public officers.207However, its powers were limited, it 
lacked independence and it was institutionally weak due to its establishment through a 
Gazette Notice.208  
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The Commission on Administrative Justice was constituted in 2011 as an independent 
institution, accountable to the Executive and to the National Assembly.209 It derives its 
primary functions from the Constitution under Article 59 and its enabling legalisation, the 
Commission on Administrative Justice Act, 2011 (the Act).210 Its primary mandate is to 
investigate “any conduct in State affairs or any act or omission in public administration in 
any sphere of Government and complaints of abuse of power, unfair treatment, manifest 
injustice or unlawful, oppressive, unfair or unresponsive official conduct.”211 It is also tasked 
with facilitating “the promotion and protection of the fundamental rights and freedoms of the 
individual in public administration.”212 In addition, the Commission is required to discharge 
its mandate utilising a human rights-based approach. This is stipulated in its guiding 
principles contained in its founding Act, which states:  
“In fulfilling its mandate, the Commission shall act in accordance with the values and 
principles set out in the Constitution and the laws of Kenya, and shall observe and 
respect— 
(a) the diversity of the people of Kenya; 
(b) impartiality and gender equity; 
(c) all treaties and conventions which have been ratified by Kenya and in 
particular the fact that human rights are indivisible, interdependent, 
interrelated and of equal importance for the dignity of all human beings; and 
(d) the rules of natural justice.”213 
 
Thus, the Commission on Administrative Justice has a more explicit human rights mandate 
than the South African Public Protector. This provides the Commission with a definitive basis 
to engage with the promotion and protection of refugee rights. Its role in this regard is 
pertinent given that the Kenyan government has taken over the administration of the refugee 
regime from the UNHCR. In particular, the challenges that the refugee protection regime 
faces, as discussed below, primarily result from the Kenyan government’s inaction or 
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implementation of its obligations either arbitrarily or in contravention to its international 
obligations. Its role within the refugee protection regime will be discussed in chapter 7. 
The CAJ’s other functions and powers are similar to those of the KNCHR and Gender 
Commission except for their focus on addressing maladministration and promoting 
administrative justice. It has the powers to investigate “any complaints of abuse of power, 
unfair treatment, manifest injustice or unlawful, oppressive, unfair or unresponsive official 
conduct within the public sector.”214 It has in this regard jurisdiction to receive complaints in 
confidence and under seal, from persons in places of detention including prisons, remand or 
mental institutions.215 Given the frequent arrest and detention of refugees and asylum seekers 
in Kenya, the potential role of NHRIs for accountability with respect to refugees and asylum 
seekers in places of detention is crucial.   
The Commission has the powers to recommend compensation or other appropriate 
remedies against persons or bodies.216 It has additional powers to adjudicate on matters 
within its mandate, issue summons and to enter, search and seize articles relevant to its 
investigations.217 It has the additional function of enhancing social cohesion in Kenya, 
overseeing the implementation of relevant decisions of international tribunals such as the 
African Commission on Human and People’s Rights (African Commission)218 and overseeing 
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the implementation and enforcement of the Access to Information Act.219  This is another 
important function within the context of refugee rights as the African Commission receives 
complaints (known as communications) from refugees and asylum seekers. The African 
Commission for instance, has found that Kenya violated the rights of a refugee, but there is 
no record to indicate if its decision was implemented by the Kenyan government.220  
The Commission on Administrative Justice discharges its mandate through issuing 
advisory opinions, complaints handling, publication of reports, conducting research, 
conducting investigation into systemic problems within the public sector.221 It also litigates 
and acts as amicus curiae.222 According to Section 9 of the Act, its membership comprises 
three Commissioners, one of whom is the Chairperson. The Act sets out the qualification 
requirements for the Chairperson and the Commissioners.223 The appointment process is 
detailed, transparent and it is similar to the process of appointment for the Chairpersons and 
Commissioners for the KNCHR and the Gender Commission.224  The National Assembly 
gives the final approval of nominees to the office.225  The Commissioners serve a limited 
term of six years without renewal and do so on a full-time basis.226  
The Commission has faced challenges in fulfilling its mandate. It has faced 
allegations of corruption, maladministration and is the subject of litigation to the detriment of 
its mandate.227 It has noted the limited levels of awareness of its existence, role, and functions 
among the public and within the public sector especially the judiciary, has challenged the 
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extent to which it can effectively discharge its mandate.228 Its work has also been hampered 
by poor financial resource allocation from the Government.229 There is also a dearth of 
empirical literature on the Commission to determine its effectiveness either as an anti-
corruption institution or a human rights institution, which would be especially important in 
the context of refugee rights given its mandate to oversee social cohesion and the 
implementation of relevant findings from international tribunals. 
The Commission has developed strategies to overcome some of the administrative 
and institutional challenges it faces for instance, by developing an integrated referral system 
for complaints handling with other public institutions with a wider grassroots presence.230 It 
also implements some of its key projects in partnership with UN agencies such as the UNDP 
and other aid agencies.231  
4.6 The refugee protection regime: Kenya 
Kenya has hosted refugees since the 1960s and was one of the States involved in the drafting 
of the 1969 OAU Refugee Convention.232 Initial refugee flows began in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s and were from Uganda owing to the brutal regime under Idi Amin.233 The 
number of Ugandan refugees was relatively low and many had relatives in Kenya.234 Thus, 
many settled with relative ease and were readily absorbed into the country’s economic 
sector.235 Most Ugandan refugees acquired Kenyan identity cards and gained some level of 
access to social services such as education, health and housing.236  
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Kenya’s refugee population increased significantly from the mid-1980s due to internal 
strife and civil war in Ethiopia, Somalia and South Sudan.237 The severe drought in Ethiopia 
in 1985 also caused a significant number of Ethiopians to seek asylum in Kenya.238 As a 
result, the refugee numbers grew exponentially, from 14,500 to 130, 000 in 1991.239 By 1992, 
the number of refugees in Kenya stood at 420,000 and they were primarily from Somali, 
Ethiopia and Sudan (now South Sudan).240 In 1994, the genocides in Rwanda and Burundi, 
coupled with civil conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo led to large numbers of 
persons from these countries seeking asylum in Kenya.241    
The figures for refugees and asylum seekers in Kenya have fluctuated from the height 
of the regional crises in the 1990s but have remained relatively high. Kenya currently hosts 
421,248 officially registered refugees and 50,476 asylum seekers, though reports indicate that 
many are not registered.242 A new wave of Ethiopian asylum seekers, estimated at 9,600, 
begun to arrive in March 2018, following unrest in the Oromo region of Ethiopia.243   
The majority of the refugees live in two refugee camps, that is, the Kakuma Refugee Camp 
(Kakuma), close to the border with South Sudan and the Dadaab Refugee Camp (Dadaab), 
close to the border with Somalia. A further estimated 65,000 registered refugees and asylum 
seekers live in urban areas.244  
The evolution of the refugee protection regime in Kenya can be categorised into two 
phases. The first phase runs from independence in 1963 to the adoption of the new 
constitution in 2010 and the second phase is post-2010. These two phases are discussed 
below.  
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4.6.1 Domestic legal framework (1963-2010)   
Kenya was a dualist State until 2010 when a new constitution was adopted. Therefore, 
treaties did not apply unless parliament passed domestic legislation or amended existing 
legislation to incorporate treaty provisions.245 Despite having ratified the 1951 Refugee 
Convention and its protocol and the 1967 AU Refugee Convention in 1966, 1981 and 1993 
respectively, Kenya only adopted legislation related specifically to refugees in 2006 through 
the Refugees Act No. 13 of 2006.246 Discussions on the incorporation of international refugee 
law into domestic law had begun in the early 1990s, but there was limited political will to 
give effect to any rights, duties or obligations as prescribed by international and regional 
refugee law.247 
In the absence of refugee specific legislation, matters related to refugees and asylum 
seekers were governed by the Immigration Act of 1967 and the Aliens Restriction Act of 
1973.248 Under the Immigration Act, classes of entry permits were provided for, under which 
a person could apply for entry into Kenya. Class M allowed for a refugee to apply for an 
entry permit. It also allowed the spouse or the child of the refugee to apply for the permit. 
The Class M entry permit states: 
“A person who is a refugee, that is to say, is, owing to well-founded fear of being 
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social 
group or political opinion, unwilling to avail himself of the protection of the country 
of his nationality or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his 
former habitual residence for any particular reason, is unable or, owing to such fear, is 
unwilling to return to such country; and any wife or child over the age of thirteen 
years of such a refugee.” 249 
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Section 5(2) of the Immigration Act set out the assessment procedures. Immigration Officers 
of the Ministry of State in the Office of the President were assigned the role to hear and to 
determine applications for refugee status. The Immigration Officer issued an entry permit 
upon satisfaction that the applicant met the refugee definition. Under the Act, an applicant 
was required to answer any question and to produce any document that would allow the 
Immigration Officer to ascertain whether they should be permitted entry into Kenya.250 Even 
though the Act provided for an appeal to be lodged should an application be rejected, the 
Immigration Officer was not required to provide reasons for any decisions made.251 
The Aliens Restriction Act of 1973 in Section 3, read together with rule 4, required all 
foreigners to report to a registration officer within 90 days of arrival in Kenya.252 The 
registration process required foreigners to complete a form, which had a category for 
refugees. The registration process did not provide refugee status determination procedures. 
Both Acts did not provide for refugee rights, they only governed their entry into Kenya as 
non-nationals. They did not offer any safeguards. These only came into effect once the 
Refugees Act No. 13 of 2006 (Refugees Act) was promulgated. The Refugees Act repealed 
both the Immigration Act and the Aliens Restriction Act.253   
The Refugees Act, similar to the South African Refugees Act, incorporates both the 
international and regional definitions of a refugee in its Section 3(1) and 3(2) respectively. In 
addition, Section 11(3) allows for the recognition of refugees in situ, for persons already 
lawfully present in Kenya. Furthermore, the Act prohibits the penalisation of asylum seekers 
for illegal entry, as long as they present themselves for refugee status determination, within 
the stipulated timeframe.254  
The Act established a number of offices to manage refugee affairs in the country. It 
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created the Secretariat of Refugee Affairs, to serve as the administrative hub for refugee 
matters.255 The Act also created the office of the Commissioner for Refugee Affairs, who is 
the primary custodian for the implementation of all aspects of refugee affairs in Kenya. The 
Commissioner’s comprehensive set of tasks relating to the promotion and protection of the 
rights of refugees, are set out in Section 7 of the Act.256 These include formulating policy and 
implementing refugee law and policy in accordance with international standards.257 The 
Commissioner is required, under the Act, to collaborate with UN Agencies and any other 
institutions to ensure that refugee rights are promoted and protected.258 The Commissioner is 
also the person tasked with receiving and processing applications for refugee status. This 
specific role is undertaken with the assistance of a Refugee Affairs Committee.259 
The Act recognises the principle of family reunification. Any members of family of a 
refugee may also be considered refugees.260 The refugee can also apply to have members of 
his or her family outside Kenya, to reside with them.261 Such family members will be granted 
the full rights and privileges of a refugee.262 There is no prohibition for family members to 
apply for refugee status individually should they choose to do so.263  
The Act provides specific protection for refugee women and children through Section 
23. Section 23 (1) stipulates that the commissioner shall “ensure that specific measures are 
taken to ensure the safety of refugee women and children in designated areas.” The 
commissioner shall also “ensure that a child who is in need of refugee status or who is 
considered a refugee shall, whether unaccompanied or accompanied by his parents or by any 
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other person, receive appropriate protection and assistance.”264The Commissioner is also 
required to ensure that unaccompanied refugee minors receive all necessary assistance to 
trace their parents or other family members to enable reunification of the family.265 Where 
reunification is unsuccessful, the Commissioner must ensure that the unaccompanied refugee 
minor receives the requisite protection afforded to minors who have been deprived of their 
families.266  
Additionally, the Act sets out the rights and duties of refugees and asylum seekers, 
though the rights of asylum seekers are not set out clearly.  Section 16(1) states that “every 
recognized refugee and every member of his family in Kenya shall be entitled to the rights 
and be subject to the obligations contained in the international conventions to which Kenya is 
party.” In addition, refugees are granted the right to work.267 Both refugees and asylum 
seekers have the right to documentation.268 Asylum seekers may also be required to reside in 
transit centres or refugee camps during their status determination process.269  
The Act provides grounds for exclusion, cessation and withdrawal of refugee status 
while also reaffirming the principle of non-refoulement in Section 18. An amendment to the 
Act imposed a limit on the number of refugees and asylum seekers permitted to stay in 
Kenya. It set the threshold at 150,000, which could only be revised through Parliament, for a 
maximum of six months.270 This provision was included following several attacks in Kenya 
by the Somali-based terrorist group, Al-Shabaab.271 However, this provision was deemed 
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unconstitutional because it violated the principle of non refoulement. 272 
The Act contains inherent contradictions with respect to the rights accorded to 
refugees. According to the Act, every recognized refugee is entitled to the rights and is 
subject to the obligations contained in the international conventions to which Kenya is 
party.273 However, in terms of law, refugees [and asylum seekers] are required to reside in 
camps. This restricts their movement and by implication their ability to earn a living and to 
access many other socio-economic rights. 
In addition to the Refugees Act, the Kenyan National Action Plan on Human Rights 
(NAP) identifies refugees and asylum seekers as one of the vulnerable groups requiring 
particular attention with respect of rights promotion and protection. It notes that, “this 
substantial population necessitates a rights- based approach to ensuring the protection and 
assistance of refugees and asylum seekers especially since Kenya has a policy of encampment 
[Author’s own emphasis].”274 The NAP reiterates the State’s commitment to “taking all 
appropriate measures to ensure the realisation of refugee rights in accordance with 
international refugee protection norms and standards.”275 
In 2014, the Department of Refugee Affairs initiated a process to develop a National 
Asylum Policy, which would include the review of the Refugees Act.276 A Refugee Bill was 
subsequently introduced to Parliament in July 2016 and passed in 2018. However, the 
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President declined to sign it citing poor consultations with the public.277 Nonetheless, the Bill 
proposes some significant and positive changes in the refugee protection framework.  
It mandates a formal role for the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights. It 
envisions, in Section 7(1) (c) (viii), an advisory role for the KNCHR together with the 
UNHCR, and in Section 11 as a voting member of the Refugee Status Appeal Board. It 
provides in more detail the refugee status determination process and reinforces the legality of 
the identification documentation that an asylum seeker receives.278 It does away with 
mandatory encampment, but it does give the Minister the powers to implement an 
encampment policy primarily targeting asylum seekers.279  In addition, it guaranteed refugees 
and asylum seekers rights due to them under international law, including non-refoulement.280 
It also explicitly provided for the rights to access land, access education and to seek 
employment (for both refugees and asylum seekers).281 The Bill is drafted in the spirit of 
integration for refugees in Kenya.  
The amended Bill, The Refugees Bill, 2019, waters down many of the above 
provisions. It broadly provides for the rights and duties for refugees and asylum seekers.282 It 
focuses on encampment, voluntary repatriation and resettlement of refugees and does away 
with many aspects of local integration contained in the 2016 version of the Bill.283 It therefore 
reinforces the Kenyan government’s stance of the temporary nature of its role as a refugee 
host country. The revised Bill retains a role for the KNCHR within the proposed Refugee 
Status Appeals Committee but removes its explicit reference as an advisory member of the 
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proposed Refugee Advisory Committee.284 The possible inclusion of the KNCHR as a 
member of the committee is left to the discretion of the members of the committee. Article 
9(2) states: “The Committee may, when necessary, co-opt any person to attend the meeting of 
the Committee and advise it on the performance of its duties.”285 The amended Bill was 
reintroduced to Parliament in September 2019 for debate, but is to be passed.286 
 
4.6.2 Refugee status determination process 
Prior to the refugee influx that begun in the early 1990s, the Kenyan Government heard and 
determined all refugee claims based on policy. A Special Programme of Refugees (SPR) and 
an Eligibility Committee were set up within the Ministry of Home Affairs to deal with 
refugee matters.287 The Special Programme of Refugees was tasked with the management of 
all matters related to the implementation of the national refugee policy, including the refugee 
status determination process.288 An official and two assistants managed the SPR while the 
Eligibility Committee processed individual refugee claims. The committee’s members were 
drawn from the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Immigration Department and the UNHCR.289 
This arrangement proved problematic as the Immigration Department’s refugee mandate 
derived directly from legislation whereas the Ministry of Home Affairs, which was allocated 
the primary task of dealing with refugees, derived its mandate from Government policy.290 
The Immigration Act and the Aliens Restriction Act, which formed the basis of the 
Kenyan asylum system, did not prescribe the procedures for determining refugee status. The 
Eligibility Committee thus developed its own procedures to process the asylum claims on an 
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individual basis.291 The UNHCR’s role was limited to that of a financial donor. It provided 
the financial assistance to the Government to set up and run a Refugee Reception Centre on 
the outskirts of Nairobi.292 Recognised refugees would then receive official documentation 
signed by both the Minister of Home Affairs and the UNHCR.293 The law was silent on 
entitlements, but practice suggests that they received treatment in accordance with 
international norms.294 Thus, refugees could work, access education, had access to health 
care, enjoyed freedom of movement and were not subjected to refoulement.  
The UNHCR conducted a parallel refugee status determination process based on its 
Statutes due to the absence of refugee specific legislation.295 Thus, asylum seekers who were 
rejected by the Government would still have the possibility of being granted refugee status 
through the UNHCR, and were referred to as mandate refugees.296 Mandate refugees were 
however, not eligible for any Government support, but they received support from the 
UNHCR.297 Other refugees received limited assistance from the Government and relied 
heavily on NGOs for social assistance and access to employment.298 
The Government’s capacity to process individual applications collapsed due to the 
large influx of refugees. 299 It became impractical to process such large numbers of asylum 
applications in the existing Refugee Reception Centre, as the refugee numbers had increased 
dramatically from 14,000 to over 400,000 in two years.300 The Government then began to 
abdicate its role to the UNHCR, and other NGOs specifically contracted by the UNHCR as 
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implementing partners.301 The UNHCR was thus requested to establish refugee camps where 
the refugees were located, resulting in the Government’s complete handover of the refugee 
status determination process to the UNHCR from 1991.302 The Kakuma and Dadaab camps 
were then established to cater for the refugee influx.  This marked the end of the laissez faire 
approach to refugee protection that had characterised Kenya and the beginning of the 
encampment policy.303 It also marked the loss of experience that the Government had 
acquired from directly handling refugee status determination.  
The UNHCR adopted both the individual status determination process and the prima 
facie recognition of refugees due to the situation of mass influx.304 Initially, the UNHCR 
delegated this role to an NGO in Nairobi (the Jesuit Refugee Services (JRS)). Where a person 
was granted refugee status, they would receive a letter confirming their refugee status and 
would then be required to relocate to the camps. On an exceptional basis, refugees would 
receive permission to remain in Nairobi. This led to the de facto implementation of the 
encampment policy by the UNHCR. Rejected applicants were required to leave the country. 
The process was conducted without any participation of Kenyan officials. The result was that 
a sense of apathy was developed, resulting in the abdication of the Government’s protection 
obligations to refugees.305 
Its protection obligations were eroded to the extent that the government refused to 
recognise the official refugee documents issued by JRS under the authority of the UNHCR.306 
Following the impasse, the JRS withdrew its services stating that it could no longer perform a 
function that was the responsibility of the Kenyan government and the UNHCR.307  Faced 
with a government reneging on its international obligations, and reluctant to establish an 
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effective system to deal with refugees, the UNHCR took over refugee protection in its 
entirety even though it faced institutional challenges in undertaking this task.308 This had 
ethical implications as the UNHCR took on the dual role of protecting refugees and 
implementing the Convention standards it was tasked with supervising.309 In addition, there 
was no official acknowledgement by the Kenyan government that it recognised the UNHCR 
refugee status determination procedure.310 The implications of this have been dire as many 
refugees and asylum seekers face harassment from police, arbitrary arrests and detention, 
despite having letters from the UNHCR, which the police often refuse to recognise.311 
4.6.3 Refugee status determination under the Refugees Act 2006 
With a system in shambles, the UNHCR together with CSOs began to lobby the government 
to adopt legislation that would ensure that the Government resumed its responsibilities with 
respect to the promotion and protection of refugee rights.312 The promulgation of the Refugee 
Act in 2006 finally established the required legal framework, compliant with international 
norms and standards, to deal with refugees. In terms of the Act, the Commissioner with the 
assistance of the Refugee Affairs Committee is mandated to determine the status of 
refugees.313 The Refugee Regulations set out the details of the process prescribed by the 
Act.314  
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An asylum seeker must present themselves for registration before the UNHCR and/or 
the Department of Immigration and Registration of Persons. It is at this stage, that a person 
requests asylum through a statement setting out the reasons for the asylum request.315 The 
duty is placed on the asylum seeker to register, disclose information and surrender any 
relevant documentation. An eligibility interview then takes place with a qualified officer to 
determine whether the person meets the refugee definition thresholds. This is a non-
adversarial process of information gathering procedure. Regulation 21 ensures 
confidentiality, sensitivity to gender, age and diversity. The burden of proof rests on the 
asylum seeker and the threshold is “reasonable likelihood” that the asylum seeker fits the 
definition of a refugee.316  
In terms of the Act, it may take up to 180 days from the moment the 
Commissioner/Refugee Affairs Committee/the UNHCR receives the application for asylum 
before an interview can be conducted.317 Refugee status is then conferred or rejected 
following the interview, a decision that must be communicated to the asylum seeker/refugee 
in writing, within fourteen days of the interview having taken place.318Asylum seekers have 
the right to appeal a negative decision. This must be done within 30 days of receiving the 
rejection.319 The reasons for rejecting the application must also be communicated in 
writing.320 In terms of the Act, the Refugee Appeals Board, which is an independent entity, 
hears all appeals.321The Courts, following exhaustion of the appeals process as set out by the 
Refugee Act, may also hear appeals.322  
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The Department of Refugee Affairs began conducting refugee status determination 
interviews in 2011, five years after the Refugees Act had been passed, but the Department 
was still not operational.323 The UNHCR therefore continued to conduct the registration and 
status determination interviews. A process was initiated in 2015 to transition the asylum 
process and refugee management fully to the Department of Refugee Affairs over the course 
of two years.324 The transition process has yet to be finalized.325 
   
4.7 Key challenges within the refugee protection regime in Kenya 
The Refugees Act of 2006 provides a protection framework that meets the minimum 
international norms and standards. It provides a clearer refugee status determination process 
and provides refugees and asylum seekers with important safeguards. However, in practice, 
its implementation has resulted in a precarious situation for many refugees and asylum 
seekers.326 The limited prospects for durable solutions compounded by limited access to basic 
services and avenues for self-reliance have reduced many refugees and asylum seekers to 
poverty.327 The limited support that government institutional structures tasked with managing 
asylum have received from the State, has also contributed to the protection challenges that 
refugees and asylum seekers in Kenya face.  The key challenges faced include securitisation 
of asylum and xenophobia and are discussed below.  
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4.7.1 Securitisation of asylum and the encampment policy 
A growing body of evidence attests to the securitisation of asylum regime in Kenya. Maina 
asserts that Kenya has always viewed refugees through a national security lens.328 As 
discussed above, the Kenyan Government employs an encampment policy for refugees and 
asylum seekers. Under the original Refugees Act of 2006, the encampment policy was an 
option to be implemented at the discretion of the Minister. However, it was never pronounced 
in policy. Rather, the Kenyan government received a large influx of refugees from Sudan and 
Somalia from 1991, on the condition that they were settled in refugee camps.329  
An amendment to the Refugees Act in 2014 by the Security Laws Amendment Act 
made it a requirement for refugees and asylum seekers to reside in camps with limited 
prospects for local integration.330 The Kenyan Government’s position is that the only viable 
durable solution for the refugee problem is repatriation.331 This is despite the protracted 
conflicts in the countries of origin (with the exception of Rwanda). The result is that some 
refugees in Kenya are in protracted situations as they have been in camps since their arrival in 
the early 1990s.332  
While Kenya generally adopted an encampment policy following the influx of 
refugees in the early 1990s, camps were located in both urban and remote areas close to the 
border with the primary countries of origin - South Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia.333 In the 
1990s, the urban camps were closed and refugees could only receive limited assistance if they 
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chose not to stay in the camps.334 An amendment to the Refugees Act in 2014 formalised the 
encampment policy and required by law that all refugees and asylum seekers reside in 
camps.335 The UNHCR manages the camps together with its implementing partners, with 
limited involvement from the government except for the RSD process.336 The remoteness of 
the refugee camps and their location in areas of the country, which have traditionally been 
insecure, where the rule of law is weak and perpetrators of violence can act with a high 
degree of impunity, impinges directly on refugee protection.337 The location of the refugee 
camps close to the borders of the primary refugee source countries has also exposed the 
refugees and asylum seekers to the risk of refoulement.338   
In addition, the Kenyan Government has since the 1990s officially linked refugees 
with security concerns.339This has been used to justify the encampment policy and has led to 
the implementation of restrictive government policies targeting refugees, asylum seekers and 
other foreign nationals in the guise of dealing with security threats posed by aliens.340 For 
instance, in 2007, despite evidence of new asylum seeker arrivals following the flare-up of 
conflict in Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia, the Kenyan government closed the border 
between Kenya and Somalia citing security concerns posed by the fleeing Islamic Courts 
Union militia.341 However, the border closure did not stop Somali asylum seekers from 
fleeing into Kenya, as the border is highly porous.342  
In addition, on 18 December 2012, the Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National 
Security issued a directive that stated: 
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The Government of Kenya has decided to stop reception, registration and will close 
down all registration centres in urban areas with immediate effect. All asylum 
seekers/refugees will be hosted at the refugee camps. All asylum seekers and refugees 
from Somalia should report to Dadaab Refugee Camp while asylum seekers from 
other countries should report to Kakuma Refugee Camp. UNHCR and other partners 
serving refugees are asked to stop providing direct services to asylum seekers and 
refugees in urban areas and transfer same services to the refugee camps.343 
 
The government had also linked the proliferation of small arms and light weapons to the 
presence of refugees and asylum seekers within the country.344 The terrorist attacks which 
increased in 2011 following Kenya’s military intervention in Somalia, heightened the 
unsubstantiated views that refugees and asylum seekers were terrorists.345 The result was the 
relocation of administration and service provision to camps.346 A similar directive was issued 
on 16th January 2013.347 Another directive was issued on 26 March 2014 on the basis that 
refugees were still residing in urban areas and must be moved back to the camps.348  
The enforcement of these directives eradicated efforts that had been put in place to 
implement an urban refugee policy that recognised over 65,000 refugees residing in cities 
across the country.349 Thus, the UNHCR was no longer able to provide assistance to 
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registered asylum seekers and refugees in Nairobi, leaving them extremely vulnerable. Those 
outside the capital city and in other urban areas did not receive any form of assistance but 
would have been able to do so when in Nairobi. However, this Directive was successfully 
challenged in court on the grounds that the closure of the urban refugee centres infringed on 
the right to dignity of refugees and asylum seekers; it violated their freedom of movement; it 
exposed them to a level of vulnerability inconsistent with the State’s duty to take care of 
persons in vulnerable circumstances; and that it exposed them to the risk of refoulement.350  
In 2013, the Kenyan government, together with the Somali government and the 
UNHCR signed a tripartite agreement to repatriate Somali refugees, despite the on-going 
conflict in Somalia.351 Under the agreement, Somali refugees would be repatriated to safe 
areas in Somalia.352 The agreement was signed shortly after the Al-Shabaab terrorist attack in 
Nairobi, whose perpetrators the government alleged had used the Dadaab Refugee Camp as a 
base.353 The agreement continues to be implemented with the UN confirming that the aim is 
to eventually close down the Dadaab Refugee Camp.354  
In 2014, following the third directive, Kenya began to implement a more restrictive 
compulsory encampment policy based on the amended Refugees Act.355 Had the amended 
Act not been found unconstitutional, an infringement would have incurred a penalty of a six-
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month jail term, a fine of 20,000 Kenyan shillings (approximately $200), or both.356 While 
the directives affected the entire refugee and asylum seeker population in Kenya, the primary 
target of the enforcement were those of Somali origin. Thousands of ethnic Somalis, 
regardless of their nationality or legal status, were arrested across the country following the 
issuance of these directives in an operation called Usalama Watch (Security Watch), resulting 
in illegal detention, arbitrary arrest and forcible removals to the Dadaab Refugee Camp.357  
The cumulative effect of these directives and subsequent actions to implement them 
resulted in a significant number of Somali refugees repatriating, both officially and on their 
own volition, despite the risk of refoulement.358 In 2015, after another Al Shabaab-linked 
attack at a local university located in a border town near Somalia, the government ordered the 
closure of the Dadaab Refugee Camp, the repatriation of all its residents and disbanded the 
Department of Refugee Affairs in May 2016.359 A court order subsequently stopped the 
Government from closing the camp and disbanding the Department of Refugee Affairs.360 It 
would have resulted in the involuntary repatriation and the possible refoulement of over 
240,000 Somali refugees, in contravention of Kenya’s refugee law and international 
obligations.361  
4.7.2 Xenophobia in Kenya 
The securitisation of the refugee problem has also led to increasing levels of xenophobia.362 
While refugees, asylum seekers and migrants are not subjected to levels of violence similar to 
what occurs in South Africa, it is the xenophobic stance within the political spheres that has 
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led to the impasse in creating an environment conducive to implementing progressive asylum 
policies in Kenya.363 It is quite common for politicians to make xenophobic pronouncements 
about refugees and asylum seekers.364 This includes distorting facts about refugees, citing 
humanitarian aid that refugees and asylum seekers receive as discriminatory against host 
communities, blaming refugees for crime and competition for scarce economic 
opportunities.365  
This has led to hostility towards refugees and asylum seekers and many face 
persistent police harassment, arbitrary arrests, illegal detention and extortion of bribes.366 To 
sum the situation as one legal expert on a Task Force to review the Refugees Act of 2006 
stated: “Such a heightened atmosphere is neither favourable nor conducive to constructive 
discussions on refugee rights and legal frameworks.”367 
4.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has provided an overview of the key national human rights institutions in South 
Africa and Kenya. It also discussed the situation of refugees and asylum seekers in both 
countries and the resultant evolution of the respective refugee domestic protection regimes. 
This chapter also discussed the key protection challenges that have manifested within the 
refugee protection regimes in South Africa and Kenya. This provides the backdrop for the 
discussion in the following chapters on the how the respective NHRIs have discharged their 
mandates to give effect to the promotion and protection of refugee rights.  
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Chapter 5 
Research Methodology  
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents this study’s research methodology. The research methodology provides 
a justification for the choice of the non-doctrinal research approach and discusses the primary 
data collection process. This includes a discussion of this study’s research design, the data 
collection approach, the ethical considerations that were addressed and the limitations of this 
study.  
5.2 Research approach 
Considering the research questions, this study utilised a non-doctrinal approach as the 
methodological framework and employed a qualitative research design.1 According to 
Vibhute and Aynalem, in the non-doctrinal legal research approach, “the researcher tries to 
investigate through empirical data, how law and legal institutions affect or mould human 
attitudes and what impact on society they create.”2 This type of research is much broader with 
questions not necessarily available in conventional legal sources such as case reports, legal 
periodicals or statutory materials.3 Thus, the researcher is usually required to undertake 
fieldwork to collect data to answer the research questions.  
A research approach or design refers to the plan, structure and strategy of 
investigation used to obtain the answers to the research questions.4 Simply stated, it is a plan 
                                                
1 While non-doctrinal legal research is the primary approach that the researcher adopted, it must be noted that 
there are elements of the doctrinal legal research within the study, for instance the discussion in Chapter two on 
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methods in non-doctrinal legal research. Vibhute and Aynalem, Legal Research Methods: Teaching Material, 
2009 chilot.wordpress.com; Mike McConville and Hong Wing Chui, ed. Research Methods for Law. Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2007.  
2 Vibhute and Aynalem, Legal Research Methods, 87. 
3 Vibhute and Aynalem, Legal Research Methods, 85-98. 





that lays out why and how research will be conducted.5 For this study, the following 
processes were undertaken to implement the research approach: formulation of the objectives 
and conceptualisation of the research questions, desk review, population and sampling, 
ethical approval, primary data collection and data analysis, identification of the limitations of 
the study. The research approach involved a desk review and primary data collection. 
5.3 Desk review 
The desk review involved library search of books, journals, internet sources, reports, policy 
documents, government gazettes and newspaper articles. It also included analysing relevant 
international and regional human rights instruments, soft law, various pieces of legislation 
and cases. The information from the desk review contributed to the identification of the 
normative and implementation gaps within the international refugee protection regime. This 
in turn highlighted the role that NHRIs could play to address the protection issues linked to 
refugees and asylum seekers. This information provided the basis for a critical review of 
theoretical and legal frameworks that underpin the evolution of NHRIs, an overview of the 
international refugee protection regime, State responsibility and legally binding obligations. It 
also informed the discussion on the overview of the legislative frameworks of the NHRIs in 
South Africa and Kenya. 
5.4 Population and sampling 
This section describes the population and sampling for this study. The population for this 
study included refugees, CSOs and NHRIs from which the participants were selected. For the 
refugee participants, the inclusion criteria was: a refugee who had participated, within the 
past ten years, in an NHRIs’ activities such as lodging a complaint, attending an 
outreach/community advocacy activity or being part of an NHRI’s research or education 
initiatives. The refugee participants were recruited through refugee communities. For the 
                                                
5 Kristina Simion, Practitioner’s Guide: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches to Rule of Law Research, 





service provider participants, the inclusion criteria was:  staff who were assigned to work on 
refugees matters, had handled complaints relating to refugees, had done any substantive 
research on refugees or advocacy for refugee rights, or were knowledgeable about NHRIs. 
For participants from NHRIs, the inclusion criterion was similar to that of service provider 
participants. The service provider and NHRI participants were recruited through introductory 
letters.  
Thus, this study included the following categories of participants: Refugees who had 
participated in a national human rights institution’s activity, or who had engaged with a 
service provider [through for instances seeking services] that had a working relationship or 
knowledge about national human rights institutions; representatives from CSOs providing 
services to refugees and asylum seekers who were familiar with national human rights 
institutions and other organisations or institutions working with national human rights 
institutions (referred herein as service providers); and representatives from national human 
rights institutions working directly on matters related to refugees and asylum seekers or 
within a unit that would handle such matters either through research, advocacy or complaints 
handling. 
Nineteen (19) participants were interviewed, of which seven were refugees, nine were 
service providers and three were staff from NHRIs. Of the service providers, five worked 
exclusively with refugees and asylum seekers, while two focused on human rights broadly, 
but also implemented specific programmes for refugees and asylum seekers. The table below 
provides a summary of the participants: 
 South Africa Kenya 
Refugees  4 3 
Service providers  5 4 
NHRI 2 1 
Total  11 8 





The sample size for study was small due to the following factors. Saturation was achieved 
after 16 interviews with service provider and refugee participants were conducted. According 
to Creswell, saturation refers to the point during data collection that the information stops 
giving new insights.1 This means that at a given point the service provider and refugee 
participants were giving similar information about the questions being asked.  
In addition, the CSO participants who met the selection criteria were few and were 
selected from a pool of relatively few CSOs, as the national number of CSOs providing 
services to refugees and asylum seekers, and who were accessible to the researcher or agreed 
to participate in the study were few. Very few service providers were implementing 
programmes with NHRIs or referring clients [refugees and asylum seekers] to NHRIs for 
assistance. Additionally, few members of the refugee communities had participated in NHRI-
related activities within the past ten years or were aware of a refugee who had. This, as the 
research determined, was due to the fact that refugees and asylum seekers sought redress or 
services primarily through CSOs.   
In Kenya, the operational context generally excludes NHRIs; therefore, there is 
limited substantive interaction among service providers with NHRIs outside of the referral 
mechanisms. In addition, the NHRIs have not established units or offices within the refugee 
camps though most service providers operate primarily from the refugee camps. Thus, those 
refugees who participated in the study resided in Nairobi and were referred to the researcher 
through CSOs or by word of mouth.  
The sample for this study was drawn from Durban, Cape Town and Johannesburg 
(South Africa) and Nairobi (Kenya). The criterion for selection was a location with an NHRI 
office and a relatively high presence of refugees. In the case of South Africa, the three NHRIs 
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included in the study have their largest offices in the three main metropolises (Durban, Cape 
Town and Johannesburg). In addition, South Africa adopts an urban refugee policy with 
patterns of refugee settlement being primarily in these three main cities. In Kenya, all three 
NHRIs have primary locations in Nairobi with limited presence outside the capital city. 
Kenya adopts an encampment policy but has a large urban refugee population. Therefore, the 
likelihood that the NHRIs implemented activities in Nairobi that had a bearing on refugee 
rights was higher than within the refugee camps. The refugee camps were thus excluded as 
study sites.   
As the above population categories indicate, the researcher purposively selected 
participants who met the inclusion criteria, that is, familiarity with national human rights 
institutions within the refugee protection context and/or currently working or have worked 
with a national human rights institution. Thus, a purposive sampling method was employed to 
purposively select participants that have the attributes that best contribute to this study.2 
Purposive sampling is defined as the intentional selection of informants based on their 
ability to elucidate a specific theme, concept, or phenomenon.3 The general principle it 
embodies is “think of the person or place or situation that has the largest potential for 
advancing your understanding and look there.”4 One of the main advantages of purposive 
sampling is that it provides greater depth of information.5 In the case of this study, 
participants selected were those who had interacted with or were familiar with national 
human rights institutions.  
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Thus, the NHRI representatives recruited were those who were assigned duties that 
related specifically to the promotion and protection of refugee rights or had worked on an 
activity related to refugee rights. All NHRIs received an introductory letter requesting 
participation in the study. The SAHRC, the CGE and the KNCHR responded affirmatively 
and a participant from each of the NHRIs was interviewed. No responses were received from 
the Public Protector, the NGEC and the CAJ. Therefore, the desk review supplemented the 
interviews where participants referenced the work of the Public Protector, the NGEC and the 
CAJ served as the source of data.  
The service providers were selected based on their mandate - either providing services 
exclusively to refugees and asylum seekers, or, services to refugees and asylum seekers 
formed part of their primary activities. The total number of CSOs invited to participate in the 
study was eleven but only nine agreed to participate. The list of participants is included as 
Appendix 8.  
5.5 Primary data collection approach 
The primary data was drawn from transcripts from interviews with research participants in 
South Africa and Kenya. This study employed semi-structured interview schedules as the 
data collection instruments [See Appendices 5-7]. Three different interview schedules were 
developed for the three categories of participants, that is refugees, service providers and staff 
from NHRIs. The interview schedules were designed in relation to the research questions. 
Each interview was recorded digitally with the consent of all participants. This was done to 
avoid extensive note taking during the actual interview, thereby allowing the researcher to 
fully engage with the interviewing process. Each interview lasted approximately 40 minutes. 
All interviews were conducted in English, as all the participants were fully conversant with 





The interviews were conducted either face-to-face or telephonically. Those conducted 
telephonically were due to convenience for the participant or where the researcher had 
limited access to the participant due to logistical constraints. Data was collected over a period 
of eight months (September 2018 to March 2019). This was done in two phases: the first 
phase with participants in South Africa and the second phase with participants in Kenya.  
5.6 Primary data analysis 
Data analysis is the process through which researchers make sense of their data.6 In 
qualitative research, this means looking for patterns of ideas or themes.7 This study followed 
guidelines from Tesch’s thematic data analysis approach.8 Thematic analysis is defined as a 
method for identifying and interpreting patterns of meaning across qualitative data.9 For 
this study, the thematic analysis involved transcription of all interviews; coding, searching 
for themes, reviewing themes, defining and naming themes, development of a framework for 
the presentation of the findings; writing up the findings following the framework; and lastly, 
comparing and contrasting the findings with previous research or existing theories as 
discussed in the literature review, that is, a process of triangulation.10 Data from the 
interviews was reviewed and common themes from the responses were grouped together.  
The result of the thematic analysis of the data was the identification of six main 
themes, which informed the discussion of the findings in chapter six and chapter seven. 
Themes are the central organising ideas that answer the research question, and may be 
constituted of a collection of ideas known as sub-themes.11 Sub-themes are themes within a 
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theme and maybe useful in giving coherence to a large and complex theme.12 Therefore, from 
the analysis, two of the themes, which were either particularly large or complex were 
categorised further into sub-themes. The themes and sub-themes that provided the framework 
for the analysis and are described below: 
1. NHRIs’ engagement with refugee and asylum related matters varies widely 
2. The socio-political context undermines the extent to which the NHRIs can effectively 
advance refugee rights. The sub-themes were securitization of asylum, xenophobia 
and lack of political will to effectively implement refugee laws and policies 
3. NHRIs utilise specific working methods to promote and protect refugee rights 
4. Capacity constraints negatively impact the extent to which the NHRIs can effectively 
promote and protect refugee rights 
5. Non-prioritisation of refugee rights or invisibility of NHRIs to refugee issues impacts 
negatively on the NHRIs’ effective promotion and protection of refugee rights 
6.  There are opportunities available to NHRIs to enhance their effectiveness in 
addressing refugee rights. The sub-themes were improving institutional capacity, 
increasing their visibility, enhancing their relationship with CSOs and the UNHCR, 
and utilising regional mechanisms and platforms to enhance promotion and protection 
of refugee rights. 
5.7 Ethical considerations 
Ethical considerations relate to standards associated with the research process and respect for 
the subjects of the research.13 These are based on four generally accepted ethical principles, 
which are: respecting autonomy-where a person makes an informed decision about 
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participating; beneficence- where benefits are maximised and risks are minimised; non-
maleficence- avoiding bad intention or ‘do no harm’; and justice-fairness to research 
participants both in terms of their selection and their access to research benefits.14  
While the units of study in this research are NHRIs, human subjects were included as 
sources of primary data. In particular, the research included interviews with refugees, who are 
deemed, in the context of research, to be especially vulnerable to harm or exploitation.15 
Consequently, it was necessary that the research process included consideration of pertinent 
ethical issues, which emanate from the four principles mentioned above. These were 
voluntary participation, informed consent, no deception to the subjects, ‘do no harm’, 
anonymity, confidentiality and obtaining ethical approval from the mandated research ethics 
bodies at the University of Cape Town and in Kenya.  These are discussed below.  
5.7.1 Voluntary participation 
Voluntary participation as an ethical consideration requires that participants are not coerced 
into participating in this study and is a principle derived from the notion of respecting 
autonomy.16 All the participants voluntarily agreed to participate in this study. No incentives 
to induce participation were offered to the participants. All participants confirmed that they 
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Edition, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019). On the concept of justice in research see I Pieper, and C.J.H 
Thomson, “Justice in Human Research Ethics: A Conceptual and Practical Guide,” Monash Bioethics Review I 
31, no. 1 (2013): 99-116.  
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were participating in this study voluntarily before each interview commenced. They were 
assured that their participation or non-participation would not have consequences with the 
institutions they worked for or organisations that provided them with services.  
5.7.2 Informed consent 
Informed consent also derives from the notion of respect for the research participant’s 
autonomy.17 Written informed consent was obtained from participants [See Appendix 4]. All 
participants received an email with an information sheet setting out the parameters of this 
study, the process of the interview and the option to withdraw from participation without 
consequence. Hardcopies of these were also given to the participants for their review and 
signature. Before the interview commenced, the researcher also sought permission to record 
the interviews to avoid excessive note taking. All the participants agreed to the recordings. 
The participants were also assured that they had the right to terminate the interview and 
withdraw from this study at any time without any consequences. None of the participants 
terminated an interview.  
5.7.3 No deception of the participants  
According to Creswell, deception occurs “when participants understand one purpose but the 
researcher has a different purpose in mind.”18 Participants were assured about the purpose of 
this study. The researcher did not make any promises in tangible changes in policy, practice 
or direct benefit from participation in this study. The participants were made aware that the 
research was purely for academic purposes and that the researcher was a doctoral candidate.  
5.7.4 ‘Do no harm’  
Minimising the risk of harm to participants was taken into account, in particular in the case of 
the refugees who are deemed a group vulnerable to harm and exploitation. There was no 
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evident physical risk of participation in this study. Any psychological and social risks were 
minimised through ensuring anonymity and confidentiality. The questions were formulated to 
ensure as far as possible that the participants did not feel uncomfortable answering them. 
Prior to commencing, the researcher identified service providers who could provide 
psychosocial support should the need have arisen. All interviews were also conducted at the 
convenience of the participants and in locations where they felt comfortable. None of the 
participants displayed signs of distress during the interviews. There are no direct benefits for 
participants in this study. However, the findings would support this study’s argument about 
the need to consider NHRIs’ potential role in filling the existing gaps in the promotion and 
protection of refugee rights.  
5.7.5 Anonymity and confidentiality  
Anonymity is the principle that participants will remain anonymous throughout the study and 
confidentiality entails ensuring that identifying information will not be made available to 
anyone not directly involved in the study. 19 In terms of assuring anonymity, this study 
ensured that participants’ personal information was not collected in any form. All the 
participants were assured that the interviews would be anonymised and no personal 
information would be collected. The data was captured using identifiers to avoid revealing 
the participants’ actual institutional, organisational or refugee community affiliation [See 
Appendix 8]. The findings were also presented in manner that ensured their individual 
responses could not be linked back to them. To assure confidentiality, the data collected was 
stored in password-protected devices and will be destroyed in accordance with the University 
of Cape Town’s (UCT) ethical guidelines in research. In addition, only the researcher and her 
supervisor have access to the data, which is in the researcher’s possession.  
                                                






5.7.6 Ethical approval to conduct the study 
Given that this study involved human participants, ethical approvals from the relevant 
research ethics committees in South Africa and Kenya were obtained. The UCT Law 
Faculty’s Ethics in Research Committee granted ethical approval for this study on 24th April 
2018 [See Appendix 1]. Additional research clearance was obtained from the National 
Commission for Science and Technology (NACOSTI), the research authority in Kenya, on 
17th October 2018 [See Appendix 2]. In addition, permission was sought from individuals in 
authority to recruit study participants who were representatives from the NHRIs and the 
CSOs. Letters explaining the purpose of this study and a request to conduct an interview with 
a representative were emailed to the relevant institutional or organisational authorities [See 
Appendix 3].  
5.8 Limitations of the study 
The limitations of a study are those aspects of the research design or methodology that had an 
impact on the interpretation of the research findings. 20  These are usually beyond the 
researcher’s control but are inherent in the research methodology.21 The first limitation of this 
study relates to the sampling procedure.  The sample size was small as it was selected using a 
purposive sampling technique. The use of purposive sampling indicates a bias as the 
researcher deliberately selects certain units for study from the population.22 However, it seeks 
to maximise the range of specific information that can be obtained23- in this case, information 
about national human rights institutions within the context of refugee protection. As a result, 
only few participants could be recruited to participate in the study, as the selection criteria 
required one to either be knowledgeable about NHRIs or to have had direct contact with an 
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NHRI through its activities or indirectly through a service provider that worked closely with 
NHRIs.  
However, the small sample size is acceptable in this context, as there is no intention 
on the researcher’s part to generalise beyond the sample surveyed. As such, while the 
interviews generated detailed information about the participants’ experiences and 
perceptions, these cannot be generalised. As Jacobsen & Landau note:  
One of the most significant problems of small-scale studies is that while they yield in-
depth and valid information, they are seldom representative of the target population 
about which the researcher wishes to make claims. As such, they do not allow us to 
make accurate descriptive inferences about the groups in which we are interested.24  
 
Therefore, the sample for this study may not be representative and cannot be generalised to 
all national human rights institutions or to the experiences of all refugees or service providers 
who have interacted with NHRIs in South Africa and Kenya. This study is exploratory in 
nature and the research design suited the purpose of creating an argument for the need to 
increase attention to the role that national human rights institutions can play in filling the 
existing gaps in the promotion and protection of refugee rights.  
The second limitation is that the use of the semi-structured interview schedule 
required continuous careful consideration to ensure that the interview was not conducted in a 
rigid manner. This was necessary to allow for spontaneous discussion to occur and sufficient 
opportunity for probing and clarification.  Furthermore, this was needed bearing in mind that 
the conversational tone and body language may prompt particular responses or that may 
inadvertently direct answers, or that the responses may be biased. The third limitation was 
that some participants were asked to provide information on institutions that they worked for. 
Thus, there was the possibility that they might provide socially desirable responses.   
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5.9 The positionality of the researcher  
According to Rowe, positionality in research is the researcher’s positioning in relation to the 
context of the study.25 This positioning influences the research processes for instance, how 
the research is conceptualised, how data is collected or the manner in which the data is 
interpreted.26 This researcher had prior work experience with the South African Human 
Rights Commission and is knowledgeable about NHRIs and the international refugee 
protection regime. Thus, this study’s conceptualisation drew from the researcher’s experience 
with and knowledge of NHRIs and international refugee law. This professional and academic 
background, to some extent, positioned the researcher to lend credibility and authority to the 
discussion and interpretation of the findings. 
 
5.10 Conclusion  
The discussion in this chapter highlighted the research process undertaken to answer this 
study’s questions. This study employed a non-doctrinal approach as the methodological 
framework and a qualitative research design. A detailed discussion of the research design 
highlighted the research process, the limitations of this study and ethical considerations 
addressed.  The subsequent data analysis identified six themes that formed the basis of the 
discussion of the findings. The next two chapters will discuss these findings in-depth and 
include critical commentary comparing the findings to secondary sources, similar studies or 
theories examined in previous chapters.
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Chapter 6 
NHRIs’ Engagement with the Promotion and Protection of Refugee Rights in South 
Africa 
6.1 Introduction  
This chapter discusses the findings based on thematic analysis of the perceptions about the 
role that NHRIs in South Africa play in the promotion and protection of refugee rights. The 
first section discusses the extent to which the NHRIs in South Africa have engaged with the 
refugee protection regime. This is followed by a discussion on the impact that the context 
within which NHRIs operate has had an impact on the extent to which the NHRIs have 
engaged with the promotion and protection of refugee rights.  The next section discusses the 
working methods that NHRIs have utilised to promote and protect refugee rights. A 
discussion on the impact of capacity constraints has had on the NHRIs’ effective engagement 
with the refugee protection regime then follows. The final section presents the discussion on 
the opportunities that NHRIs in South Africa have to enhance their engagement with the 
promotion and protection of the refugee rights. The discussion of each of the six themes 
follows below.  
 
6.2 The NHRIs’ engagement with refugee related matters varies based on the 
breadth of their mandate  
The findings indicate that the NHRI with the broadest mandate has the highest level of 
engagement with the promotion and protection of the rights of migrants in general and 
refugees and asylum seekers in particular. The level of engagement was determined using the 
following factors: the number of documented activities that the NHRI conducted; and the 
NHRI that participants reported to have frequently engaged with or that they were 
knowledgeable about. This finding corresponds to Pegram’s conclusion that a broad and 





detention and where migrants, refugees and asylum seekers face xenophobia.1 The NHRI’s 
broad mandate implies that it can promote and play an oversight role over a broad spectrum 
of rights. This has placed the SAHRC at an advantageous position with respect to the 
promotion and protection of refugee rights. Thus, it is the SAHRC, which has been the most 
actively engaged with matters related to refugees and asylum seekers or migrants in general. 
The Gender Commission and the Public Protector have had limited engagement, as indicated 
from the participants’ responses and the desk review.2 Though there is evidence indicating 
that the NHRIs interact on occasion where refugee rights are concerned, this is usually during 
commemorative events such as the annual World Refugee Day.3 In addition, the participants 
reported that they have interacted primarily with the SAHRC, to a limited extent with the 
Gender Commission, but not at all with the Public Protector.  
The SAHRC has since its inception, been involved in promoting and protecting 
refugee rights.4  Refugee rights were identified as a priority human rights issue and a 
Commissioner was tasked with overseeing this area of work, as supported by this statement:  
As an institution, we have been working on the rights of refugees, as these are 
fundamental human rights, which the SAHRC is mandated to promote and protect. 
My office was recently specifically assigned, in 2018, to this portfolio. Previously, 
this portfolio was managed by Chairperson Majola [the SAHRC Chairperson].5  
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situation of displaced refugees prepared by Gender Commission in 2015 and discussed in section 6.5.2. This 
report was not published on the Gender Commission website. 
3 Interview with NHRI participant 1, Johannesburg, South Africa.  
4 Interview with NHRI participant 1, Johannesburg, South Africa.  





In accordance with the SAHRC Act, it has also made use of an advisory committee to 
provide additional technical support on asylum-related matters.6 The advisory committee, 
referred to as the Section 11 Committee, forms the basis for establishing working 
relationships with CSOs and relevant UN agencies working on refugee rights and other 
migrants.7 These relationships will be discussed in section 6.7 below. 
The SAHRC’s broad mandate has allowed it to engage in policy development to the 
extent that compliance with the Constitution and international human rights norms and 
standards require this. It has implemented advocacy programmes to address xenophobia, 
promoted human rights education in schools on the rights of migrants, and held workshops 
and public discussions on the challenges that undermine the realisation of rights for refugees 
and asylum seekers.8 It has also litigated and investigated complaints about violations of 
refugee rights.9 These activities are highlighted in chapter four and are discussed in depth in 
section 6.4 below.  
The participants reported they interacted primarily with SAHRC and that they were 
aware of the SAHRC’s involvement with refugee rights. All service provider participants had 
made referrals of refugee complaints to the SAHRC and one service provider had 
implemented a programme and litigated on a matter together with the SAHRC [See 
discussion in section 6.7]. However, none of the service providers reported satisfaction with 
                                                
6 Established under the South African Human Rights Commission Act, Section 11. According to the NHRI 
participant 1, at the time of the interview in March 2019, the Section 11 Committee on Migration had not yet be 
re-constituted and its future is pending determination by the current Commissioner overseeing matters related to 
migration.  
7 Interview with NHRI participant 1, Johannesburg, South Africa; See also HSRC, Assessment of Relationship 
between CSOs and NHRIs in South Africa, 2007. 
8 SAHRC Annual reports 2012-2018; Interview with NHRI participant 1, Johannesburg, South Africa. 
9 For instance, Centre for Child Law and 25 others v Minister of Basic Education and 4 others (with SAHRC as 
amicus curiae); South African Human Rights Commission and Others v Minister of Home Affairs: Naledi 
Pandor and Others (41571/12) [2014] ZAGPJHC 198; 2014 (11) BCLR 1352 (GJ); [2014] 4 All SA 482 (GJ) 
(28 August 2014); MT v Refugees Appeal Board and Others, GP /415/0433; The SAHRC represented an asylum 
seeker, Hafiz Saddiq, in the Equality Court sitting at the Vereeniging Magistrate’s Court. The asylum seeker 
sought access to his unemployment benefits when his claim was rejected by the Department of Labour because 
he was an asylum seeker. (Hafiz Saddiq v Department of Labour, 4 July 2017); Interview with participant; See 





the SAHRC’s role within the South African refugee protection regime as exemplified by the 
following responses:  
Yeah, I suppose there is some impact. I think a lot of people probably would expect it 
to be more and I think generally the human rights commission have kind of 
difficulties with capacities and having their recommendations followed or seen kind 
of acknowledged you know, so it’s not just with refugees where they run into trouble I 
think they are struggling across the board.10 
 
With regard to the Gender Commission, since its participation in the development of the 
Refugees Act in 1996, its involvement with refugee matters has been ad-hoc. The Gender 
Commission participant reported that the Gender Commission did not plan to carry out any 
specific activities related to refugees or asylum seekers:  
I do not recall any recent work on refugees and there is currently no plan to do so. I 
think a report was done after the xenophobic violence erupted in KZN in Chatsworth 
in 2015, but I will have to check with one of the Commissioners to see if any work 
will be done in this area in future.11 
 
From the findings, only two service providers indicated having interacted with the Gender 
Commission.12 These interactions occurred during the observance of Women’s 
Day/Women’s month in South Africa, participation in workshops and when a complaint 
related to access to education for refugee children and children seeking asylum was lodged 
with the Gender Commission. Both participants reported that the interaction with the Gender 
Commission was not based on any form of strategic engagement and reflects the Gender 
Commission’s apparent lack of strategic engagement with refugee related matters.  The 
perceptions about the CGE are encapsulated in this statement by a service provider 
participant: “With CGE? No, there hasn’t been a lot of interaction [with CGE] except in 
general workshops but not in implementation of particular programmes.”13   
                                                
10 Interview with service provider 5, Cape Town, South Africa 
11 Interview with NHRI participant 2, Johannesburg, South Africa 
12 Interview with service provider 1 (Durban, South Africa) and service provider 2 (Johannesburg, South Africa) 
participants.  





This study also found that the Public Protector’s engagement with the promotion and 
protection of refugee rights has been peripheral and ad hoc. Service providers held a negative 
view of the Public Protector. They claimed that the Public Protector was not at all interested 
in asylum matters. They also expressed little confidence in the Public Protector’s capacity to 
influence any positive outcome where rights of refugees, asylum seekers, or migrants in 
general were concerned as indicated by the statements below:  
[Respondent laughing] The Public Protector? No, we have never dealt with them and 
as far as I know, they do not deal with matters related to refugees and asylum 
seekers…I would be surprised.14 (Service provider, Durban)  
On occasion, some of our clients do come and have a case opened with the Public 
Protector, but I don’t remember one way or the other if there was any positive 
conclusion in those cases.15  (Service provider, Cape Town) 
We have collaborated with Chapter Nine institutions [NHRIs] but not the Public 
Protector due to lack of confidence in the current Public Protector’s office.16(Service 
provider 1, Johannesburg) 
The findings indicate that the NHRIs in South Africa have significant roles to play in the 
promotion and protection of refugee rights in accordance with their respective mandates. 
Their roles, depending on the NHRI, are recognised and acknowledged by the various actors 
within the refugee protection regime and their mandates allow for robust engagement with 
asylum-related matters, particularly given the evidence that refugee law and policy lacks 
effective implementation and often implementation occurs in contravention of the law and 
court rulings.  
However, there is a general perception among service provider and refugee 
participants that the NHRIs were failing to effectively discharge their mandates. Service 
provider participants acknowledged that the SAHRC, in particular, was an ally, but they 
expressed little confidence in its capacity and capability to utilise its powers to bring about 
change within the refugee protection regime. Refugee participants held similar perceptions to 
                                                
14 Interview with service provider 1, Durban, South Africa. 
15 Interview with service provider 4, Cape Town, South Africa. 





those of service providers. While they reported awareness of the SAHRC’s role, they 
perceived service providers as more competent and more willing to act on their behalf, as one 
refugee participant said:  “NGOs are filling a gap because the NHRIs aren’t doing what they 
should do.”17  
With respect to the Gender Commission, its mandate affords it the opportunity to 
address the gendered aspects of asylum, either highlighting these in policy, law or practice or 
addressing the challenges that arise or may arise during implementation. Two participants 
referred to gender. One discussed the need to address the rights of sexual minorities, and 
another the need to pay particular attention to the situation of women and children refugees. 
These responses flagged an often-excluded aspect of the asylum experience i.e. the 
requirement to consider gender.18 
Gender-related aspects of asylum are not limited to considerations of gender-related 
grounds of persecution, but take into account the asylum experience as a whole, including 
how rights are accessed and the impact that problems such as gender-based violence has on 
women, children and sexual minorities. 19 Studies show that sexual minorities, women and 
children asylum seekers face significant challenges when accessing the asylum system, with 
many of these challenges continuing for those granted refugee status.20 Further, that there is a 
dearth of knowledge about the experiences of these categories of refugees and asylum 
                                                
17 Interview with refugee participant 1, Durban, South Africa  
18 Jane Freedman, “Protecting Women Asylum Seekers and Refugees: From International Norms to National 
Protection?” International Migration 48, no. 1, (2010): 175-198, doi:10.1111/j.1468-2435.2009.00549.x.   
19 B Camminga, “Gender Refugees” in South Africa: The “Common-Sense” Paradox,” Africa 
Spectrum, 53, no. 1, (2018): 89–112. 
20 Heinrich Boll Stiftung, A Double Challenge: LGBTI Refugees and Asylum Seekers in South Africa, 
Interview with Victor Chikalogwe, PASSOP, 11 October 2018. https://za.boell.org/2018/10/11/double-
challenge-lgbti-refugees-and-asylum-seekers-south-africa, accessed 3 September, 2019; Yellavarne Moodley, 
“Receiving LGBTI Refugees in South Africa: Towards a Culture of Non-Discrimination and Human Rights,” 
Working Paper Series [Paper 5 of 2012] University of Cape Town: Refugee Rights Unit, accessed 2 September 
2019, http://www.refugeerights.uct.ac.za/usr/refugee/Working_papers/Working_Paper_5_of_2012.pdf; Tal 
Schreier, Critical Challenges to Protecting Unaccompanied and Separated Foreign Children in the Western 
Cape: Lessons Learned at the UCT Refugee Rights Unit, UCT Refugee Rights Unit, (2011); June Middleton, 
Barriers to Protection: Gender-Related Persecution and Asylum in South Africa, 2009, (Unpublished Master’s 
Thesis); A. Bloch "The Right to Rights? Undocumented Migrants from Zimbabwe Living in South Africa." 





seekers, as research tends to overlook them, findings in reports are reflected in broad strokes 
or fail to disaggregate data on them.21   
These issues indicate that the Gender Commission can play an important role within 
the refugee protection regime, to ensure that challenges based on gender are addressed within 
the asylum adjudication process and when making rights accessible.  In this regard, the 
application of the principle of intersectionality in the NHRIs’ work would be pertinent to 
ensure a holistic approach in addressing the situation of women, girls and sexual minority 
refugees and asylum seekers. There is a growing trend among NHRIs to either explicitly or 
implicitly undertake human rights work by utilising an intersectional approach either in 
general or specifically with respect to women’s rights and other persons with identified 
vulnerabilities such as those with HIV or in places of detention.22 However, acknowledging 
this need does not necessarily mean that the NHRIs have the technical capacity to do so. It 
would be incumbent upon the NHRIs to recognise this need to enhance their technical 
capacities, if so lacking, and to utilise a multi-layered approach to addressing human rights 
issues. Such an approach also lends itself to enhanced collaboration among the NHRIs.  
Given the challenges that have been widely and comprehensively documented on the 
Department of Home Affairs’ failings with respect to the implementation of the Refugees 
Act, the adverse court rulings and its non-compliance with court orders, participants opined 
that the Public Protector ought to have played a more prominent role within the asylum 
                                                
21 Foundation for Human Rights, Assessment of knowledge, services and gaps regarding refugee and migrant 
women and children, 2013. 
https://www.fhr.org.za/files/5713/8504/0322/FHR_women__children_gaps_report_FINAL_130227.pdf  
22 GANHRI and APF, “The Role of National Human Rights Institutions in Promoting Gender Equality and the 
Empowerment of Women and Girls Living in Rural Areas: Report Presented at the 62nd Session of the 




%20the%20empowerment%20of%20women%20and%20girls%20in%20rural%20areas.pdf; ARASA, Africa 
Regional Grant on HIV and NANHRI, “Promoting and Protecting the Rights of Key Populations: Making 
Rights a Reality,” Second Regional Capacity Strengthening Convening for African Human Rights Institutions: 
Johannesburg South Africa, 4-7 September 2017, 17 
https://www.arasa.info/media/arasa/Resources/Meeting%20reports/nhri-report-2017-updated-22jan18.pdf 





system. Apart from the information from two interviews, this study identified only citations 
of the Public Protector’s involvement with refugee rights’ issues. In 2004, the Public 
Protector conducted an investigation into the Department of Home Affairs’ management of 
the Johannesburg Refugee Reception Office (RRO).23 The Public Protector found that the 
Department of Home Affairs was failing to meet its obligations with respect to refugees and 
asylum seekers.24 In 2012, a local CSO partnered with the Public Protector to assess the 
situation of refugees and non-nationals in South Africa.25 Despite its involvement, the report 
of the assessment did not include any recommendations for the Public Protector.26  
The evidence from this research therefore supports the perception that the Public 
Protector has played a minimal role in the refugee protection regime. This could be due to 
poor reporting or publication mechanisms within the institution rather than a complete 
disengagement with asylum-matters. The findings also indicated that the institution is rarely 
considered a necessary avenue for remedies when challenges arise. Yet, it has the potential 
for demanding a high degree of accountability from the Department of Home Affairs and 
other relevant government structures in light of the Constitutional Court’s ruling that 
determined that its recommendations for remedial action were binding.27 
Finally, the findings highlight that there is limited collaboration amongst the NHRIs 
with respect to addressing asylum matters. The findings did not identify any strategic and 
coordinated level of engagement amongst the three NHRIs on any matters in general. Neither 
                                                
23 HRW, Living on the Margins; Office of the Public Protector of South Africa, Report on an investigation, 3-4 
24 Human Rights Watch, “South Africa: Living on the Margins, 12. 
25 FHR, Refugee Report: Assessment of the Human Rights Situation of Refugees and Non-nationals July 2011 – 
April 2012, accessed 2 August, 2017, 
http://www.fhr.org.za/files/1214/0016/1064/REFUGEES_AND_NON_NATIONALS_ASSESSMENT_2012_F
INAL_REPORT.pdf,  
26 FHR, Refugee Report. 
27 Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others and Democratic Alliance v 
Speaker of the National Assembly and Others; Recent challenges to the Public Protector’s findings have resulted 
in low perceptions of its credibility and effectiveness: News24, “The legal argument for removing the Public 
Protector,” accessed 2 September 2019, https://www.news24.com/Columnists/Serjeant_at_the_Bar/the-legal-
argument-for-removing-the-public-protector-20190726; Jan Gerber, “Parliament asked to Speed up Public 







was there evidence that refugee rights were addressed concertedly, despite all three NHRIs 
having implemented at least one key activity dealing with refugee rights promotion or 
protection. This is a missed opportunity for effective engagement. As discussed above, an 
intersectional approach to human rights work, would foster critical reflection on the roles that 
each of the NHRIs play and the opportunities provided by the Forum of Institutions 
Supporting Democracy to encourage synergies in discharging mandates.28 This forum was 
identified as an important mechanism for fostering co-ordination and cooperation among the 
institutions following a parliamentary review of the chapter nine institutions.29 While the 
forum has faced institutional challenges,30 it can provide an avenue, through which an NHRI 
can place refugee rights on the agenda of the other institutions. It can also provide a means 
for the NHRIs to formally engage in collaboration, pool resources, and address crosscutting 
refugee rights issues. The coordinated approach utilised in developing the domestic refugee 
protection regime showed that good results could be achieved quickly where various 
stakeholders have a common goal; and where roles and responsibilities are clearly defined 
and understood. Critically, in the South African context where conflation of migrants with 
refugees and asylum seekers features prominently, it is necessary for the NHRIs to delineate 
this particular group of migrants in their interventions.  
 
                                                
28 SAHRC, “Forum of Institutions Supporting Democracy in South Africa Unequivocally Condemns Attacks on 
Foreign Nationals,” Joint Media Statement by the Forum of Institutions Supporting Democracy, Friday, 17 
April 2015, SAHRC, accessed 26 June 2020, https://www.sahrc.org.za/index.php/sahrc-media/news-2/item/319-
forum-of-institutions-supporting-democracy-in-south-africa-unequivocally-condemns-attacks-on-foreign-
nationals. The members of the FISD issued a joint statement condemning violence against foreign nationals that 
broke out in parts of South Africa in 2015. A search of the internet did not yield any other joint statements 
issued by the FISD on any matter except for a media report requesting their inclusion in the national processes 
dealing with the COVID-19 pandemic in South Africa. Linda Ensor, “Constitutional bodies want to be included 
in state’s Covid-19 fight,  BusinessDay, 17 MAY 2020 https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2020-05-17-
constitutional-bodies-want-to-be-included-in-states-covid-19-fight/   
29 Kader Asmal Report, xiii, 140 
30 Portfolio Committee of Justice and Correctional Services, “Duplication in Functions of Institutions 
Supporting Democracy: Input by the Commission for Gender Equality; South African Human Rights 







6.3 The socio-political context undermines the extent to which the NHRIs can 
effectively advance refugee rights  
The findings indicate that the socio-political context within which the NHRIs operate in 
South Africa, has limited the extent to which these NHRIs can effectively engage with 
refugee rights. The particular contextual concerns raised by participants related to the 
securitisation of asylum, xenophobia and the lack of political will to create an environment 
conducive to the effective promotion and protection of refugee and asylum seeker rights. 
Given the finding that the NHRI with the broadest mandate has had the highest level of 
engagement with the promotion and protection of refugee rights, this discussion will 
primarily focus on the SAHRC.  
This section will discuss how the socio-political context has influenced the SAHRC’s 
engagement with the promotion and protection of the refugee rights. It will illustrate how the 
three factors identified by the participants have contributed to the extent to which the NHRIs 
advance refugee rights. These were the securitisation of asylum, xenophobia and the lack of 
political will. This discussion is based on the understanding that context can either impede or 
progress the achievement of an institution’s goals.31  
 With respect to the securitisation of asylum, the findings confirm that asylum is 
becoming increasingly securitised and that this posed a challenge to the effective promotion 
and protection of refugee rights. As one participant summed it up: “what we now have are 
very security driven approaches to dealing with the refugee question.” 32  Van Lennep 
describes securitisation as “the process whereby political actors turn an issue into a matter of 
security. Asylum is securitised by the repeated characterisation of refugees as fraudsters, 
                                                
31 David A. Hyman; William E. Kovacic, "Why Who Does What Matters: Governmental Design and Agency 
Performance," George Washington Law Review 82, no. 5 (October 2014): 1446-1516; Anne Schneider and 
Helen Ingram, “Social Construction of Target Populations: Implications for Politics and Policy,” The American 
Political Science Review, 87, no. 2 (Jun., 1993): 334-347. 





criminals and terrorists.”33 The result is a sense of unease, among the population, which is 
promoted by politicians and is coupled with “blame deflection” that is, it is because of 
refugees that things are not as they should be.34 The findings of this study reflect this 
perspective. 
Van Lennep, Ilgit and Klotz, Hammerstadt, and Carciotto and Mavura have found that 
the South African asylum system is plagued with a myriad of challenges, in part due to the 
focus on security concerns.35  Hence, the conclusion that the proposed amendments to the 
asylum policy are due to a shift in thinking and practice that sees migration as an issue of 
national security.36The SAHRC’s stance echoes these conclusions. The SAHRC 
acknowledges the securitisation of asylum and has raised concerns about its impact on the 
realisation of refugee rights.37 The SAHRC has criticised the securitised nature of changes to 
immigration policy through the amendments to the Immigration Act, the Refugees Act and 
proposals for the Green Paper and the White Paper on Immigration. 38  
The securitisation of asylum has not limited the SAHRC’s ability to work on asylum-
related matters, but, combined with other factors including those discussed below, has led to 
increased difficulties in engaging with the Department of Home Affairs.39 For instance, the 
Department of Home Affairs’ officials ignore requests for meetings with the SAHRC to 
                                                
33 Van Lennep, Tove, The State of the South African Refugee Protection Regime: Part III – Party Politics, Dec 
05, 2018. Available at: https://hsf.org.za/publications/hsf-briefs/the-state-of-the-south-african-refugee-
protection-regime-part-iii-party-politics, accessed 10 June, 2019; See also B. Buzan, O. Waever, and J. de 
Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998).   
34 Van Lennep, The State of the South African Refugee Protection Regime. 
35 See for instance: Asli Ilgit and Audie Klotz, “How Far Does ‘Societal Security’ Travel? Securitization in 
South African immigration policies,” Security Dialogue 45, no. 2 (April 2014): 137-155; LHR, Migrants Suffer 
as South Africa’s Refugee System Crumbles, accessed 10 June, 2019, 
https://www.lhr.org.za/news/2012/migrants-suffer-south-africa’s-refugee-system-crumbles; Anne Hammerstadt, 
“Securitisation from Below: The Relationship between Immigration and Foreign Policy in South Africa's 
Approach to the Zimbabwe Crisis,” Conflict, Security and Development, 12(1), March 2012, doi: 
10.1080/14678802.2012.667659.    
36 Sergio Carciotto and Mike Mavura, The Evolution of Migration Policy in Post-Apartheid South Africa: 
Emerging Themes And New Challenges, Cape Town: The Scalabrini Institute for Human Mobility in Africa 
(SIHMA), 2016, 72.  
37 SAHRC, “SA Legislation on migrants takes wrong path,” SAHRC, 26 June 2018, 
https://www.sahrc.org.za/index.php/sahrc-media/news/item/1416-sa-legislation-on-migrants-takes-wrong-path,  
38 SAHRC, SA Legislation on migrants.   





discuss challenges within the department and the impact on refugees and asylum seekers’ 
accessing their rights.40 This has limited the SAHRC’s efforts to engage substantively with 
the Department of Home Affairs to address systemic issues that have contributed to the poor 
implementation of South Africa’s asylum laws and policies. The SAHRC participant 
attributed these challenges to the department’s reluctance to effectively manage asylum in 
South Africa.41  
This study also found that xenophobia was identified as a significant contextual factor 
that impacts on the SAHRC’s activities related to refugee rights. Huysmans, Ibrahim, 
Hammerstad, Ilgit and Klotz conclude that there is an association between securitisation of 
asylum and xenophobia.42 The securitisation of asylum and high levels of xenophobic 
discourse in South Africa reflect this association. As discussed in chapter 4, section 4.4.2, 
studies have found that xenophobia in South Africa is systemic and an integral part of the 
asylum [and migration] experience.43 In fact, the Department of Home Affairs is often 
described as a department that is institutionally xenophobic as reflected in its policies, 
directives and official’s attitudes towards migrants.44 Further, Bouyat and Demeestre found 
that the department is promoting the institutionalisation of xenophobia in other public 
                                                
40 Interview with NHRI participant 1, Johannesburg, South Africa. 
41 Interview with NHRI participant 1, Johannesburg, South Africa. 
42For example: Jef Huysmans, "The European Union and the Securitization of Migration," Journal of 
Common Market Studies 38, no. 5 (December 2000): 751-778; Maggie Ibrahim, “The Securitization of 
Migration: A Racial Discourse, International Migration, 3, no. 5 (November 2005): 163-187 https://doi-
org.ezproxy.uct.ac.za/10.1111/j.1468-2435.2005.00345.x, accessed 23 November, 2019; Anne Hammerstad, 
“Securitization from below; Asli Ilgit and Audie Klotz, “How far does ‘societal security’ travel?”  
43For example:  Loren Landau, “Tragedy Or Farce? Xenophobic Violence Against Foreign Nationals And Other 
“Outsiders” In Post- Apartheid South Africa, ACMS Issue Brief, (March 2016); Jonathan Crush, “South Africa: 
Policy in the Face of Xenophobia,” Migration Policy Institute, (July 28, 2008), accessed May 10, 2017, 
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/south-africa-policy-facexenophobia; Jonathan Crush and Godfrey 
Tawodzera, “Medical Xenophobia Zimbabwean Migrant Access to Public Health Services in South Africa,” 
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 40, no. 4 (April 2014). doi: 10.1080/1369183X.2013.830504.  
44 Roni Amit and Norma Kriger, “Making migrants 'il-legible': The Policies and Practices of documentation in 
Post-apartheid South Africa in Kronos, 40 n.1 Cape Town Nov. 2014, accessed 12 May 2018, 
http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0259-01902014000100012; see also LHR report; 
Roni Amit, Queue Here for Corruption; Loren Landau, “Protection and Dignity in Johannesburg: Shortcomings 






institutions such as schools, police stations and public health care facilities as a direct result 
of compliance by officials within these institutions with its policies and directives.45  
This assertion is reflected in the nature of complaints that the SAHRC receives from 
refugees or asylum seekers. The SAHRC reports indicate that the majority of complaints it 
receives from migrants, including refugees and asylum seekers, relate to discrimination based 
on ethnic or social origin.46 The reported instances of discrimination primarily occur when 
accessing the rights to documentation, health, education, and employment and when dealing 
with the police.47 Though this study found evidence indicating that the Gender Commission 
and the Public Protector handled complaints from refugees and asylum seekers, it could not 
determine if the grounds for such complaints was discrimination based on the complainants’ 
status as either refugees or as asylum seekers.48 
Other NHRI activities have also been undertaken as a direct result of widespread 
violence targeting migrants or in efforts to address the impact of xenophobia on the rights of 
migrants in general. For instance, the SAHRC has held several national public hearings on 
xenophobia and social cohesion. It also subpoenaed Department of Home Affairs’ officials in 
2019 to demand action to address the delays in adjudication of asylum applications and the 
resultant backlog. The SAHRC cited the department’s unwillingness to engage on asylum 
matters as the reason for the subpoena. In the hearing that ensued, the view of one 
stakeholder was that the challenges arose as a direct result of the Department of Home 
                                                
45 Jeanne Bouyat and Rodolphe Demeestre found that institutionalisation of xenophobia is particularly high in 
public high schools and police stations and is as a direct result of compliance by officials within these 
institutions with the Department of Home Affairs’ policies and directives. See Jeanne Bouyat and Rodolphe  
Demeestre, The Institutionalization of Xenophobia in the contemporary South African State Officials’ practices 
towards African Immigration in high schools of Johannesburg and police stations of Cape Town, Seminar 
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state/  
46 SAHRC, Trends Analysis Report 2016/2017. 
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47 South African Human Rights Commission and 40 Others v Minister of Home Affairs: Naledi Pandor and 4 
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Affairs being xenophobic and unwilling to adhere to the prescripts of the Refugee Act to 
ensure an effectively run asylum system.49 The Gender Commission played a role in 
assessing the compliance of the displacement camps that housed refugees and asylum 
seekers, with international standards following an outbreak of xenophobic violence in 
Durban, South Africa in 2015. 
Broadly speaking, the activities mentioned above can be classified into two groups, 
either provision of services (complaints handling and referrals) or advocacy for social-
change, to enhance integration or better policy implementation for systemic and structural 
change. Resources allowing, the interventions at service provision level would perhaps be 
easier, given that resolution of a matter is usually at an individual case-by-case level. The 
challenges, as noted by Pugh, arise when “advocating for what is arguably a socially and 
politically unpopular population within a national discourse and climate that largely positions 
migrants, refugees and asylum seekers as a threat or zero-sum competition to the economic 
and social well-being of other…citizens.”50  
Furthermore, discussions with participants on how xenophobia impeded NHRIs’ 
capacity and capability to effectively address refugee rights revealed a perception that 
xenophobic attitudes were deeply embedded among policy-makers, politicians and civil 
servants. As stated by one participant: “We keep hearing “how can we deal with foreigners 
when we are struggling to provide for our own people?”51 There was also the perception that 
the NHRIs faced significant social and political pressure to clearly prioritise the needs of 
citizens over those of migrants as encapsulated in responses such as: “We’ve often heard that 
South Africans face many challenges, how then can the Commission, CGE [Gender 
                                                
49 The DailyVox Team, ADF: Home Affairs Comments on Asylum Seekers are Xenophobic, The DailyVox, 
February 13, 2018, https://www.thedailyvox.co.za/home-affairs-comments-on-asylum-seekers-xenophobic/  
50 Sarah A. Pugh, “Advocacy in the Time of Xenophobia: Civil Society, the State, and the Politics of Migration 
in South Africa,” Politikon, 2014, 41:2, 231, doi:10.1080/02589346.2014.905255.  





Commission] or Public Protector think about us?”52 These perceptions correspond to studies, 
which have found the prevalence of this view in South Africa.53  
Such views support the hierarchical facilitation of access to rights and limited 
resources, thereby prioritising the needs of South Africans first regardless of the 
constitutional obligation to ensure rights of all people in the country.54 The SAHRC reiterated 
that despite the challenges discussed above, the Constitutional requirement to promote and 
protect the rights of all people could not be deviated from, and “we are mandated to promote 
and protect rights of all migrants including refugees and asylum seekers.”55 
 The third factor perceived to have an impact on NHRIs’ effectiveness was the lack of 
political will to promote the effective implementation of the domestic refugee protection 
regime. The manifestation of the lack of political will was two-fold. For NHRIs, the State as 
the primary actor in the refugee protection regime was reluctant to engage effectively with 
refugee matters. However, service providers and refugee participants perceived both the State 
and the NHRIs as lacking the political will to engage effectively with refugee matters.  
In order to understand the impact of political will on policy implementation and the 
resulting impact on NHRIs’ role, it is important to first ascribe meaning to the notion of 
political will. Available literature suggests various definitions and conceptualisations of the 
term “political will”.56 While no singular definition or understanding of the term is proffered, 
there is convergence in the suggestions of the key elements that must be present when 
discussing political will. These are “willingness”, “capacity”, “authority” and “reform”.57 
Therefore, the presence or absence of political will rests on the willingness of an actor or 
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wiley-com.ezproxy.uct.ac.za/doi/epdf/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2010.00253.x; Jeff Crisp, Mobilizing Political Will 
for Refugee Protection and Solutions: A Framework for Analysis and Action 2018, accessed 27 August, 
2019https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/documents/WRC%20Research%20Paper%20no.1web.pdf ,) 






actors who has/have the capacity and authority, to bring about change or reform.58  Based on 
this definition, it would be appropriate to attribute the presence or absence of political will to 
engage effectively with the implementation of the refugee protection regime, to both the State 
and the NHRIs.  
In the case of States, they have the authority and must be willing to put in place 
proper structures and resources (capacity) to cause change. Similarly, NHRIs have the 
authority (constitutional and legislative mandate) and must be willing to utilise the resources 
at their disposal to influence change. A cautionary note here is that actors can also display a 
willingness to bring about change but not commit themselves to actually invest resources to 
bring about the required change, thereby creating an illusion of there being political will.59 
Another important aspect of political will, which Post et al point out, is that it is dynamic and 
is influenced by context.60 This means that States and other actors respond to their local 
constituencies and the implementation of refugee policy is no exception to this, as has been 
discussed above. The sections below will discuss this study’s findings on the impact that 
political will has had on the status of the refugee protection regime, and perceptions that exist 
of the role that NHRIs need to play to address the resultant challenges.  
Considering the key elements of political will, this study found that with respect to 
“reform” there was consensus among all the participants that change required the effective 
implementation of the domestic refugee protection regime. This corroborates previous studies 
on South Africa [and Kenya], which have drawn similar conclusions about the need to reform 
the implementation of refugee policies in South Africa [and in Kenya].61  However, reform 
rests on the willingness and the capacity of an actor to authoritatively advocate for change, 
                                                
58 Post, Raile and Raile, “Defining Political Will,” 657-659. 
59 Post, Raile and Raile, 657-659. 
60 Post, Raile and Raile, “Defining Political Will,” 657-659. 





and to do so successfully, requires a favourable environment.62 Therefore, it is important to 
look at these elements and how they affect NHRIs’ engagement with the refugee regime in 
South Africa.  
In terms of capacity, one of the NHRI participants stated that the government had 
deliberately undermined the refugee regime by under-resourcing the government units tasked 
with refugee management. For example, as mentioned above, the Department of Home 
Affairs has had a backlog of asylum applications and appeals for over fifteen years.63 The 
often-cited reason for the backlog is the lack of capacity.64 Despite the department 
implementing several interventions in the past fifteen years to address this, the backlog 
problem remains.65 This exemplifies the notion of the illusion of political will. The SAHRC 
intervened and demanded that the Department of Home Affairs implement an action plan to 
address the asylum backlog.66 This action stemmed from a complaint the SAHRC received 
from an asylum seeker whose asylum application took ten years to be adjudicated.67   
Service provider participants concurred that the South African government did not 
appear particularly interested in addressing capacity concerns. One participant described the 
state of affairs as follows: “The closure of the refugee reception offices (RRO) has been a 
nightmare for many refugees and asylum seekers who need to access documentation. Despite 
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court rulings ordering the DHA to reopen the RROs, the DHA refuses to comply saying that 
they do not have the resources to handle asylum applications.”68 Another participant stated: 
…DHA are dead set on their approach so you are not going to really have that much 
of an impact. They are already kind of set in stone there, on their path forward. So for 
example, they released their Green Paper on International Migration for public 
comments and they had a whole bunch of controversial, restrictive policies in it, and 
then while the Green Paper is still out for public consultation, they release a Refugees 
Amendment Bill in draft form, which has all the proposals in the Green Paper already. 
So, I mean they’ve clearly made up their minds and whether the Scalabrini Centre, the 
Cape Law Society or the Human Rights Commission tells them, one way or the other 
I don’t think that really matters. You can have some small impact here or there on 
legislation but the path is set.69 
 
There was also consensus among participants that the political will to engage with refugee 
maters was heavily influenced by the local populations’ attitudes towards African migrants in 
general, refugee and asylum seekers, or specific groups of refugees and asylum seekers. In 
this study, this is manifested in the form of xenophobia, as discussed above.  
On the notion of “authority”, the findings show that the perception of “who” the actor 
responsible for the reform was, differed among the participants. For NHRIs, the primary actor 
was the State, whereas service providers, refugees, and asylum seekers identified both the 
State and the NHRIs as having primary roles in reforming the refugee protection regime. 
Thus, service providers and refugees felt that the NHRIs had not displayed sufficient 
willingness to advocate for change to improve the implementation of refugee law and policies 
and the asylum experience for refugees and asylum seekers. As one participant stated: “If 
they showed interest in refugee matters as Chapter Nines [this refers to NHRIs] they would 
make a difference, they have the powers. For example Thuli Madonsela [former Public 
Protector] raised the profile of the Public Protector and showed how effective it could be 
when a Chapter Nine used its powers to deal with matters within its mandate.”70 
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In addition, service provider and refugee participants felt that the State [DHA] was 
unwilling to engage with refugee-related matters to such an extent that it had negated its 
responsibilities towards refugees and asylum seekers. This stance was perceived to have had 
a detrimental effect on the NHRIs’ abilities to engage meaningfully with the promotion and 
protection of refugee rights. As one participant lamented: “…to the extent that that 
submission [SAHRC submission on the White Paper on Immigration] is going to have some 
tangible impact, I wouldn’t hold my breath.”71  
The NHRI participant’s views were consistent with those held by the service provider 
and refugee participants. The participant reported that the State’s unwillingness to engage 
effectively with the promotion and protection of refuge rights impeded their own efforts. The 
participant expressed particular frustration with the difficulties faced in securing audience 
with Department of Home Affairs officials to discuss any matters related to asylum. For 
example, during a media briefing, the SAHRC Chairperson stated that the Commission had 
attempted to engage with Home Affairs for a year to no avail.72 This was reiterated by the 
NHRI participant who indicated that the institutions could not handle individual complaints 
reported by refugees and asylum seekers effectively, as the Department did not respond to 
either its requests for information on the complaints concerned or requests for meetings to 
discuss the complaints.73  
Contrary to the views held by the service provider and refugee participants, the NHRI 
participant felt that the institution had the political will to engage with refugee matters but 
that the environment it operated in impeded its efforts. Such impediments were not 
necessarily obvious to other actors and may have given the impression that there was 
institutional reluctance to deal with the promotion and protection of refugee rights. The 
service provider and refugee participants’ views perhaps also reflect the high expectations 
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placed on NHRIs to address all manner of human rights violations, within relatively short 
periods of time, without due regard to the constraints they may face.74  
Renshaw and Fitzpatrick suggest that where high expectations are not met, NHRIs 
may become marginalised from the wider human rights community.75 This is reflected in the 
South African context where the service providers and refugees do not often engage with the 
SAHRC even on crucial matters. For example, a service provider who had lodged a 
complaint with SAHRC following the Department of Home Affairs’ refusal to process 
asylum applications from applicants lacking adequate documentation, stated:  
We approached the SAHRC when the DHA [Department of Home Affairs] refused to 
accept asylum applications from new arrivals who could not produce their passports. 
Then we realised that the SAHRC has challenges. It has internal issues. There are 
things that they can do and others that they can’t do. We dropped them along the way 
and approached LHR [Lawyers for Human Rights] who have since taken up the 
matter.76 
 
The findings also demonstrate that there is a perceived association between the lack of 
political will and the poor implementation of refugee law and policies. South Africa has 
domesticated international and regional refugee law in the form of the Refugees Act. 
Therefore, in theory, refugees and asylum seekers are protected in accordance with 
international norms and standards. However, participants reported dereliction of duty by the 
government precisely because of the lack of political will to ensure the promotion and 
protection of the rights of refugees and asylum seekers. This finding is consistent with 
research within the public policy discourse, which has established the causal link between 
political will and policy implementation.77 As such, one of the factors necessary for effective 
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policy implementation is the presence of political will. For refugees and asylum seekers, 
implementation of laws and policies may make the difference between protection and 
refoulement and the resultant danger to life.  
The findings reflect consensus among all participants that the government was not 
adhering to the laws, policies, and regulations governing the protection of refugees and 
asylum seekers. The implementation challenges that the Department of Home Affairs face 
have been widely documented.78 Based on the complaints it had handled, the SAHRC reports 
indicate that implementation challenges primarily related to administrative action involving 
documentation and appeals against rejected asylum applications; access to basic services 
particularly health services and education; and arbitrary arrest and unlawful detention.79 
These matters all stemmed from the Department of Home Affairs’ implementation of asylum 
related policies contrary to the Refugee Act, the Immigration Act and the Constitution, or in a 
manner that would result in the poor implementation of these laws and policies, for instance, 
the Department of Home Affairs’ reluctance to provide the requisite resources to effectively 
discharge its mandate.80  
These findings reflect similar conclusions from studies on the refugee status 
determination process in South Africa and relevant court decisions.81 The SAHRC has 
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resorted to litigation to force the Department’s compliance with the provisions of law.82 
However, the Department has consistently ignored court rulings leaving the proper 
implementation of asylum-related laws and policies in abeyance.83 The SAHRC has, as a 
result, found that quite often, it is unable to ensure redress where refugee and asylum seeker 
rights have been violated.84 Service provider and refugee participants concurred that the 
Department of Home Affairs implemented laws and policies poorly and that it was reluctant 
to engage meaningfully with other stakeholders to improve implementation, as reflected in 
these statements:  
DHA are dead set on their approach so you are not going to really have that much of 
an impact.85 
 
This issue: that you have policies, then you have regulations, then you have directives. 
You find that at the ground here, the directives that are issued by the DG [Director 
General] or the Deputy DG in charge of refugees are in clear violation of the law. 
This issue of passports [asylum seekers being required to produce passports before 
DHA can accept an application for asylum] is neither here nor there, it’s not 
mentioned anywhere but apparently these are directives from the DG…86 
It’s been a very tough journey. I finally got my status, but it was a nightmare going to 
Home Affairs. I’m lucky that it took me 10 years to get my papers. I have a friend 
who came here before me but he’s still waiting to get help.87 
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6.4 NHRIs utilise the working methods available through their legislative mandates 
to promote and protect refugee rights  
The findings indicate that the NHRIs utilise the working methods available through their 
legislative mandates to advance refugee rights, despite the absence of an express requirement 
within their mandates to either promote or protect these rights.  All the NHRIs in South 
Africa surveyed for this study, have both promotion and protection mandates. The findings 
showed that the extent to which they engaged with matters related to refugees varied greatly, 
and in some cases was non-existent.  
As discussed in section 6.2, the findings confirm that the SAHRC has the highest 
degree of engagement with matters related to migrants broadly and specifically those that 
related to refugees and asylum seekers. This section will first discuss the SAHRC’s 
promotional activities and then the protection activities undertaken to advance refugee rights. 
Reference will also be made to the activities of the other NHRIs where the findings indicate 
engagement with the promotion and protection of refugee rights.  
 
6.4.1 NHRI Promotional activities 
In their study on the safeguards for NHRI effectiveness, Linos and Pegram assert the 
importance of NHRIs being vested with promotional functions.88 The Paris Principles also 
lay particular emphasis on NHRIs’ having promotional responsibilities and suggest the type 
of activities that this function should entail. These include giving advice to government or 
other actors, examining and making recommendations on legislation and policies, preparing 
reports on the domestic state of human rights, promoting compliance with international 
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human rights norms, standards and obligations, cooperating with international and regional 
bodies and conducting training, education and research.89 
Consequently, NHRIs’ promotional activities are primarily concerned with human 
rights education and awareness. These activities are important as they enable the 
dissemination of information and knowledge about human rights to the public and to specific 
target groups thereby promoting a human rights culture.90 The specific activities that can be 
implemented to achieve the promotional objective can be classified into four broad 
categories, that is, advisory; reporting; human rights education and awareness-raising.  
Where advisory activities are concerned, the Paris Principles recommend that NHRIs 
advise the government and related structures on any human rights matters including 
compliance of legislation, policies, bills, guidelines etc. with fundamental human rights 
principles.91 This includes advising on the harmonisation of legislation, regulations and 
practices with the international human rights instruments to which the State is a party, and 
their effective implementation.92 In addition, NHRIs are required to contribute to State 
reports to international and regional mechanisms, and to submit independent reports to these 
entities.  
Within this function, NHRIs will review existing and proposed laws, policies and 
practices and where necessary, recommend changes or the adoption of new measures to 
ensure compliance with human rights norms and standards. This function helps in promoting 
human rights mainstreaming, thereby encouraging compliance with international human 
rights norms and standards. The advisory role is usually done through the submission of 
advisory opinions.  
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A review of African NHRI mandates, found that majority have the powers to perform 
the advisory role but that they face challenges when performing this role.93 The factors that 
were determined to impede these NHRIs’ capacity to undertake this role effectively included: 
the lack of strategies to ensure adoption of recommendations; low levels of interaction with 
relevant portfolio committees; and lack of technical capacity in terms of staff and expertise to 
undertake research and policy development as well as to develop convincing advisory 
opinions based on law and evidence.94  
This study has found that the SAHRC and, to a lesser extent the Gender Commission, 
perform this function with respect to the promotion of refugee rights. The SAHRC regularly 
reviews laws, policies, and guidelines to encourage the development and implementation in 
compliance with the Constitution and international and regional human rights norms and 
standards. The SAHRC has a unit, the Parliamentary and International Affairs Unit, within 
the Research Programme, with the sole mandate to ensure that the SAHRC fulfils this aspect 
of its mandate. Its tasks are: legislative analysis and drafting of submissions; analysis of 
South Africa’s compliance with its international and regional human rights obligations; 
drafting NHRI reports to international and regional human rights bodies; and providing 
advice and opinions on cases, findings, court judgements etc. from a legislative and 
international perspective.95  
Thus, the SAHRC has made submissions on bills, regulations and policies related to 
refugee rights including: Refugee Amendment Bills (2017, 2007), Hate Crimes & Hate 
Speech Bill (2017), Trafficking in Persons Bills (2006 and 2004), Immigration Act 
Regulations (2003), Immigration Bill (2000) and the White Paper on International Migration 
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(2000).96 On occasion, the SAHRC has appeared before Parliament at the request of a 
portfolio committee to discuss their submissions and to propose recommendations to address 
challenges which migrants, refugees and asylum seekers face, such as xenophobia.97 
A participant expressed confidence in the SAHRC’s institutional structures to 
adequately support its advisory role.98 What it lacked was the development of an institutional 
monitoring and evaluation strategy to determine its impact, and the effectiveness of its role in 
the development of laws and policies that comply with international and regional refugee law, 
norms and standards.99 An important factor here is that the SAHRC lacks the power to 
enforce its recommendations and, in the absence of a monitoring and evaluation strategy, 
relies heavily on the government’s goodwill for implementation of recommendations.100 
Having such a strategy in place is crucial in light of the views held by participants regarding 
the SAHRC’s capacity to influence implementation of policies, to ensure effective promotion 
and protection of refugee rights. As one participant stated:  
Before we can even talk about [the SAHRC’s impact on the] implementation of 
policy, there’s a huge policy shift as far as migrants and immigration is concerned. 
Our view is that the amended Refugee Act has clauses that are in violation of the 
Constitution and certainly the 1951 Refugee Convention that South Africa signed 
without reservation. We would have expected the SAHRC to engage internally with 
DHA [Department of Home Affairs] and government to challenge those unacceptable 
provisions.101 
Another challenge that impacts on its effectiveness is the context within which it operates in, 
as discussed in section 6.3 above. Participants cited the DHA’s reluctance to engage 
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meaningfully with stakeholders where immigration and asylum policies were concerned, as 
one of the most significant challenges.  
The second category of promotional activities is that of reporting. Reporting is the 
presentation of human rights information that the NHRIs have gathered during the course of 
conducting their activities. This information could be gathered from the NHRI’s own 
research, from its investigative activities, international and regional bodies, or even the 
courts.  This information is usually disseminated in the form of annual, thematic or regular 
reports either highlighting its own activities or the state of human rights in the country. 
Depending on the nature of the report, the NHRI may also recommend measures for redress 
or highlight the challenges it faces in the course of conducting its activities. The reports may 
be disseminated to both national and international bodies.  
This study found that the SAHRC reports on its activities related to refugee rights at 
both the national and international levels. However, the details and availability of such 
reporting varied. For instance, the SAHRC’s report on the investigation into xenophobic 
violence against foreign nationals in 2008 was very comprehensive and remains the main 
reference document for demanding government accountability for the poor progress in efforts 
to address xenophobia.102 In stark contrast, no formal reports have been published of its 
subsequent activities on xenophobia since 2008.  For example, the fact-finding report on the 
conditions of encampment for refugees and other migrants in Durban following displacement 
due to xenophobic violence in the 2015 has not been published. Reference to the fact-finding 
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mission that took place is only available on media platforms.103 Yet here too, and based on 
the media reports of concerns it raised, the SAHRC made findings relevant to the 
improvement of human rights situation of those displaced and broadly to address the 
underlying causes of xenophobia. Had these findings been made public, they could have 
served as vital information for advocacy efforts for other stakeholders. The SAHRC also 
hosted a national dialogue in 2018 on xenophobia and social cohesion, but as at the time of 
writing, this report was yet to be published.104 Only one published Gender Commission report 
includes a reference to a refugee-related activity.105   
The challenges that NHRIs face in documenting and disseminating their work for 
impact have been widely acknowledged.106 GANHRI the global NHRI network found in its 
NHRI capacity assessments, that many NHRIs reported a lack of internal capacity to report 
effectively. 107 Concurring with this, one participant stated: 
It is difficult to access information on the work that NHRIs do. Usually we stumble 
upon the information during conversations or when we send out a request for 
particular information. I often get surprised at the amount of work that NHRIs do 
that’s not captured or reported on. It is usually in someone’s computer.108 
 
Barkow argues that one of the most powerful tools a public agency can have is the ability to 
“generate and disseminate information that is politically powerful” to the public.109 She rests 
this argument on two notions: that the public may not have the tools to organise effectively; 
and that the public may not be aware that there is an issue worth fighting for because of the 
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absence of resources to monitor the government in a manner similar to interest groups.110 
Thus, independent public institutions such as NHRIs play an important role in keeping the 
public informed about important issues in an independent manner. Barkow further adds that 
the information generation and dissemination processes must be supported by the capacity of 
an institution to undertake research based on credible data, but that the resultant studies and 
reports are only useful if they are disseminated to the public and utilised in political spaces 
and oversight hearings.111 As such, the lack of effective reporting or complete absence 
thereof has a detrimental effect on the NHRIs role in influencing change for the effective 
realisation of refugee rights. 
Despite some of the challenges faced with documenting and disseminating their 
activities, NHRIs have increased their visibility particularly at the international level by 
reporting on human rights issues including challenges, opportunities, or the status of 
realisation of rights. Indeed, the Paris Principles require that NHRIs actively engage with 
both regional and international human rights entities to ensure the promotion and protection 
of human rights.112 The SAHRC stated that it is actively engaged with both the African Union 
and UN human rights bodies including the treaty bodies, other special mechanisms and 
processes on matters related to migrants, and where necessary, it highlights specific issues 
related to refugee rights.113 For example, its engagement with the UN treaty body, the 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) shows some promising 
results with regard to demanding State accountability for the realisation of refugee rights.114  
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The CERD’s concluding observations to South Africa following its review in 2016, 
made extensive reference to the SAHRC’s recommendations to the Committee as contained 
in its NHRI Report (shadow report).  On xenophobia, the SAHRC brought to the 
Committee’s attention the notion of “medical xenophobia” and highlighted its specific 
manifestations when migrants accessed health care services. These included:  
The requirement that refugee patients produce identification documentation and proof 
of residence status before receiving treatment; health professionals refusing to 
communicate with patients in English or allow for the use of translators; treatment 
often accompanied with xenophobic statements, insults and other verbal abuse; non-
South African patients being required to wait until all South African patients had 
received medical attention, even if they had been waiting longer for treatment; and, 
refugees and asylum seekers experienced difficulty accessing anti-retroviral treatment 
for HIV in public hospitals, resulting in their reliance on NGO treatment 
programmes.115  
 
The SAHRC put forward specific recommendations to CERD, which were included by the 
Committee in its concluding observations, as highlighted below. The CERD urged South 
Africa to:  
Take measures to ensure that non-citizens have access to basic services such as 
health care and access to justice, without discrimination; provide language 
interpretation services to eliminate barriers in access to basic services; and conduct 
training for law enforcement officials and health and social service providers on the 
rights of non-citizens.116 [Author’s own emphasis].  
 
In addition, various other concluding observations reflected the SAHRC’s contribution to the 
CERD. Following the release of the CERD’s concluding observations, the Geneva-based 
GANHRI representative, stated that it was the first time since the formalization of the 
engagement between NHRIs and the treaty bodies began, that a Committee had incorporated 
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in its concluding observations, extensive recommendations from an NHRI following a State’s 
review.117 
The third category of NHRI promotional activities is human rights education. There is 
no universally agreed upon approach to human rights education among NHRIs. However, the 
Danish Institute of Human Rights in consultation with other NHRIs developed a guide for 
NHRIs and human rights education.118 The guide proposes that NHRI activities related to 
human rights education are those that fall within the definition of human rights education 
suggested by the Declaration on Human Rights Education.119 The Declaration notes that 
human rights education is education about human rights, through human rights and for human 
rights.120 This implies that human rights education is teaching that provides knowledge and 
understanding about human rights, in a manner that respects both the educator and the learner 
and empowers the person to enjoy, exercise, respect and uphold human rights.121  
In addition, the Paris Principles recommend that NHRIs “assist in the formulation of 
programmes for the teaching of, and research into, human rights and to take part in their 
execution in schools, universities and professional circles.”122NHRIs conduct human rights 
education so that targeted audiences gain knowledge on their rights and responsibilities and 
receive information on avenues for seeking redress where violations occur. Some NHRIs also 
have documentation centres or institutes to support this function.123  
This study found that the SAHRC has conducted human rights education activities with 
respect to migrants’ rights, though these were limited. The SAHRC conducts human rights 
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education through its Advocacy and Communications Unit. The SAHRC reported that the 
bulk of human rights education interventions are conducted at the provincial level and it 
would appear that reporting on the activities remains internal.124 A review of its reports and 
materials on the SAHRC website did not identify any specific reports or materials that had 
been developed for human rights education on refugee rights.  This is despite the SAHRC’s 
designation of refugee rights as a priority thematic area in its work. A review of literature 
identified reference to only one training activity that the SAHRC conducted in 2008 with a 
UNHCR implementing partner, the University of Cape Town’s Refugee Rights Unit. This 
was an outreach activity the SAHRC implemented to raise awareness about refugee and 
asylum seeker rights among this group in the wake of the 2008 xenophobic attacks.125  
Human rights education would be particularly useful as a tool for targeting frontline 
service providers such as the police, healthcare providers, Department of Home Affairs 
officials and school administrators. That it appears underutilised reflects conclusions drawn 
by Carver and Keet that NHRIs tend to focus their work on protection of human rights.126 
Keet adds that the SAHRC has also grappled with a lack of staff with expertise as human 
rights educators.127  
The fourth category of NHRI promotional activities is human rights awareness- 
raising.  Human rights awareness-raising is done to promote a wide understanding and 
observance of human rights principles and standards.128 There are various tools or avenues 
that NHRIs utilise to conduct promotional activities. These include seminars, workshops, 
campaigns, publications (e.g. pamphlets, booklets, websites, policy briefs etc.), making use of 
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the media and community-based initiatives.  This study found that the use of awareness 
raising activities as an important avenue through which the NHRIs could inform the public, 
refugees, and asylum seekers about their mandate and the rights that refugees and asylum 
seekers are entitled to.  
One of the SAHRC’s important awareness-raising activities about refugee rights was 
the Roll Back Xenophobia campaign, which was launched in December 1998.129 The 
Campaign was implemented together with the National Consortium on Refugee Affairs 
(NCRA)130 and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). This was a 
comprehensive and multifaceted campaign. It included seminars on forced migration, 
xenophobia and refugee rights with journalists and at universities, press conferences, public 
service announcements on print, television and radio, the publication and distribution of 
pamphlets, a magazine, a comic booklet, the broadcast of a radio series on community radio 
stations countrywide, and a refugee photography project.131  
However, SAHRC’s available public records do not indicate that it continued to 
implement this campaign beyond 2000, nor is there a public record of its report of the 
campaign except for a brief description in its Annual Report of 1998/1999.132 Based on the 
review of the partner’s reports, it appears that the SAHRC pulled out of the campaign.133 This 
research could not identify any reasons why this occurred, but the perceived failure of the 
campaign to achieve its intended goals was laid at SAHRC’s feet.   
The Consortium of Refugees and Migrants in South Africa (previously NCRA) stated 
that the SAHRC’s withdrawal damaged the effectiveness of the campaign and the ability to 
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continue raising awareness to address xenophobia.134 The UNCHR also drew the same 
conclusion, stating: “a change in attitudes towards refugees and migrants requires that the 
SAHRC recommits itself to implementing on going national anti-xenophobia campaigns.”135 
The Roll Back Campaign has been cited by several studies as having had the potential to 
effectively address xenophobia in South Africa.136 The impetus was lost due to the lack of 
follow up and the SAHRC has not implemented a similar activity since its participation in 
this campaign.137  
In an assessment of the state of refugee protection in South Africa conducted in 2006, 
the Consortium of Refugee and Migrants in South Africa challenged the SAHRC to make 
effective use of its mandate to monitor the respect of refugee rights by renewing collaboration 
with NGOs, pursuing the implementation of its recommendations especially those related to 
xenophobia and increasing its visibility at the community level to further the realisation of 
refugee rights.138 Despite the passage of more than a decade since the above assessment was 
conducted, the findings from this study reflect the perception that the SAHRC is not utilising 
its mandate effectively. Service provider and refugee participants concurred in their 
conclusion that the three primary NHRIs were reluctant to utilise their powers. As one service 
provider participant stated: “But like I said maybe people tried them once or twice then found 
that they are useless so they don’t go back.”139 Likewise, a refugee participant concluded: 
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“Maybe they are doing something underground. They can issue a statement but that’s about 
it.”140 
6.4.2 NHRI Protection activities 
The three general categories of activities that fall within the protection mandate are 
complaints handling, conducting investigations, and monitoring.141 The Paris Principles do 
not require that NHRIs have a protection mandate or quasi-judicial competence. Rather, they 
suggest that should this be the case, then there are certain elements of the protection mandate 
that should be met. These are that the NHRI should “hear and consider complaints and 
petitions concerning individual situations… brought before it by individuals, their 
representatives, third parties, non-governmental organizations, associations of trade unions or 
any other representative organizations.”142 This simply means that the NHRI with a 
protection mandate can handle complaints and conduct investigations. Generally, in its 
enabling law, the NHRI will be granted powers to investigate, monitor human rights and to 
accept and investigate individual complaints. All three primary NHRIs in South Africa 
referred to in this study have quasi-judicial powers prescribed by law.  
 In terms of complaints handling, NHRIs hear individual complaints from members of 
the public. These can be lodged directly by an individual or individuals. They can also be 
lodged on behalf of an individual or individuals by a third party. It is a mechanism that allows 
the NHRIs to interface directly with the public. It enhances accessibility, to remedies in a 
cost-effective manner, especially for vulnerable groups, as the service is provided freely. In 
cases where an NHRI cannot deal with a matter, the presence of a referral system is 
envisaged to enable the complainant access to a remedy.  
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However, there are inherent challenges that affect this mechanism. For example, the 
NHRI can be overloaded with complaints, taking away resources that could be utilised to 
address priority human rights issues. Where a caseload is high and capacity is limited, the 
NHRI could be faced with a large number of unresolved cases or cases might take too long to 
resolve. Thus, NHRIs with dual mandates need to be able to balance the promotion and 
protection mandates to avoid diverting from dealing effectively with priority human rights 
concerns.  
This study found that of the three NHRIs, it is the SAHRC, which has reported the 
highest number of complaints related to migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers.  Its annual 
reports indicate that complaints relating to discrimination on the basis of ethnic or social 
origin have constituted between seven per cent and ten per cent of all discrimination 
complaints.143 Based on a review of published reports of concluded individual complaints and 
media reports, this study determined that other complaints that the SAHRC handled that 
related to migrants, refugees or asylum seekers involved administrative action, unlawful 
detention, arbitrary arrests, ill-treatment, violence, access to health and access to education 
(including discrimination when accessing these rights).144    
The SAHRC has achieved some significant results with regard to the protection of 
refugee and asylum seekers’ rights through the complaints handling function. For example, in 
South African Human Rights Commission v Minister of Home Affairs, the court ruled that the 
Department of Home Affairs must grant the SAHRC regular access to South Africa’s 
immigration detention centre known as Lindela, to monitor the situation of detainees.145 The 
court also ordered the Department to submit to the SAHRC, quarterly reports on the details 
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and status of the detainees, including reasons for detention.146 An initial baseline assessment 
of the conditions of detention at the facility had identified refugees and asylum seekers 
among those detained.147 Subsequent to the ruling, the Department’s reports indicate that no 
refugee or asylum seeker has since been detained in the facility.148 These reports are verified 
independently by the SAHRC.149   
Since the court ruling was made in 2014, the SAHRC has been designated the 
national preventive mechanism (NPM) under the Optional Protocol to the Convention against 
Torture (OPCAT).150 This designation as South Africa’s monitoring mechanism for torture 
prevention will, at least in theory, increase access to other places of detention where asylum 
seekers and refugees may be held. The NHRI participant acknowledged that this designation 
would enhance its role in protecting refugee rights.151 This assertion finds credence in 
Welch’s findings with respect to NHRIs’ impact on the decline of the use of torture in a 
country.152   Welch’s study found that the ability of NHRIs to generate information about 
prevalence of torture had resulted in the decline of the use of torture by State apparatus.153 He 
attributed this decline to the utility function that the information serves. Those with 
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information have a higher recourse to seek redress resulting in the State’s reluctance to use 
torture.154  
Steinerte, as referred to earlier, had identified the potential that an NPM designation 
had for an NHRI to make significant contributions to promoting and protecting refugee rights 
in places where they are deprived of their liberty.155  In the SAHRC’s case, its designation 
formalises a role it had taken on through an implied interpretation of its mandate. This 
provides it with a stronger legal basis for expanding its role within the context of prevention 
of torture and other forms of ill-treatment including with respect to refugees and asylum 
seekers.  
In addition, tools designed specifically for African NHRIs to engage with prevention 
of torture are already available and would not require that the SAHRC commit additional 
resources to develop new tools, except if there was need to adapt them to include special 
considerations for refugees and asylum seekers. It would also be important for the SAHRC to 
pay particular attention to its technical capacity to ensure that it undertakes this aspect of its 
mandate effectively. As will be discussed in section 6.5, the SAHRC has faced challenges in 
effectively deploying human resources with respect to refugee rights and has at times created 
the impression, among stakeholders, that it does not have the requisite expertise in addressing 
refugee rights.  
In MT v Refugee Appeal Board, the SAHRC’s investigation into a complaint on 
administrative justice resulted in the Department of Home Affairs formally requesting the 
UNHCR for technical assistance to address the asylum application and appeals backlog.156 It 
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also led to the SAHRC’s decision to develop a strategy to address the systemic issues that 
affect access to asylum and the protection of refugee rights.157 
The Gender Commission and the Public Protector have also handled complaints on 
violations of rights of refugees and asylum seekers. This study identified two reports of 
complaints published by the two institutions. Other cases were inferred through reports of 
activities undertaken in collaboration with other partners or CSOs.158 Only one participant 
knew of a refugee who had filed a complaint with the Public Protector relating to delays in 
the adjudication of an asylum application by the Department of Home Affairs.159 The 
complaint lodged with the Gender Commission related to access to reproductive health 
services.160 This was filed by a group of women, which included refugee women.161 No 
information was made available about the current status of the complaint.  
With respect to the Public Protector, a complaint was lodged about corruption and 
maladministration at the Department of Home Affairs’ Johannesburg Refugee Reception 
Office in 2004.162 The Public Protector found that the Department was failing in its duties and 
responsibilities with respect to refugees and asylum seekers.163 There was no evidence of 
follow up with Department by the Public Protector. The Johannesburg refugee office was 
subsequently closed in 2011 following a court order that determined that the office had been 
established in contravention of zoning requirements.164 Reports indicate that at the time of its 
closure, the Johannesburg refugee office had made efforts to improve its administrative 
processes to improve data capture, curb loss of files and to address corruption.165 It is not 
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apparent if these improvements were because of the Public Protector’s findings and 
recommendations for remedial action.  
In 2012, the Public Protector participated in an assessment of the situation of refugees 
and non-nationals in South Africa.166 The report mentions that the Public Protector received 
complaints during the exercise.167 However, the report did not provide any additional 
information about the number of the nature of the complaints. In addition, the final report did 
not proffer any recommendations to the Public Protector on its role to advance the promotion 
and protection of refugee and asylum seekers’ rights. A further review of the published 
investigations of the Public Protector did not identify any matter related to either refugees or 
asylum seekers, except for the above-mentioned refugee reception office investigation.168.  
All participants acknowledged that the SAHRC’s complaints handling function was 
important, but some reported frustration with the process. The primary concern was the 
length of time it took to finalise a complaint.  As one participant stated: “Complaints are 
handled very slowly. Sometimes matters are finalized long after the issue has run its 
course.”169 This perception is reflected in media reports and other CSO reports, which detail 
the inordinate length of time the SAHRC took to respond to and to investigate complaints, 
which were particularly critical and time sensitive.170  
This challenge corresponds to conclusions from studies, which have found that the 
complaints handling function can be extremely demanding on an NHRI’s resources, with 
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negative consequences for efficient delivery of results.171 This is a challenge that the SAHRC 
acknowledges.172 One participant opined that it would be a mammoth task and unrealistic 
approach for the SAHRC to utilise the individual complaints handling mechanism, to try to 
resolve the challenges that refugees and asylum seekers faced.173 In addition, service provider 
and refugee participants expressed little confidence that the Public Protector had the capacity 
to offer any remedies. None of the participants had lodged a complaint with the Gender 
Commission, nor were they aware of any refugee or asylum seeker who had.  
Another challenge identified related to reporting of findings. As Barkow notes, the 
ability to publish findings and to disseminate them is critical in influencing change.174 This 
ability needs to be supported by mechanisms that allow for the interpretation of data in a 
meaningful way.175  This study found that the NHRIs did not report findings or statistics on 
refugee and asylum seeker cases in a manner that would highlight their vulnerability to 
human rights violations. It was quite difficult to determine the exact number of and nature of 
the cases handled, as published reports contained limited information and where available 
they were reported on broadly.176  
For example, the SAHRC does not publish a report with a detailed analysis of the 
complaints it handles. Rather, it produces a report, referred to as the Trends Analysis report, 
which provides an overview of complaints handled in a given year.177 Thus, it is quite 
difficult to draw any conclusions, based on their published reports, about who reports, why 
they report and how they get to report violations to the SAHRC. Similarly, delays in 
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reporting on findings or not reporting them at all, impacts on the perceived usefulness of 
investigations. For instance, the SAHRC held a national dialogue on migration and social 
cohesion in March 2018, which included submissions and discussions on the challenges of 
asylum in South Africa. The report and recommendations from this dialogue are yet to be 
published. It is not apparent why such delays occur, but this thesis notes that NHRIs face 
challenges reporting on their activities and reporting for impact (see section 6.4.1 above). 
However, parliament, which plays an oversight role over NHRIs, can request, during review 
meetings, for release of NHRI reports within specified time frames.   
Finally, the question of access to NHRIs is an important aspect to consider especially 
in the context of seeking redress for human rights violations. According to Carver, access 
usually takes the form of physical access to the institutions or to its representatives, and 
through other platforms such as electronic means and includes other factors such as ‘child 
friendliness’ or being culturally accessible.178  Carver also identifies physical accessibility, 
which includes having offices or representatives located throughout the country, as an 
important factor in determining NHRIs’ effectiveness.179 However, studies show that few 
NHRIs have the capacity to have presence outside of urban and peri-urban areas, usually 
because of limited funding.180 This makes accessibility to institutions difficult and results in 
the focus on issues that emerge in urban areas, which may not necessarily be the most urgent 
human rights issues.181 
This study found that the SAHRC meets this basic criterion of physical accessibility. 
It has ten offices; one being its headquarters and the other nine are located in each of the 
country’s nine provinces. All ten offices are located in urban areas, usually within the central 
business districts of the provincial capital or a major metropolis (as is the case of the two 
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offices in Johannesburg). However, an NHRI’s offices must be accessible to all and while the 
SAHRC has a relatively good geographic spread compared to other African NHRIs,182 the 
location of its offices in urban areas has drawbacks to its accessibility.  
For instance, the SAHRC receives complaints primarily from those residing in urban 
areas and conducts many of its activities such as national inquiries, dialogues, and workshops 
in Johannesburg.183 This has resulted in engagement with stakeholders located primarily in 
Johannesburg as reflected in one participant’s comment: “It is not easy to determine what 
kind of information trickles down to Cape Town. For instance, I’m not aware about the 
Section 11 Committee perhaps because it sits in Johannesburg. The LHR [Lawyers for 
Human Rights] is more involved with the SAHRC based on proximity. For us it’s a struggle 
being included in all this, hearings crop up at the last second.”184 
In order to improve access, the SAHRC reported that it hosts periodic human rights 
clinics in informal settlements, peri-urban and rural areas. However, there was no information 
available to indicate that any of these human rights clinics targeted refugees or asylum 
seekers, despite many of them living in informal settlements.185   
The second category of protection activities is investigations, which usually take the 
form of public inquiries or public hearings and tend to deal with systemic violations.186 These 
forums examine how laws, policies, practices, patterns of behaviour and ingrained attitudes, 
can operate in violation of human rights norms and standards in a general manner.187  As 
such, the underlying reason for using such investigation techniques is that the human rights 
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concern is systemic in nature or affects a large segment of the population. Therefore, the 
individual complaints mechanism would not suffice given the broader interests.  
This study found that the SAHRC also utilises this format to protect the rights of 
migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers and has convened a number of public hearings on 
xenophobia and social cohesion.188 Except for one held in 2004, these public hearings have 
not been conceptualised to elicit the specific challenges that refugees and asylum seekers 
face.189 In addition, the majority of the SAHRC’s public hearings relate to violations of socio-
economic rights.190 However, none of these hearings have included specific considerations on 
refugee and asylum seekers’ access to these rights.191 This is a significant protection gap 
given available evidence, including from complaints it receives, that many refugees and 
asylum seekers in South Africa face high levels of discrimination and difficulties accessing 
socio-economic rights. 192  
There is also a need to address the conflation of the various categories of migrants. 
The hearings, conceptualised as they are, do not address this aspect of the problem. The 
opportunity to foster an understanding that refugees and asylum seekers require a different 
degree of protection may be missed altogether. In addition, this study found that the 
continued challenge presented by xenophobia has created perceptions that the SAHRC’s 
capability to influence change through using the format of hearings is weak.  
The Gender Commission has also utilised its investigative powers to assess conditions 
of encampment for displaced refugees. In April 2015, a large number of foreign nationals 
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including refugees were displaced following xenophobic attacks in parts of Durban. Three 
shelters were initially set up to host over 4000 displaced persons, but as the violence subsided 
and number of displaced people reduced, the shelters were consolidated into one. This was 
set up in Chatsworth, a suburb in Durban, and had population of 187 displaced persons.193  
The objectives of the mission were to assess the shelter’s compliance with minimum 
standards set by the UNHCR; to determine the situation for women and children in the 
shelters; to gather data to inform a report on the plight of women foreign nationals who are 
victims of xenophobic violence in the province; and to assess possibilities for legal assistance 
for gender related complaints.194 The Gender Commission conducted focus group discussions 
with the displaced persons, many of whom were later determined to be refugees in possession 
of valid refugee identity documents and some were asylum seekers with permits.  
The Gender Commission made findings with respect to the right to decent and proper 
housing, the state of security, right to water and sanitation, right to food, right to health and 
the right to education. These were assessed based on the UNHCR’s minimum standards.195 
The findings indicated that the overall establishment and management of the site partly 
complied with the UNHCR guidelines. However, not all minimum requirements had been 
met. 196 For instance, while there was access to health services, the Gender Commission 
found that no specific care was provided for pregnant women.197 It proposed a number of 
recommendations including those that addressed pertinent issues that affected women and 
children, thus highlighting the need to improve women’s access to health and privacy and 
children’s access to education.198  The Gender Commission also recommended that the 
provincial government should tackle xenophobia using a multi-sectoral approach which 
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includes community level engagement, giving due regard to women’s experiences with 
xenophobia. 199 The Gender Commission and the SAHRC did not collaborate in this 
monitoring exercise, despite the opportunity to do so. The SAHRC conducted its own visits 
to the shelters to assess the conditions of displacement.200 The manner in which the SAHRC 
and the Gender Commission undertook these interventions is another indication of the lack of 
strategic collaboration, as discussed in section 6.2 above.  
 
6.5 Capacity constraints negatively impact on the extent to which the NHRIs can 
effectively promote and protect refugee rights  
This study found that capacity constraints impact negatively on the extent to which the 
NHRIs can effectively promote and protect refugee rights. Capacity constraints, usually in the 
form of financial and human resources, have often been cited as key challenges that impede 
NHRI effectiveness.201 The SAHRC acknowledged that it faced significant financial and 
human resource constraints that impeded its work generally but also with respect to the 
promotion and protection of refugee rights. Service provider participants also felt that 
capacity constraints limited the NHRI’s effectiveness, as one participant lamented: “They 
[SAHRC] always complain about being under-resourced and understaffed.”202  
These particular challenges are reflected in Hyman and Kovacic’s argument about the 
requirements for effective implementation of policy or institutional mandates.203 They 
suggest that effective implementation should be understood in terms of capacity and 
capability. The criteria they suggest for capacity is “the necessary critical mass of human 
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talent and supporting resources to perform the assigned functions well.”204Capability, they 
assert, is whether an agency has statutory powers, organisational structure, and quality 
control mechanisms to make good decisions and apply its authority effectively.205 This 
section will discuss the findings based on these two elements.  
Responses from the SAHRC confirmed that capacity constraints limited the nature 
and scope of the interventions taken to advance refugee rights. In terms of human resources, 
the SAHRC pointed out that it lacked sufficient personnel to deal with refugee and asylum 
seeker related interventions. For example, the findings in the South African Human Rights 
Commission v Minister of Home Affairs required the SAHRC to monitor the Lindela 
repatriation centre on at least a quarterly basis. However, the SAHRC did not comply with 
this ruling until 2019, citing budgetary constraints and the lack of human resources.206  
The findings also show that the organisational structure has had an impact on the 
NHRIs’ capability to engage substantively with asylum-related matters. For the SAHRC, an 
organisational restructuring process has had a serious impact on the nature of engagement 
and capacity to deal with refugee rights.207 Until 2012, the SAHRC had a dedicated staff 
member tasked with coordinating all aspects of the institution’s work with respect to 
migrants.208 This was a national coordinator for non-nationals (the term SAHRC uses when 
referring to migrants) and the position was located within the Research Department.209 A 
Commissioner then provided strategic oversight over the SAHRC’s work related to 
migration.  
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Evidence from the SAHRC’s reports, submissions to Parliament and presentations in 
various fora, indicates that this work, as supported by the national coordinator, focused on 
refugees, asylum seekers and undocumented migrants.210 The engagement with asylum 
related matters and stakeholders within the sector appeared robust and substantive.211 
However, this position was made redundant in 2012, following the restructuring of the 
institution.212 
Within the present organisational structure, a research advisor supports the 
Commissioner who is tasked with dealing with migration as a focus area. The current 
research advisor does not have any training in refugee or asylum law nor has the incumbent 
previously worked on migration issues.213 The SAHRC, however, indicated that there is 
another research advisor on staff with the requisite competence in refugee law who is 
consulted where necessary.214 This research advisor is currently tasked with dealing with the 
right to health and supports the Commissioner assigned to the health focus area. In addition, 
the SAHRC’s research department does not provide direct support for this focus area. A 
review of all the research reports published by the research department on the SAHRC’s 
website, did not identify specific findings or recommendations related to the realisation of 
rights of migrants in general nor of refugees and/or asylum seekers in particular.215  
This finding shows that there is a discrepancy with the deployment of staff within the 
SAHRC - at least with respect to effectively meeting the technical capacity required to 
                                                
210 E.g. Joyce Tlou, Speech by Non-Nationals Coordinator on vulnerability of migrants to Xenophobia, New 
York, 4 May 2011, https://www.sahrc.org.za/index.php/sahrc-media/news/item/34-speech-by-non-nationals-
coordinator-on-vulnerability-of-migrants-to-xenophobia; PMG, “Draft Report By The South African Human 
Rights Commission on the Open Hearings on Xenophobia and Problems Related to It Hosted by the SAHRC 
and the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee” PMG, 29 July 2005. 
211 As discussed previously, SAHRC was a founding member of CoRMSA and its work on addressing 
xenophobia; See also submission by refugee rights network Tutumike to parliament and role played by SAHRC 
in promoting and protecting the rights of refugees and asylum seekers http://pmg-assets.s3-website-eu-west-
1.amazonaws.com/docs/2007/070612tutumike.htm; Also evidenced by the SAHRC’s strong partnership with 
Lawyers for Human Rights and Legal Resource Centre, the two prominent legal services providers for refugees 
and asylum seekers 
212 SAHRC, Annual Report, 2012/2013. 
213 Interview with NHRI participant 1, Johannesburg, South Africa.  
214 Interview with NHRI participant 1, Johannesburg, South Africa.  





address the challenges with the realisation of refugee rights. Participants identified this issue 
as a problem. One participant stated: “I think they need to get some people who have a lot of 
knowledge on refugee law and the process because a lot of people [from the SAHRC] I’ve 
spoken to, I have to explain a lot of what’s happening and that’s fine to a certain degree, but 
if the people writing the reports are kind of unsure about the things then that’s 
problematic.”216 Another participant asserted: “It would help if they handled more individual 
cases from refugees. This would build knowledge and understanding within the organization 
about what’s actually going on.”217 
The proposed guidelines for the assessment of effectiveness of NHRIs notes: “if a 
national institutions is to work effectively, its members and staff need to possess the 
necessary professional skills, including expertise in human rights.”218 In addition, the 
Network of African NHRIs has emphasised the need for African national human rights 
institutions to have or acquire specialised technical capacity for the promotion and protection 
of human rights.219 Thus, the reform of the SAHRC and the manner in which staff have been 
deployed has curtailed its capacity to adequately engage with the promotion and protection of 
refugee rights. While the SAHRC’s mandate is not explicit with respect to the promotion and 
protection of refugee rights, its decision to designate these rights as a priority thematic area 
implies the recognition of the need to commit the requisite resources and enhance its 
technical capacity to engage effectively with refugee rights. That it has not done so may be 
because of factors outside its control, such as limited budgetary allocation from the 
government,  high staff attrition, or the absence of a strategic plan to effectively utilise the 
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resources at its disposal through its links with credible refugee rights CSOs (for instance the 
Consortium for Refugees and Migrants (CoRMSA).220 
Additionally, this study found that the focus area on migration has not translated into 
the mainstreaming of migrants rights into the other areas of the NHRIs’ work. In the case of 
the SAHRC, a review of its published reports, whether on civil and political rights, equality 
or socio-economic and cultural rights did not find a specific inclusion of such rights. The only 
reports that address aspects of challenges that migrants, refugee and asylum seekers face, 
were contained in the SAHRC’s reports to treaty bodies as part of the government’s 
review.221  
Compounding the staffing issue is the fact that the current Commissioner serves dual 
focus areas, with the second focus area being the promotion and protection of children’s 
rights. These focus areas are addressed independently with issues affecting migrant children, 
regardless of status, addressed as they arise rather than strategically within the migrants’ 
rights portfolio.222 In fact, two participants raised concerns about the lack of NHRI 
engagement with matters related to refugee children and those children seeking asylum. 
These concerns related to access to education, access to documentation, the plight of 
unaccompanied minors and those rendered stateless due to the lack of documentation. 
However, except for the question of access to basic education, the NHRI participant stated 
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that the institution had not identified any systemic issues that affected refugee children or 
those seeking asylum.223   
Systemic issues affecting migrant children including refugee children in South Africa 
have been widely documented.224 These issues, as reported by the service provider and 
refugee participants and as corroborated by several studies, are not limited to access to basic 
education.225 The fact that the SAHRC has not identified such issues despite having 
designated children’s rights as a core thematic area of its work, reflects a degree of 
disconnect between the work the SAHRC undertakes and the reality of the context within 
which it operates.   
In summary, despite the designation of migrant’s rights as a focus area, the SAHRC’s 
lack of a coherent approach to addressing these rights, particularly those of refugees and 
asylum seekers, presents a challenge to the effective promotion and protection of their rights.  
There is growing evidence that suggests that the use of specific strategies to advance the 
rights of migrants should include strategies using the minority-rights based approach to 
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programming.226 As discussed earlier, taking cognisant of an intersectional approach to 
programming, there is also a need to consider refugees and asylum seekers among groups 
already identified as particularly vulnerable to discrimination, violence and exploitation, such 
as persons with disabilities, older persons, women, children and sexual minorities.  
  
6.6 NHRIs are invisible and are not prioritising the promotion and protection of 
refugee rights  
“They need to be more visible”227 
The notion of invisibility varies depending on the context of its application, but its basic 
definition refers to the idea of “not being seen.” It abounds in refugee, forced migration 
literature, and refers primarily to the exclusion of refugees and asylum seekers or specific 
groups of refugees and asylum seekers from services, interventions, and even research 
studies. Within the context of migration, Gasper and Truong identified four categories of 
invisibility.228 These were statistical invisibility, strategic invisibility, social invisibility, and 
institutional invisibility.  
Statistical invisibility occurs when certain groups of migrants, such as women, 
children, and those with disabilities are not reflected in statistical data resulting in their 
exclusion from policy.229 Strategic invisibility arises when migrants choose to avoid State 
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apparatus or limit social interactions because of the discrimination they may face.230 Social 
invisibility refers to situations where migrants are outside the realm of recognition, for 
example their contribution to the economy, as informal economic activities is not recognised 
and they are not acknowledged as players within the economy.231 Lastly, institutional 
invisibility results from migrants not having a formal status or having an unauthorised status 
and are, as a result, excluded from accessing services that would otherwise benefit them. One 
example includes the situation of undocumented minors being excluded from accessing basic 
education in South Africa in the absence of policy addressing their plight.  
Various scholars also describe institutional visibility as the extent to which an 
institution “sees” refugees and asylum seekers. In this respect, to what extent do the 
institutional structures acknowledge refugees and asylum seekers through policy, norms, and 
programmes?232 For instance, do local government policies acknowledge refugees and 
asylum seekers as recipients of social services? In the context of this study, do NHRIs 
acknowledge refugees and asylum seekers as a target population and do they systematically 
include them in their programmatic activities? Extending this further, are the institutions or 
organisations mandated to protect refugee rights “seen” within the structures or systems that 
advance refugee rights? Put differently, are the NHRIs visible within the refugee protection 
regime?  
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Polzer and Hammond point out that a critical reflection of invisibility requires careful 
consideration of “not only who or what is invisible, but invisible to whom, in what ways, and 
why.”233 They assert that the “who” or “what” refers to the groups or processes that are part 
of the experience of displacement but are only identified as groups or issues of concern at a 
particular time, for instance refugees and asylum seekers who are sexual minorities have 
always existed, but focus on their plight is recent.234 “Invisible to whom” they argue, focuses 
on the actors, where a particular group of refugees or asylum seekers may be visible to local 
CSOs, residents or local government actors but not to national or international actors.235  
The question of “in what way” refers to categories applied to groups and situations 
and the functions those categories fulfil.236 For example, the categorisation of displaced 
persons as IDPs (internally displaced persons) rather than citizens thus making them visible, 
including under international law, to various institutions, and demanding a different set of 
rules for responsibility. The question of “why” is about the process and politics of knowledge 
production, noting that “keeping something or someone invisible involves power: the power 
to decide who receives resources, who has the legitimacy to make their voices heard, or who 
can be harmed or ignored without consequences.”237  
Therefore, the notion of invisibility is a complex and multi-layered issue and aspects 
of this complexity were reflected in the findings. However, a precise interrogation of the 
manifestation of invisibility within the refugee protection regime in South Africa is beyond 
                                                
233 Tara Polzer and Laura Hammond, "Invisible Displacement," Journal of Refugee Studies 21, no. 4 (2008): 417 
(417-431), https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/fen045 
234 Tara Polzer and Laura Hammond, “Invisible Displacement,” 417; Yiftach Millo, Invisible in the City: 
Protection Gaps Facing Sexual Minority Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Urban Ecuador, Ghana, Israel, and 
Kenya, (HIAS: Nairobi, 2013); See also Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh on the matter of Saharawi Refugees: Elena 
Fiddian-Qasmiyeh “Invisible Refugees and/or Overlapping Refugeedom? Protecting Sahrawis and Palestinians 
Displaced by the 2011 Libyan Uprising,” International Journal of Refugee Law 24, no. 2 (2012): 263–293, 
doi:10.1093/ijrl/ees027.  
235 Tara Polzer and Laura Hammond, 417 
236 Tara Polzer and Laura Hammond, 417 





the scope of this thesis. Thus, the focus of the analysis will be based on the findings, and as 
such will not reflect on all the critical questions that Polzer and Hammond raise. 
In terms of this study, the first three categories identified by Gasper and Truong are 
not relevant – except for statistical invisibility, aspects of which have been discussed in 
relation to disaggregation of data when reporting (see section 6.2 in this chapter).  What is 
apparent from the findings is the notion of institutional invisibility, as described above and 
the answer to the question of “invisible to whom” posed by Polzer and Hammond. As the 
opening quote indicates, this study found that the three NHRIs, as institutional actors, are not 
visible within the refugee protection regime. Reiterating this notion, another participant 
stated: “Have they done submissions on these matters? I mean, I have seen LHR [Lawyers for 
Human Rights] making submissions, I’ve seen LRC [Legal Resource Centre] winning court 
cases and so on but I haven’t seen anything that the SAHRC has done.”238  
Additionally, the findings indicate that the NHRIs are also not visible among the 
refugees as the refugee participants’ awareness about NHRIs was low. Those refugees, who 
were aware of the NHRIs, were primarily those in the employ of CSOs working with 
refugees and asylum seekers, as indicated in this statement by a refugee participant: “I got to 
know about the system here through my activism. I was also part of a project at the 
University of KwaZulu Natal that did some research which included these institutions, but 
it’s not often to hear about people going to them. I know one person, also a refugee who 
opened a case with the Public Protector, but they haven’t helped him at all.”239  
As far back as 2006, service providers had been lamenting the SAHRC’s absence 
from within the communities and the detrimental impact that this has had on the awareness 
about refugee rights, both among refugees and asylum seekers and their host communities.240 
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From the interviews, it is apparent that the sentiments about the SAHRC’s invisibility persist 
and that there is complete disengagement between the CSOs and refugees on the one hand 
with the Gender Commission and the Public Protector on the other hand.  
Furthermore, from the findings, the SAHRC’s institutional designation of refugee 
rights as priority rights has not translated to its visibility within the refugee protection regime. 
This is exacerbated by the fact that there is limited systematic and sustained reference to 
refugee rights in any of the NHRIs’ reports or activities, except where required, for instance, 
during World Refugee Day commemorative activities (see discussion in section 6.4.1). This 
aspect of institutional invisibility is supported by the service provider and refugee 
participants’ views that the NHRIs did not prioritise refugee rights in their work, as observed 
by one participant:  
“On debates in parliament on the amendment of the Refugee Act, we haven’t heard 
anything from them [NHRIs]. There is a new White Paper on the whole international 
migration policy; they want to overhaul the policy. We are asking  …I’m still to hear 
anything from their [NHRIs] side. So that’s why I’m saying that if migrant issues is 
[are] a priority area, then they are weak and are unable to engage on the issue [s].”241   
 
This finding contradicts one NHRI’s perception of its prioritisation of refugee rights. The 
SAHRC participant stated that the institution prioritised refugee rights through the 
designation of migrants’ rights/migration as a focus area. However, this contrasted with the 
Gender Commission’s level of prioritisation of refugee rights in its activities as reported by 
the participant from the institution who stated: “I do not recall any recent work on refugees 
and there is currently no plan to do so. I think a report was done after the xenophobic 
violence erupted in KZN in Chatsworth in 2015, but I’ll have to check with one of the 
Commissioners to see if any work will be done in this area in future.”242  
The finding that NHRIs do not appear to prioritise refugee rights implies that the 
NHRIs are perhaps not accessible to this target population with implications for their 
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visibility as key actors for refugee rights promotion and protection. Carver emphasises the 
significance of accessibility in enhancing an NHRI’s effectiveness, stating that:  
“accessibility in all its dimensions is one of the most important determinants of NHRI 
effectiveness.”243  This is supported by the Network of African NHRIs, which determined 
that African national human rights institutions’ level of engagement with the general public 
was low and had a detrimental impact on their ability to raise awareness, educate and to 
receive complaints.244  
Accessibility could also be through partnerships with CSOs.245 However, the findings 
reflect that though partnerships exist, there is no clear strategy for maintaining these 
partnerships for instance, through already existing CSO networks that assist refugees and 
asylum seekers or among NHRIs through the forum of institutions supporting democracy. 
Participants raised questions about the value of the advisory committees that the SAHRC has 
in place yet, this could be an important channel for enhancing accessibility.  
The context within which the NHRIs operate in was also raised as a possible reason 
for the perceived invisibility of NHRIs within the refugee protection space in South Africa. 
As discussed in section 6.3 in this chapter, the findings confirm that the socio-political 
context has imposed limitations on the NHRIs’ capacities to effectively advocate for access 
to rights for refugees and asylum seekers and remedies where rights have been violated. This 
may have contributed to the impression that the SAHRC, the Gender Commission, and Public 
Protector are reluctant to engage meaningfully where refugee rights are concerned.  
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6.7 Opportunities to strengthen NHRIs’ for effective promotion and protection of 
refugee rights 
All participants acknowledged that NHRIs had an important role to play within the refugee 
protection regime, and that there were opportunities available for the NHRIs to enhance their 
engagement with refugee rights. These include increasing NHRI institutional capacity, 
increasing visibility, enhancing relationships with CSOs and the UNHCR, and enhancing 
regional cooperation on asylum-related matters.  While these are all important areas for 
enhancing NHRI effectiveness, these opportunities should be considered within the context 
that both internal and external factors, as the findings reflect, shape NHRI activities. Carver 
for instance stated: “it is certain that many NHRIs do not perform effectively, but this is more 
symptomatic of State failure to meet human rights obligations than an inherent problem with 
NHRIs.”246 Rachel Murray drew a similar conclusion, stating:  
“The research we have done indicates quite clearly that it is not one … factor… alone 
that can render a NHRI effective, but a combination of them. Some are clearly the 
responsibility of a NHRI itself as to how it chooses to prioritise and organise its work, 
but a considerable impact on its effectiveness falls outside of its control.”247  
 
This section discusses opportunities for strengthening NHRIs, bearing these perspectives in 
mind. In terms of NHRIs’ need to increase institutional capacity to become more effective, 
one participant stated:  
 “Where is their plan as Chapter 9 institutions [NHRIs]? They don’t seem to have a 
plan-at least the public doesn’t feel the effect of their work. Look at how TAC 
[Treatment Action Campaign] took on the Department of Health to make anti-retroviral 
drugs available to HIV patients. That is what we want to see from Chapter 9 
institutions.”248  
 
This perception corresponds to conclusions drawn by Renshaw and FitzPatrick, Smith, 
Carver and Jensen, which have found that addressing institutional capacity, such as with 
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respect to funding, human resource and technical skills on refugee or asylum law would 
enhance NHRIs’ effectiveness.249 As discussed in section 6.5 above, the SAHRC 
acknowledged that shortfalls in funding had limited the extent to which they could discharge 
their human rights mandate in general and this had an impact on addressing migrants’ rights 
in general. 
 Addressing institutional capacity would have a bearing on NHRI’s accessibility and 
visibility to the refugees, asylum seekers and other stakeholders, while addressing refugee 
rights would require use of specific strategies. For instance, the SAHRC could do this by 
ensuring that it monitors refugee rights through its designated role as the national preventive 
mechanism under OPCAT. This would not require a separate budgetary or human resource 
allocation. Rather, the SAHRC would be effectively utilising the opportunities presented by 
this designated role.  
This argument is supported by Welch’s findings, as highlighted in section 6.4.2 
above, which determined that the NHRIs’ ability to generate information about prevalence of 
torture had resulted in the decline of the use of torture by State apparatus. 250 Based on his 
findings, Welch concluded that: “Given that a top concern for NHRI effectiveness is budget 
constraints (...), investing in existing NHRIs to make them more capable of making 
international treaty obligations meaningful would be an effective strategy to improving 
respect for rights internationally.”251  Should NHRIs “mainstream” refugee rights within this 
oversight role, then perhaps they will be better placed to influence the extent to which 
implementation of refugee policies occurs in favour of refugees and asylum seekers.   
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Accessibility may also be enhanced through building comprehensive referral systems 
and increasing presence at community levels by building partnerships with local community 
organisations. This is linked to the suggestion that NHRIs enhance their relationship with 
CSOs as a means to enhance their engagement with refugee rights. This study found that the 
SAHRC and CGE have open working relationships with the CSOs, but that these networks 
needed to be strengthened for more substantive engagement to occur. Service provider 
participants reported that the lack of a formalised relationship resulted in an ad-hoc approach 
to interaction. Rarely did this amount to substantive and sustained engagement on a particular 
refugee rights issue, leading one participant to state: “Somebody said the only way to get the 
HRC [SAHRC] to fulfil its mandate would be to sue them, which would be quite an 
occasion.” Additionally, other participants provided the following responses reflecting their 
perceptions about the ad-hoc nature and weak substantive engagement between the NHRIs 
and CSOs:  
“We do not have a formal working relationship…they contact us.”252  
 
“We’ve met a number of times, but we focus on some advocacy activities for instance 
advocacy on World Refugee Day, SA Women’s Day, World AIDS Day and the 16 
Days of Activism [against gender-based violence]. We bring [invite] them when 
doing [hosting] such events.”253  
 
(Laughing) “No. They [SAHRC, CGE] never approach us. We invite them to our 
events.”254 
 
In the case of the SAHRC, it has operationalised Section 11 of its Act, which gives it the 
authority to establish committees of expertise to provide technical guidance on the realisation 
of particular rights. The SAHRC has established a Section 11 Committee on Migration whose 
membership was drawn from the academia, CSOs working on refugee rights and 
international organisations including the UNHCR and the International Organisation for 
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Migration (IOM). However, it is not clear the extent to which this Committee has influenced 
the SAHRC’s strategic work on refugee rights or even broadly, on migrants’ rights, as at the 
time of writing, the Committee’s work within the SAHRC had not been evaluated. Reports of 
the Committee’s work, its terms of reference and other documents that would point to the 
essence of the strategic relationship are also not publicly available. 
Few participants were aware of the Section 11 Committee as indicated by these 
responses: “No, I’m not aware of any. I have not heard of either the section 5 or Section 11 
Committee on Migrants,” and “No I’m not aware of such a Committee. It could be that it is 
because we are far removed from Johannesburg, but no, I’ve never heard of this 
Committee.”255 Nevertheless, the SAHRC has conducted joint activities with some of the 
Committee, members as highlighted below, that have had significant legal implications for 
refugee rights.  
The Paris Principles underscore the importance of creating and maintaining 
relationships with CSOs. They recognise CSOs as an important constituency for NHRIs. 
They require NHRIs to “develop relations with the non-governmental organisations devoted 
to promoting and protecting human rights, … as these organisations play a fundamental role 
in expanding the NHRI’s work.”256They emphasise the importance of forming partnerships 
with institutions that protect groups that are deemed particularly vulnerable including 
children, migrant workers, refugees, and physically and mentally disabled persons.257 
The relationship between NHRIs and CSOs is symbiotic and would require a cost-
benefit analysis to ensure that the focus remains one of achieving human rights ideals, 
without compromising both real and perceived independence and credibility issues.258 Indeed, 
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the SAHRC has acknowledged this stating: “While we have and will continue to work with 
NGOs, the approach we take is one of caution as the agendas and ideological approach that 
NGOs have may be very different from those of the SAHRC. The SAHRC is open to 
working partnerships with credible NGOs on a case-by-case basis and is justified by the 
prevailing interest on the matter of collaboration.”259  
CSOs also offer an accessibility channel for NHRIs as they can extend the reach of 
NHRI services and facilitate information gathering.260 Conversely, service provider 
participants noted that the NHRIs, especially the SAHRC, assisted with access to State 
authorities, which helped in providing traction for matters that would not have garnered 
meaningful responses, had the NHRI not been involved as one participant noted: “We’ve had 
doors to the DHA [Department of Home Affairs] opened simply because we brought the 
SAHRC along.”261  
One example of a successful partnership between the SAHRC and the CSO was the 
SAHRC’s investigation into conditions of detention at the Lindela immigration detention 
facility.  In 2012, a group of CSOs led by Médecins sans Frontières (MSF) lodged a 
complaint with the SAHRC about violations to the right of access to health for detainees at 
the Lindela Repatriation Centre.262 The investigation was initiated through the Section 11 
Committee, as three of the four complainants served as members of the Committee (Section 
27, Lawyers for Human Rights and People against Suffering Oppression and Poverty 
(PASSOP)).263 The investigation revealed that a number of detainees had either valid asylum 
seeker permits, expired asylum seeker permits, or expired refugee permits. The findings show 
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that a high number of detainees were not aware that they could appeal their deportation 
orders.264  
The SAHRC also found, inter alia, infringements of detainees’ right to health care.265 
It recommended measures to enhance access to the facility for independent monitoring; 
improved access to information for detainees; improved access to health care; and ratification 
of relevant Conventions relating to migrants and the prevention of torture.   The SAHRC 
undertakes a monthly monitoring of the facility and makes recommendations to address 
shortcomings should any be found. These recommendations are then discussed with the 
Department of Home Affairs on a quarterly basis.266 These activities are implemented in 
tandem with the duties assigned to the SAHRC in South African Human Rights Commission v 
Minister of Home Affairs, as discussed above in section 6.4.2.  
In addition, the findings indicate that the relationship between the UNHCR and the 
NHRIs is viewed as weak as some participants suggested that the NHRIs needed to enhance 
their relationship with the UNHCR. The findings further suggest that where such 
relationships exist, they were not consistent. For instance, the UNHCR on occasion conducts 
promotional activities with the SAHRC on refugee rights awareness but this is not the case 
with the CGE or the Public Protector. The activities that the UNHCR has conducted with the 
SAHRC included in October 2018, when the UNHCR and the SAHRC’s Eastern Cape 
provincial office, held a workshop on the rights of refugees an asylum seekers and when the 
UNHCR and SAHRC partnered in the 2004 to implement an anti-xenophobia campaign, Roll 
Out Xenophobia. There was no evidence found that the UNHCR has conducted any activities 
with either the CGE or the Public Protector.  
In addition, the service provider participants, who included staff from UNHCR’s 
implementing partners, expressed reservations about UNHCR’s role within the refugee 
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protection regime, as stated by one participant: “I was very surprised when in Geneva I heard 
about UNHCR working with the KNCHR on a court case. As far as I am aware, that has 
never happened here in South Africa where UNHCR challenges a government position on 
refugee matters. The UNHCR is very silent here and prefers to tow the line.”267  
Thus, there was very little evidence reflecting a substantive and sustained engagement 
between the SAHRC and the UNHCR, despite the UNHCR serving in the SAHRC’s advisory 
committee on migration and the SAHRC serving as a member of UNHCR’s Protection 
Working Group.268 According to the UNHCR, the objective of the working group is “to 
prevent and respond to xenophobic attacks.”269 The UNHCR adds that it has “put in place an 
early warning system to warn of imminent and possible outbreaks of violent attacks on 
persons of concern.”270 It is not clear how this early warning system works to achieve its goal 
or how it influences SAHRC’s interventions though one participant stated that the SAHRC 
“actively” participates in the meetings” of the working group.271  
However, despite the mechanisms in place, these do not seem to have prevented 
xenophobic violence from reoccurring. This study has also not found that the SAHRC reports 
on its activities related to the working group, nor has it identified the influence that activities 
within this working group has had on its work in relation to refugee rights. The evidence 
therefore supports the views that the relationship between the UNHCR needs to be 
strengthened.  
This assertion is also supported by the results of a survey of NHRIs on their work on 
migrants’ rights, which determined that promoting and protecting migrants’ rights, including 
refugee rights, was a key component of the work of a significant number of NHRIs across the 
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globe. 272  Given these results, the UNHCR in its role as the custodian of the 1951 Refugee 
Convention, would thus be a natural partner for NHRIs. Therefore, the development of 
working methods with NHRIs would serve to enhance the partnerships at the domestic level. 
Finally, cooperation among NHRIs at the regional level was pointed out as a possible 
avenue through which NHRIs could enhance the promotion and protection of refugee rights:  
“There are opportunities that the sub-regional NHRI groupings present to address 
crosscutting issues related to refugees. This opportunity has not received much 
attention from the UNHCR. So we are now quite keen to identify good practices in 
thematic areas to encourage NHRIs to adopt common working methods.”273 
Currently, the regional approach to promote and protect the rights of migrants is being 
advanced by the regional NHRI network through the Migration in Africa project. 274 This 
project specifically aims to facilitate African NHRIs’ promotion of the respect of refugee and 
migrant rights in transit camps.275 While it is limited in scope in its current formulation, it 
may provide an opportunity for NHRIs to develop good practices for monitoring rights of 
refugees and asylum seekers in places of detention. This would be significant for those 
African NHRIs, such as the SAHRC, which are designated as monitoring mechanisms for 
torture prevention under the OPCAT.  
The regional level also provides opportunities for refugee rights promotion and 
protection primarily through the African Commission.276 As discussed in Chapter 3, NHRIs 
can fill the gap that exists due to the African Commission’s lack of a mechanism to follow up 
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on its recommendations and concluding observations. NHRIs can in a manner similar to that 
which they perform within the UN mechanisms and processes, with respect to State 
reporting, follow up on recommendations or concluding observations. Yet, despite having 
designated refugee rights as a thematic focus area, this study did not find any reference to the 
African Commission’s recommendations, resolutions, or concluding observations on refugees 
or asylum seekers in the SAHRC’s reports. Neither did the study identify any reference to the 
African Commission in the reports of the CGE or the Public Protector. In addition, none of 
the South African NHRIs included in this study referenced the African Commission’s 
outcomes or statements specific to South Africa in their reports.  
Furthermore, none of the SAHRC’s reports reviewed for this study made any 
reference to its engagement with the NANHRI with respect to refugee rights. The SAHRC 
also publishes an annual international and regional human rights report (international report) 
but has not utilised the report to provide an analysis of its role as an NHRI within the regional 
human rights system. The international reports provide a useful reference for significant 
developments within the international and regional human rights systems but miss the 
opportunity for critical reflection of the SAHRC’s role in influencing or contributing to the 
processes, especially those linked to its priority rights issues. The regional level was 
identified as an important avenue for engagement with refugee rights and provides important 
mechanisms and avenues for a robust engagement to occur. However, it is evident that the 
level of engagement is low and has not resulted in sustained collaboration that would develop 
a coherent approach to addressing refugee rights at the regional level.  
6.8 Conclusion  
This chapter has discussed the main findings of this study in relation to the three primary 
NHRIs in South Africa. The findings reveal that the SAHRC is the most engaged with the 





Protector implement ad-hoc activities. This study identified protection gaps stemming from 
the low level of engagement with refugee rights and internal and external institutional 
challenges. In the case of the SAHRC, despite its higher level of engagement with refugee 
rights, its engagement has varied across the years ranging from a perceived robust 
engagement to one that is perceived to be lacking in strategic direction. This was reflected in 
the perceptions that the SAHRC was invisible within the refugee protection regime, largely 
due to the absence of sustained or substantive engagement with other key stakeholders 
including the refugee and asylum seeker populations.  
 The discussion also highlighted pertinent protection gaps related to the gendered 
aspects of asylum for which the Gender Commission has a role to play and those resulting 
from corruption and maladministration that the Public Protector ought to address. It also 
revealed protection gaps with regard to refugee and asylum seeking children with respect to 
access to documentation and the resultant impact on the access to basic services. These 
protection gaps have led to the criticism that the NHRIs do not prioritise refugee rights and 
that there was need for NHRIs to build technical capacity on refugee rights.  In addition, it 
was argued that the NHRIs ought to build stronger partnerships with CSOs, refugees and 
asylum seekers and the UNHCR, to promote accountability for the effective realisation of 
refugee rights. Furthermore, it was noted that the regional NHRI networks and other regional 
processes provided important avenues for the promotion and protection of refugee rights, and 







Chapter 7  
NHRIs’ engagement with the promotion and protection of refugee rights in Kenya  
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses and interprets the findings related to the NHRIs’ engagement with the 
promotion and protection of refugee rights and focuses on the findings with respect to the 
NHRIs in Kenya.  The chapter presents the thematic analysis of the findings in a similar 
sequence as discussed in chapter 6. Thus, the first section discusses the extent to which the 
three Kenyan NHRIs surveyed in this study have engaged with refugee rights. It then 
discusses the influence of the socio-political context on the degree to which NHRIs engage 
with refugee rights. This is followed by a discussion on the working methods that the NHRIs 
utilise to address refugee rights and subsequently a discussion on the challenges that impact 
on the NHRIs’ effective engagement with refugee rights. The final section discusses the 
opportunities available to the NHRIs, which if taken up would enhance the NHRIs’ 
engagement with refugee rights. The discussion of each of the six themes follows below. 
 
7.2 The extent to which NHRIs engage with refugee rights varies based on their 
mandate 
In Kenya, this study found that two NHRIs, the KNCHR and the National Gender and 
Equality Commission (Gender Commission) have dealt with matters related to refugees and 
asylum seekers. However, the findings highlight that the extent of engagement varied from a 
moderate degree of engagement to one that is minimal. There were no reports identified or 
findings made that indicated that the Commission on Administrative Justice has engaged with 
refugee-related matters. This finding contrasts to that in relation to the NHRIs in South Africa 
where this study found that the three NHRIs included, have had a degree of engagement with 





the NHRI, which has had the highest degree of engagement with advancing refugee rights. 
This would be the NHRI with the broadest human rights mandate.   
Thus, the findings indicate that the KNCHR has played a more prominent role in 
advancing refugee rights than the Gender Commission and the Commission on 
Administrative Justice. This finding also corroborates literature that highlights that the NHRI 
with the broadest mandate tends to engage with refugee rights.1 While the KNCHR’s 
constitutional and legislative mandates do not explicitly provide for the promotion and 
protection of refugee rights, it has interpreted its broad mandate to include the promotion and 
protection of these rights.2 This study found that the KNCHR’s engagement with the 
promotion and protection of refugee rights in Kenya bears some similarities with that of the 
SAHRC.  
For instance, the KNCHR has conducted activities related to migrants. It also handles 
individual complaints from refugees and asylum seekers. It has intervened, through public 
interest litigation, where the infringement of rights has had an impact on either the entire 
refugee and asylum seeker population or large portions thereof. In addition, the KNCHR also 
participated in the development of the Kenyan refugee protection framework resulting in the 
adoption of the Refugees Act of 2006. It also serves as part of the technical team overseeing 
the Act’s amendment. It has a designated focus area on the rights of migrants, which includes 
the rights of refugees and asylum seekers.3 However, the institutional support or mechanisms 
in place to guide this area of work differ from the SAHRC.  
The KNCHR has a permanent staff member based within its Research Department, 
specifically tasked with reporting on migrants’ rights including refugee rights. In addition, the 
KNCHR has on staff a Senior Legal Advisor seconded from the NGO, the International 
Development Law Organisation (IDLO). The Senior Legal Advisor has expertise in 
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international refugee law and substantial experience litigating on refugee rights.4 He assists 
with litigation on matters related to refugee rights and advises on policy positions and 
submissions or advisories that the KNCHR develops with respect to proposed legislation, 
policies or amendments to these. He also supports the KNCHR in its role within regional 
mechanisms addressing asylum in Eastern Africa. Thus, unlike the SAHRC, the KNCHR has 
a better human resource and institutional base to support its work on refugee rights.  
In terms of the Kenyan Gender Commission, its mandate is similar to the South 
African Gender Commission. It focuses on promoting equality and prevention of 
discrimination on the basis of gender. However, based on the findings, its role within the 
refugee protection regime has been minimal. Most participants reported not to have interacted 
with the Gender Commission. Only one participant, a service provider, recalled a Gender 
Commission representative in attendance in a workshop and one instance where it was 
involved in consultations with the UNHCR.5 This study did not identify any instance where 
the institution had initiated any refugee or asylum seeker related initiatives.6 There was also 
no evidence to indicate that it had handled a refugee rights’ related complaint. Interestingly, 
its current Chief Executive Officer (CEO), who was appointed in February 2018, has 
extensive professional experience in refugee protection and he served as the Acting 
Commissioner for Refugees in the national immigration department. 7  His appointment may 
perhaps influence a strategic role for the Gender Commission within the Kenyan refugee 
protection regime. This is critical as the challenges with respect to addressing the gendered 
aspects of asylum equally apply within the Kenyan context.  
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Hoassain et al, and Bartolomei et al have found that refugee and asylum seeking 
women and children face high levels of sexual and gender based violence in Kenya. 8 Millo 
and Breen and Millo also determined that those refugees and asylum seekers who are sexual 
minorities are particularly vulnerable to high levels of sexual and gender based violence in 
Kenya.9 This study found a dearth in literature on the gendered aspects of asylum in Kenya, 
either in terms of policies, laws and their implementation, or access to rights for refugee and 
asylum seeking women, children and sexual minorities.10 There was also an absence in 
empirical studies on the role of NHRIs in promoting and protecting gender equality generally 
and specifically within the asylum process.  
As is the case for the South African Gender Commission, there is an opportunity for 
the Kenyan Gender Commission to strategically engage with the refugee protection regime 
given the gap that exists both in terms of addressing protection needs of refugee and asylum 
seeking women, children and sexual minorities and the development and implementation of 
relevant laws and policies.  Increasingly, NHRIs are implementing activities focused on 
marginalised groups including refugee women and sexual minorities and are, as a result, 
contributing to the realisation of rights for women and other minorities and marginalised 
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the RSD Transition process in Kenya: Summary of Selected Points Discussed at Meetings of the Steering 





groups.11 Their role in this regard is vital in influencing the adoption and implementation of 
international norms in national policies with respect to the gendered aspects of asylum. As 
Freedman notes: 
The degree of national action and mobilisation around the issue of gender specific 
persecution and the right to asylum has clearly had a major impact on persuading 
national authorities to adopt and implement international norms and conventions. The 
degree and impact of these national mobilisations have been dependent both on 
political opportunity structures in each national context and on discursive opportunity 
structures or the degree of domestic salience of these international norms.12 
 
In the absence of a high degree of engagement with the gendered aspects of asylum, the level 
of impact that actors such as the Gender Commission can have within the refugee protection 
regime is minimal. Indeed, none of the participants in Kenya mentioned the gendered aspects 
of asylum within the refugee protection regime. Neither was reference made to whether 
NHRIs ought to pay particular attention to such issues. However, as highlighted in chapter 5, 
the sample size for this study was small and cannot be deemed as representative, and these 
issues may already be high within the refugee protection agenda, except for the lack of 
engagement by national institutions.13 
With respect to the Commission on Administrative Justice, this study found that it is 
absent from the asylum discourse in Kenya.14 There was no evidence identified to indicate 
that the Commission on Administrative Justice had investigated or conducted any activities 
related to refugee rights or the management of asylum. In addition, a review of literature on 
the Commission on Administrative Justice showed a considerable gap in the analysis of its 
role within the context of the promotion and protection of human rights, regardless of the 
                                                
11 GANHRI, Preventing and Eliminating All Forms of Violence Against Women and Girls: The Role of 
National Human Rights Institutions A Contribution to the Review and Priority Themes of CSW63, Geneva: 
GANHRI, 2019, 26 
https://nhri.ohchr.org/EN/Documents/DIMR_GANHRI%20CSW%20Report_final%20BF.pdf;  
12 Jane Freedman, “Protecting Women Asylum Seekers and Refugees: From International Norms to National 
Protection?” International Migration 48, no.1 (2010): 185-186.  
13 See notes 8 and 9 above.  





category of rights. Furthermore, none of the participants reported any form of interaction with 
this institution nor were they aware of any activities that it had engaged in with respect to the 
promotion and protection of the refugee rights, as reflected by these statements:  
No, I didn’t know that there were such institutions here to assist people like us.15 
  
I don’t recall the CAJ [Commission on Administrative Justice] or Gender getting 
involved in any of these matters, only the Human Rights Commission.16  
 
No, we haven’t done any work with the CAJ on refugee matters.17 
 
The Commission on Administrative Justice’s mandate requires that it addresses issues related 
to maladministration where public institutions and persons holding public office are 
concerned. Section 8(k) of its enabling Act grants the Commission the authority to “take 
appropriate steps in conjunction with other State organs and Commissions responsible for the 
protection and promotion of human rights to facilitate promotion and protection of the 
fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual in public administration.”18 It is, therefore, 
conferred with the authority to address maladministration within the asylum regime in Kenya. 
The discussion in chapter 4 identified administrative issues within the Kenyan asylum 
regime as one of the key challenges impeding the effective realisation of refugee rights. 
Carver and Gammeltoft-Hansen have argued that Ombudsman institutions can play an 
important role where refugee matters are concerned.19 Furthermore, Devenish et al. identified 
maladministration within asylum regimes as one of the primary factors that contributed to 
                                                
15 Interview with refugee participant 7, Nairobi, Kenya 
16 Interview with service provider participant 7, Nairobi, Kenya 
17 Interview with NHRI participant 3, Nairobi, Kenya  
18 Commission on Administrative Justice Act, Section 8(k)  
19 Richard Carver, “NHRIs and Refugees”; Hans Gammeltoft-Hansen, “Refugee Concerns” in The Ombudsman 
Concept, in The International Ombudsman Anthology: Selected Writings from the International Ombudsman 
Institute ed., Linda Reif (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999); Hans Gammeltoft-Hansen, “Asylum-
seekers, Refugees and the Danish Ombudsman” in The Living Law of Nations eds., G. Alfredsson and P. 





human rights violations faced by refugees and asylum seekers in Africa.20  They suggested 
specific ways through which Ombudsman institutions could protect the rights of refugees, 
asylum seekers including by challenging administrative injustice that refugees and asylum 
seekers face because of maladministration and corruption. Thus, the Commission’s failure to 
address manifestations of maladministration within the refugee protection regime, affects the 
degree of accountability that could be demanded from the government.  
 
7.3 The socio-political context undermines the extent to which the NHRIs can 
effectively advance refugee rights   
The socio-political context in Kenya was also found to have a negative impact on the extent 
to which the NHRIs can effectively advance refugee rights. Similar factors to those identified 
within the South African context were found to have an impact on the capacity of the NHRIs 
in Kenya to effectively engage with refugee protection. These were: the securitisation of 
asylum, xenophobia, and the lack of political will to promote the effective implementation of 
the domestic refugee protection framework.   
 In terms of securitisation of asylum, the situation for the KNCHR differs markedly 
with that of the SAHRC. Whereas the SAHRC does not face pressure from the government 
and the national assembly to desist from engaging with refugee-related matters, the KNCHR 
does - as reflected in the following statement by the NHRI participant: “Securitisation has 
made it difficult to have any meaningful dialogue with the government [and it] has become 
very abrasive about refugee matters. That’s really not encouraging for any of us working on 
human rights.  We are seen as the enemy for intervening on behalf of foreigners.”21 Service 
provider and NHRI participants reported that matters relating to asylum were now considered 
to fall strictly within the purview of institutions and government departments that fall within 
                                                
20 Annie Devenish, Arlene Brock, Franky Lwelela and Marion Adonis, “The Role of the Ombudsman in 
Protecting the Rights of Refugees, Asylum Seekers and Internally Displaced Persons,” Best Practice Brief, no.2 
(October, 2019): 3-7. 





the security cluster.22 Garlick et al, Kiama and Karanja, Maina and the UNHCR have also 
concluded that the Kenyan government views asylum matters as national security concerns.23 
Consequently, government officials routinely discourage institutions such as the KNCHR 
from intervening or participating in asylum matters.24 According to the KNCHR participant, 
this has become more evident under the current presidency, resulting in the government 
“compromising the refugee space.”25  
 The NHRI participant reported that the KNCHR experiences hostility from the 
government when it engages with asylum related matters.26 In particular, the participant 
opined that its protection role in relation to refugees and asylum seekers had been limited as a 
direct result of the securitisation of the asylum space in Kenya. For instance, the KNCHR is 
now required to refer all complaints pertaining to refugees and asylum seekers to the Refugee 
Affairs Secretariat.27 The NHRI participant noted that “the RAS [Refugee Affairs Secretariat] 
is still in a transitional phase, it is staffed with former intelligence or security officers, and is 
                                                
22 The security cluster (National Security Council s240 (2) of Constitution) includes the President, Deputy 
President, the Minister for Interior and Coordination of National Security (referred in brief as the Minister for 
Internal Security), the Minister for Defence and the Chief of the Defence Forces, Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
the Attorney General, Director General of the National Intelligence Service and the Inspector-General of the 
National Police Service. Interview with NHRI participant 3 and service provider participant 5 and 7, Nairobi, 
Kenya: 
23 See also Madeline Garlick, Elspeth Guild, Caitlin Procter and Machiel Salomons, Formative Evaluation para 
211); UNHCR, Submission by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees For the Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights’ Compilation Report-Universal Periodic Review: KENYA; Lucy Kiama and 
Rufus Karanja, “Asylum space in Kenya: evolution of refugee protection over 20 years,” Forced Migration 
Review-25th Anniversary Collection, November 2012 https://www.fmreview.org/25th-anniversary/kiama-
karanja; Andrew Maina, “Securitization of Kenya’s Asylum Space: Origin and Legal Analysis of the 
Encampment Policy,” in Refugees and Forced Migration in the Horn and Eastern Africa: Trends, Challenges 
and Opportunities, eds. Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt, Leah Kimathi, Michael Omondi Owiso (Switzerland: 
Springer, 2019): 88-89.See also discussion in Chapter 4 of this thesis.  
24 Interview with NHRI participant 3, Nairobi, Kenya. 
25 Interview with participant 3, Nairobi, Kenya.  
26 Interview with participant 3, Nairobi, Kenya. The review of the Refugees Act of 2006 began following the 
promulgation of Kenya’s new Constitution in 2010. The Kenyan Parliament signed the amended legislation, the 
Refugees Bill, in 2016. However, the Kenyan President declined to sign the bill into law and referred it back to 
Parliament citing in adequate public consultations. See Business Daily, “Uhuru rejects bill giving refugees right 
to jobs and land,” Business Daily, 8 November 2017, 
 https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/economy/Uhuru-rejects-bill-giving-refugees-right-to-jobs-and-
land/3946234-4178936-xf36adz/index.html.  
27 This is the government agency tasked with the overall administration, coordination and management of all 





poorly resourced.”28 The recruitment of staff with security or intelligence backgrounds 
certainly augments the Kenyan government’s efforts to ensure that refugee management 
retains its securitised nature. It serves to undermine the civilian nature of refugee protection.29 
Even though the NHRI participant was explicit about the problematic nature of security and 
intelligence officers managing refugees and asylum seekers, this study did not identify any 
public criticism of this recruitment process, with the exception of the implied unease with 
their formal presence within the asylum space.30 
Some of the challenges that the Refugee Affairs Secretariat faces were highlighted in 
a UNHCR evaluation of the refugee administration transition process and are corroborated by 
a study conducted on access to documentation for urban refugees. These assessments found 
that the secretariat faced considerable challenges in carrying out its mandate.31 The NHRI 
participant thus viewed the Refugee Affairs Secretariat as a weak structure, which may likely 
not be fully operationalized given the government’s negative stance on refugees and asylum 
seekers in Kenya. This has made it difficult for the KNCHR to provide optimal legal 
assistance to refugees and asylum seekers, as the KNCHR is required to make referrals to an 
institution that it has determined “lacks the capacity and capability to provide the requisite 
assistance to refugee or asylum seeker complainants.”32  
                                                
28Various reports confirm the KNCHR’s assertions that the RAS is staffed by former security and intelligence 
officers see in Sorcha O’Callaghan and Georgina Sturge, “Against all Odds: Refugee Integration in Kenya,” Its 
capacity constraints are also well documented. See Madeline Garlick, Elspeth Guild, Caitlin Procter and 
Machiel Salomons, Formative Evaluation; Hargraves, Karen, Sara Pantuliano, and Idris Ahmed, Closing 
Borders: The Ripple Effect of Australian and European and Refugee Policy: Case Studies from Indonesia, 
Kenya and Jordan, HPG Working Paper (September 2016), accessed 9 June 2019, 
https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-documents/10862.pdf; Anna Lindley, “Between a Protracted 
and a Crisis Situation: Policy Responses to Somali Refugees in Kenya,” Refugee Survey Quarterly, (2011): 8-9, 
DOI:10.1093/rsq/hdr013 
29 Rufus Karanja, “The Blurred Line: Preserving the Asylum Space in the Context of Increasing Insecurity,” 
Refugee Insights, no. 25 (2014). 
30 Sorcha O’Callaghan and Georgina Sturge, “Against all Odd” 5. Interview with participant. 
31 NRC, IHRC. Recognising Nairobi’s Refugees: The Challenges and Significance of Documentation Proving 
Identity and Status, November 2017, accessed 22 May 2018, http://hrp.law.harvard.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2017/11/recognising-nairobis-refugees_nrc_ihrc_november2017_embargoed.pdf ; Madeline 
Garlick, Elspeth Guild and Machiel Salomons, Formative Evaluation.  





However, in an attempt to bridge this protection gap, and despite the existence of the 
referral system, the KNCHR continues to investigate complaints from refugees and asylum 
seekers where it deems a human right has been violated. Where a referral is necessary, the 
KNCHR ensures that the complainant receives guidance on the process to have the matter 
resolved and follows up with the complainant. It has also adopted a strategic approach to 
complaints handling by focusing on those complaints or violations that can be resolved 
through public interest litigation, challenging in particular, the constitutionality of State 
action or inaction. Furthermore, the KNCHR increased its promotional activities in urban 
areas where refugees and asylum seekers reside in large numbers. These activities are 
discussed in sections 7.4.1 and 7.4.2 below.  
Despite the pressure to disengage from dealing with the promotion and protection of 
refugee rights, the KNCHR’s activities, alluded to above, indicate a determination to fulfil its 
mandate, though evidence shows that the costs to the KNCHR have been high. This is not 
only due to its continued engagement with asylum matters, but also because of its perceived 
effectiveness in implementing its human rights mandate in general.33 Its effectiveness in 
demanding accountability has led to both overt and covert efforts by the government to 
weaken it institutionally.  Such efforts range from members of parliament calling for the 
KNCHR’s dissolution, delays in the appointment of commissioners once terms of offices end, 
the reduction of the institution’s budget and the pressure to desist from engaging with certain 
human rights.34 For instance, the KNCHR’s operational budget had been cut so severely that 
                                                
33 KNCHR ranks among its peers as a strong and independent NHRI. KNCHR has been consistently accredited 
with the A status, that is being fully compliant with the Paris Principles since its first accreditation application in 
2005. Its work in relation to the Universal Periodic Review has been cited as best practice. So too has its work in 
relation to human rights accountability during elections and the promotion and protection of the rights of other 
persons of concern to the UNHCR, i.e., internally displaced persons (which contributed to the development of 
the UNHCR Checklist for working with NHRIs in context of internal displacement) and stateless persons. See 
also its own reflections in the report KNCHR, It’s Hard to be Good: The Work, the Wins and Challenges of the 
Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, July 2003-August 2011 (Nairobi: KNCHR, 2012), 
https://www.knchr.org/Portals/0/GeneralReports/Its_Hard_to_be_Good.pdf?ver=2013-02-21-152535-707.   
34NANHRI, Mapping Survey of Complaints Handling; See for instance KNCHR’s investigations into allegations 





it has little room to implement programmes as confirmed by the KNCHR participant: “Our 
budget has also been seriously cut and there is reluctance to provide the necessary funding to 
ensure that programmes run.”35 A service provider participant added: “The KNCHR has been 
forced to spend valuable time pursuing donor funding, which means a considerable amount of 
their limited resources are spent on developing proposals and not on actual programme 
work.”36 
The KNCHR also opined that the creation of other State institutions has led to an 
erosion of its broad human rights mandate. For example, the KNCHR handled complaints, 
including from refugees and asylum seekers, which related to police abuses such as 
harassment, arbitrary arrests, extortion, and bribery.37 This function was taken over by the 
Independent Police Oversight Authority (IPOA), which was established in 2011.38 The 
KNCHR stated that, as a result, it is required to refer all complaints it receives relating to 
police misconduct to the IPOA, whose staff do not necessarily have experience with human 
rights.39 This is problematic as research on challenges that urban refugees and asylum seekers 
face in Kenya has shown that the police constitute one of the primary violators of their 
                                                                                                                                                  
received threats: Peace Loise Mbae, “KNCHR Report: 25 killed, 81 Missing in Anti-terror Operation,” Standard 
Digital, 15 September, 2015 https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000176419/knchr-report-25-killed-81-
missing-in-anti-terror-operation; KHRC, Let’s We Forget: The Faces of Impunity in Kenya (Nairobi: KHRC, 
2011). https://www.khrc.or.ke/publications/30-lest-we-forget-the-faces-of-impunity-in-kenya/file.html; 
KNCHR, It’s Hard to be Good. 
35 Financial constraints because of low funding levels from the Kenyan government have been cited as a primary 
challenge that the KNCHR faces. See KNCHR, It’s Hard to be Good; Bonolo Ramadi Dinokopila and Rhoda 
Igweta Murangiri, "The Kenya National Commission on Human Rights under the 2010 Constitutional 
Dispensation," African Journal of International and Comparative Law 26, no. 2 (2018): 224-225, 
(https://doi.org/10.3366/ajicl.2018.0228; Also confirmed in the interview with service provider participant 5, 
Nairobi, Kenya. 
36 Interview with service provider participant 5, Nairobi, Kenya.  
37 See for instance KNCHR, The Error of Fighting Terror with Terror (Nairobi: KNCHR, 2015). 
https://www.knchr.org/Portals/0/CivilAndPoliticalReports/The%20Error%20of%20Fighting%20Terror%20Wit
h%20Terror.pdf?ver=2018-06-06-200137-237. 
38 Kenya Gazette, Independence Policing Oversight Authority Act, 2011; The IPOA provides civilian oversight 
over the work of the police. Its functions are set out in s 6 of the Act and include investigating police action, 
which results in deaths and serious injuries.    
39 See training for IPOA staff on human rights, IPOA, “IPOA Board undergoes human rights training,” IPOA, 





rights.40 In addition, the anti-terror interventions carried out by the Kenyan police have 
mostly targeted Kenyan Somalis and refugees and asylum seekers of Somali origin.41  
There is little evidence to show the existence of a working relationship between the 
KNCHR and IPOA that would point to an attempt to fill any protection gaps that may have 
resulted following the creation of the IPOA.42 In the absence of clarity over the roles, the 
KNCHR continues to investigate allegations against police action on the basis of its founding 
legislation and Article 238 (2) of the Constitution, which provides that “national security 
shall be pursued in compliance with the law and with the utmost respect for the rule of law, 
democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms.”43 
Linos and Pegram found that many NHRIs have been dismantled or undermined 
precisely because they were too effective in fulfilling their mandates.44 These findings 
corroborate the KNCHR’s experiences in the promotion and protection of refugee rights. In 
spite of this, the KNCHR has, in the face of a challenging socio-political context, found ways 
to adapt, to ensure that it complies with its mandate with respect to refugee rights. However, 
its capacity to continue addressing the challenges may be further curtailed, in the context of 
the State’s restrictive actions to circumvent protection of refugee rights. The Kenyan 
government has displayed a willingness to adapt to ensure that its objective to maintain a 
securitised asylum space is realised. For instance, the KNCHR’s recent litigation successes in 
                                                
40 Elizabeth H Campbell, “Urban Refugees in Nairobi: Problems of Protection, Mechanisms of Survival, and 
Possibilities for Integration,” Journal of Refugee Studies 19, no. 3 (September 2006): 396–413, 
https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/fel011; UNHCR, Navigating Nairobi: A Review of the Implementation of UNHCR’s 
Urban Refugee Policy in Kenya’s Capital (Geneva: UNHCR, 2011); NRC, IHRC, Recognising Nairobi’s 
Refugees; Carrie Hough, “Newcomers to Nairobi: The Protection Concerns and Survival Strategies of Asylum 
Seekers in Kenya’s Capital City,” New Issues in Refugee Research, no. 260 (2013). 
41 For instance, Operation Usalama Watch, the Kenyan governments security response to the terrorists attack. 
The KNCHR documented serious human rights violations perpetrated against Somalis-both Kenyans and 
refugees and asylum seekers-by the police. 
42 The IPOA Act provides in s 8(c) that the Chairperson of the Kenya National Human Rights and Equality 
Commission shall be an ex-officio member of the IPOA’s governing authority. While the Kenyan Constitution 
provides for the establishment of the Kenya National Human Rights and Equality commission does not exist, 
Parliament in terms of Article 59 of the Kenyan Constitution opted to split the KNHREC into 3 separate 
institutions, that is, the KNCHR, the NGEC and the CAJ.   
43 Laws of Kenya, Constitution of Kenya 2010.  





challenging the government’s policy that contravened refugee and asylum seekers’ rights 
rested on the issuance of government directives. According to the KNCHR, the Kenyan 
government has now resorted to using note verbales to demand changes in the 
implementation of the asylum policy, thus making it difficult for KNCHR and other actors to 
seek remedies through the courts.45  
Additionally, Andrew Maina argues that the Kenyan judicial space is also becoming 
securitised based on subsequent rulings in favour of the encampment policy.46 In Samow & 
Others v Cabinet Secretary & Others47 and Coalition for Reform and Democracy (CORD) & 
2 Others v Attorney General & Republic of Kenya & 10 Others,48 the courts found that the 
encampment policy was justified on the basis of national security without the State having 
provided proof of the existence of the connection between the presence of refugees and 
asylum seekers with heightened threats to national security.49  
 As discussed in chapter six, securitisation has been identified as one of the factors 
contributing to xenophobic attitudes towards refugees and asylum seekers.50 This study found 
that xenophobia is also manifested within the asylum space in Kenya. However, unlike the 
South African context, xenophobia is not an integral asylum experience for all refugees and 
asylum seekers in Kenya.51 In Kenya, xenophobic attitudes are primarily targeted at ethnic 
Somali refugees and asylum seekers [and Kenyan Somalis]. Thus, the KNCHR deals 
primarily with violations of rights concerning Somali refugees and asylum seekers usually 
because of police action directed at them because of their ethnicity or perceived 
                                                
45 Note verbales are governed under diplomatic law as they are a form of diplomatic communication and are 
subject to immunities. 
46 Andrew Maina, “Securitization of Kenya’s Asylum Space,” 88-89. 
47 Samow & Others v Cabinet Secretary & Others (eKLR, 2014) 
48 Coalition for Reform and Democracy (CORD) & 2 Others v Attorney General & Republic of Kenya & 10 
Others (eKLR, 2015.) 
49 Andrew Maina, “Securitization of Kenya’s Asylum Space,”88-89. 
50 See discussion in chapter 6 section 6.3. 





“foreignness.”52   
 The KNCHR’s litigation has also focused on the protection of the rights of Somali 
refugees and asylum seekers, as have its promotional activities. For instance, the KNCHR 
created a human rights desk in a Nairobi suburb with a high urban Somali refugee and asylum 
seeker population, precisely due to their vulnerabilities to discrimination, arbitrary arrests, 
and unlawful detention.53 It also hosts regular legal clinics at the site and provides both free 
legal advice and referral services to other service providers competent to handle their 
concerns. The findings also revealed that there was the perception that xenophobic attitudes 
towards Somalis in general were deeply embedded among policy-makers, politicians, and 
civil servants.54  
 The xenophobic attitudes coupled with the drive for a securitised asylum space had 
led to the perception that the Kenyan government lacked the political will to promote the 
effective implementation of the domestic protection regime. The notion of political will, as 
discussed in chapter 6, implies that both the State and the NHRIs have the authority and must 
be willing to put in place adequate structures and resources to cause change within the 
refugee protection regime. Additionally, there are key elements that need to be considered 
when discussing political will. These are “willingness”, “capacity”, “authority”, and 
“reform”.55 As such, political will is dependent upon the willingness of an actor who has the 
                                                
52 KNCHR, Return of the Gulag; UNHCR, Submission to UPR-Kenya, 6, UNHCR, UNHCR seeking access to 
detained asylum- seekers and refugees in Nairobi, 7 April 2014, accessed 8 September, 2019, 
https://www.unhcr.org/5342b35d9.html; Amnesty International, Kenya: Crackdown on irregular migrants risks 
sparking xenophobia, 1 September 2018, accessed 2018, 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/09/kenya-crackdown-on-irregular-migrants-risks-sparking-
xenophobia/; Sara Pavanello, Samir Elhawary and Sara Pantuliano, “Hidden and Exposed.” 
53 Operation Usalama Watch; While studies show that other groups or urban refugees and asylum seekers in 
Kenya are also at risk of unlawful detention and arbitrary arrests, the Somali ethnic group are most often the 
victims. 
54 KNCHR, Out of the Shadows: Towards ensuring the Rights of Stateless Persons and those at Risk of 
Statelessness in Kenya (Nairobi: KNCHR, 2010), 9-10, https://www.unhcr.org/4e8338d49.pdf; KNCHR, An 
Identity Crisis?: A Study on the Issuance of National Identity Cards in Kenya, (Nairobi: KNCHR, 2007)  
http://www.knchr.org/Portals/0/EcosocReports/KNCHR%20Final%20IDs%20Report.pdf . 





capacity and authority to bring about change or reform.56  
 This study found that there was consensus among all the participants that effective 
implementation of the domestic refugee protection regime required reform. Further, that the 
NHRIs’ capacity to influence the necessary reform rested on the government’s willingness to 
fully commit to realising refugee rights in accordance with its international obligations. 
Additionally, that the NHRI must also be willing to commit to utilising its resources to effect 
change. 
 In terms of capacity, the KNCHR viewed the delays in fully operationalizing the 
Refugee Affairs Secretariat, as deliberate State action to undermine the refugee regime, as 
reflected in this statement:  
RAS [Refugee Affairs Secretariat] is not fully staffed. It is still not clear if the RAS 
has deployed staff to all its sites including in the refugee camps. It’s also not 
coincidental that the RAS staff includes former intelligence and security officers. I 
have little confidence that they will view the asylum process through a humanitarian 
lens. The agenda is securitisation of asylum and the government will invest resources 
in that, not in protecting the rights of foreign nationals.57  
 
The KNCHR’s view is that the Refugee Affairs Secretariat’s inadequacies had made it 
difficult to meet the protection needs of refugees and asylum seekers. Also, that the poor 
functioning of the entity tasked with managing asylum was an illustration of the lack of 
political will on the part of the government to ensure that refugees and asylum seekers were 
protected. The KNCHR thus finds itself in a difficult situation. On the one hand, it is required 
to refer refugee and asylum seeker complaints to the Refugee Affairs Secretariat, but on the 
other hand, it risks compromising its own mandate by referring complaints to an entity that 
may not have the capacity to offer the protection required.  The KNCHR interprets this 
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situation as a protection ‘grey’ area and continues to handle all complaints it receives from 
refugees and asylum seekers that deal with human rights violations.58  
Service provider participants concurred that the government did not appear 
particularly interested in addressing capacity concerns. As a service provider in Nairobi said: 
“I feel that the government is not too committed to make sure that things are done effectively 
where refugees are concerned.”59 There was also consensus among participants that the 
political will to engage with refugee maters was heavily influenced by local perceptions of 
foreign migrants in general, refugee and asylum seekers, or specific groups of refugees and 
asylum seekers, as reflected in the following quote: “It’s not easy being a refugee in Nairobi. 
Sometimes you are here, and you don’t want people to know. You behave like you are 
invisible. You hide your passport especially where you know you have a government which 
has closed doors to people like us.”60  
On the notion of “authority”, the findings on the perception of “who” the actor 
responsible for the reform was differed from those views from the South African context. All 
participants concurred that both the State and the NHRIs had primary roles in reforming the 
refugee protection regime. The KNCHR has interpreted its mandate to include the promotion 
and protection of the rights of refugees and therefore, has the authority to advance the 
promotion and protection of these rights. Similarly, the Refugees Act grants the Refugee 
Affairs Secretariat the authority to ensure the realisation of refugee rights through its 
designation as the State organ tasked with managing asylum.  
However, the KNCHR reported that it was committed to advancing the realisation of 
refugee rights, but that the difficulties it faced in fulfilling its obligations to refugees and 
asylum seekers correlated with the government’s unwillingness to commit to the realisation 
of refugee rights. In this regard, the KNCHR faces similar challenges to those experienced by 
                                                
58 Interview with NHRI participant 3, Nairobi, Kenya. 
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the SAHRC. For instance, this study revealed that the KNCHR also experiences difficulties 
finding audience with government officials to discuss asylum related matters: “The 
government has become very abrasive about refugee matters and we’ve seen a lot of 
resistance to have a humanitarian discussion about anything. It is difficult to engage with 
state officials especially now that Internal Security [Ministry of Interior and Coordination of 
National Security] is involved.”61  
Consequently, the KNCHR concluded that the environment it operated in curtailed its 
efforts to such an extent that it gave rise to perceptions of reluctance to actively engage with 
the promotion and protection of refugee rights. This has resulted in the KNCHR resorting to 
“quiet” diplomacy where engagement with asylum matters is concerned to avoid 
confrontations with public officials.62 In addition, it has established close working 
relationships with members of parliament or government officials committed to human rights 
who then act as “friends” of the KNCHR especially where certain human rights are highly 
contested.63 Thus, a high degree of its work in relation to advocating for change in the 
implementation of the refugee protection regime goes unreported.64  However, the KNCHR 
reiterated that despite the socio-political challenges it faces, the constitutional requirement to 
promote and protect the rights of all people could not be deviated from: “We just forge ahead 
and do what we can. We have to consider the rights of all people in Kenya even though the 
government insists that we shouldn’t deal with foreigners.”65  
Service provider and refugee participants in Kenya held similar views to those in 
South Africa. They also felt that the NHRIs had not displayed a high degree of willingness to 
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advocate for change in the implementation of refugee law and policies and the asylum 
experience for refugees and asylum seekers. In addition, service provider and refugee 
participants concurred with the NHRI participants’ belief about the impact of the States’ 
unwillingness to effectively realise refugee rights. They felt that the State was unwilling to 
engage with refugee-related matters. They believed that the State’s unwillingness to engage 
with refugee-related matters was a factor that impeded the NHRIs’ abilities to engage 
meaningfully with the promotion and protection of refugee rights. In this regard, one 
participant stated:  
NHRIs are simply looking at the protection of the rights of these people. As long as 
they are within our borders then they need the protection of the law, but once these 
other conversations such as nationalism and security concerns are sort of built into the 
bigger narrative, you find now, the NHRI themselves end up suffering as a 
consequence of that ‘coz they are seen as anti-establishment; they are undermined by 
the political aspect of refugee protection.66 
 
7.4 NHRIs utilise the working methods available through their legislative mandates 
to promote and protect refugee rights 
The findings highlight that the NHRIs in Kenya also utilise the working methods available 
through their legislative mandates to advance refugee rights, despite the absence of an 
express requirement within their mandates to either promote or protect these rights.  All the 
NHRIs in Kenya surveyed for this study, have both promotion and protection mandates, 
however, the extent to which they engaged with matters related to refugees and asylum 
seekers varied greatly, and in some cases was non-existent.  
The findings also confirm that it is the NHRI with the broadest human rights mandate 
that displays the highest degree of engagement with matters related to migrants broadly and 
specifically to refugee rights. This finding is similar to that of the SAHRC. However, the 
findings revealed that despite their broad and similar mandates, the degree to which the 
                                                





SAHRC and KNCHR were involved in the promotion and protection of refugee rights varied 
significantly.   
 The activities undertaken by the KNCHR fall into two broad categories that is, 
promotional and protection activities. The promotional activities identified fall into four 
broad categories: advisory; reporting; human rights education and awareness raising. The 
protection activities are complaints handling, conducting investigations, and monitoring.67 
These activities were similar to those undertaken by the SAHRC but the implementation 
processes and challenges encountered differed. As this study did not identify any substantive 
activities conducted by the Gender Commission or the Commission on Administrative 
Justice, the findings discussed in this section relate to the KNCHR. Sections 7.4.1 and 7.4.2 
discuss how the KNCHR has utilised its working methods by highlighting particular activities 
that it has implemented. It also discusses the challenges or limitations these methods have 
had on perceived effectiveness or ineffectiveness in the promotion and protection of refugee 
rights and will compare and contrast with those findings from the NHRIs in South Africa, in 
particular the SAHRC. The discussion of the promotional and protection activities follows 
below. 
7.4.1 NHRI Promotional activities  
The KNCHR performs its advisory role in compliance with the Paris Principles. Its activities 
are similar to those of the SAHRC as it regularly reviews and makes submissions on bills and 
policies to ensure their compliance with the Constitution and international and regional 
human rights norms and standards. As discussed in section 7.2 above, the KNCHR’s research 
department, known as Research and Compliance Unit handles this responsibility as it is 
tasked with monitoring the State’s compliance with its international human rights 
                                                





obligations.68 A human rights officer within the research compliance unit conducts research 
and reports on the rights of migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers. These activities are 
undertaken in consultation with a senior refugee lawyer.69 Thus, the KNCHR has made 
submissions on bills and policies with respect to refugees and asylum seekers’ rights 
including: Refugee Bill (2006, 2016), Security Laws Amendment Bill (2014), Health Bill 
2012, Migration Policy (2017), and the East African Refugee Management Policy. The 
KNCHR also reported having regular consultative meetings with members of parliament on 
human rights and asylum.70  
  Its advisory role has had particular significance in the review of the Refugees Act. In 
2016, Parliament passed the Refugees Amendment Bill, 2016 with a view to repeal the 
Refugees Act, 2006.71 This Bill proposes guaranteed rights to refugees to education, work, 
property ownership and a pathway to citizenship.72 Section 6(a) of the Bill proposed the 
establishment of the Refugee, Repatriation, and Resettlement Commission whose 
membership would include the KNCHR (Section 7(1)(c)(viii)), serving in an advisory role. 
The KNCHR would provide advice on among others, the formulation of policy on refugees in 
accordance with international standards.73  
  Additionally, Section 11(1) of the Bill proposed the establishment of the Refugee 
Appeal Board (RAB), which also included the KNCHR with voting rights. The RAB would 
consider appeals of any decisions made with respect to determination and termination of 
refugee status.74 However, the President rejected the Bill citing inadequate public 
consultations in the drafting process.75 An amended Bill was re-tabled before Parliament in 
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September 2019 and is still subject to parliamentary processes.76 The KNCHR reported that it 
had continued to engage with the Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Security, 
which opposed what it termed as “dangerous clauses”, such as the provision for local 
integration under Part VII of the Bill.77  
  The KNCHR may also have a significant role to play in the promotion and protection 
of the rights of refugees and asylum seekers with disabilities as it was designated, in 2011, as 
the independent monitoring mechanism under Article 33(2) of the Convention on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities.78 It is perhaps through this role that the proposed 2016 Refugee 
Bill, contains a clause which requires implementation of the refugee policy giving due regard 
to persons with disability.79  
  Like the SAHRC, the KNCHR does not have a monitoring and evaluation system in 
place to ascertain the impact of its advisory role within the national human rights processes. 
Any impact is anecdotal. A review of its submissions to Parliament shows scant reference to 
rights of migrants in general. It is also difficult to gauge the extent of the mainstreaming of 
such rights in its advisory function, despite the presence of a focal point person addressing 
such rights within the KNCHR. The KNCHR did report having regular consultations with 
respect to human rights and asylum but this study did not identify any documented evidence 
of such interactions - for instance through reports, policy briefs or advisories.80 The findings 
show that the overall perception is that there is confidence in the KNCHR’s work, and there 
was acknowledgement that the government frustrated much of its efforts precisely because of 
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how effectively it undertook its activities.  
  The KNCHR also reports on its activities at the national and international levels. This 
study found that the KNCHR’s reporting varied. While it did not produce any specific report 
on the realisation of refugee rights, it included activities undertaken in some of its annual 
reports, which are submitted to parliament and the president. Its website has a section which 
provides a comprehensive overview of its work on migrant rights. However, there is limited 
reference to specific work on refugees and asylum seekers on the website and in its regular 
reports, whether annual or thematic. These inconsistencies in reporting and relatively low 
levels of information available to the public about refugee rights curtail the KNCHR’s ability 
to influence change for the effective realisation of refugee rights. As Barkow notes, reporting 
and dissemination of information needs to occur for the public to engage with pertinent 
issues.81 
  Similar to the SAHRC, the KNCHR submits reports to African Union and UN human 
rights mechanisms and processes, and where necessary, highlights challenges faced with 
realising rights for refugees and asylum seekers. For example, its engagement with the 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) also reflects the increasing 
impact that NHRIs can have in demanding accountability at the international level for the 
realisation of refugee rights.82  The KNCHR’s NHRI report to the CERD also made 
recommendations concerning refugees and asylum seekers. Specifically, on the right to 
freedom of movement, the KNCHR noted: 
Despite the High Court in Kituo Cha Sheria & 8 others v Attorney General [2013] 
eKLR declaring that the encampment policy as illegal, the State did not heed the court 
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directive and continued to hold the refugees in refugee camps therefore limiting the 
right of movement of the refugees to the designated refugee camps.83  
 
It proposed that the CERD recommend: 
The state should respect the High Court decision in Kituo Cha Sheria & 8 others v 
Attorney General [2013] eKLR and ensure that refugees have the right of movement 
within the state; the state in declaring curfew should follow the law and the curfew 
should not be in force for a disproportionate long periods of time; and the state should 
improve on the security to its citizens and should only resort to curfew in exceptional 
circumstances and for a limited time.84 [Author’s own emphasis] 
 
In its concluding observations to Kenya, the CERD noted its concerns about restrictions on 
the freedom of movement of refugees, the absence of alternative resettlement options and 
substandard conditions for those living in the camps.85 It recommended, among others, that 
the State “respect[s] the 2013 High Court decision in Kituo Cha Seria & Others v. The 
Attorney General and follow the law when declaring curfews, ensuring that they are not 
maintained for a disproportionate length of time and are resorted to only in exceptional 
circumstances.”86 
With respect to implementation of international obligations related to refugees and 
asylum seekers, the KNCHR emphasised in its report to the CERD the lack of 
implementation of the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action. It recommended that 
the CERD urge Kenya to take urgent steps to implement the Durban Declaration and include 
the status or progress of such steps in her next submission to the committee.87 In turn, the 
CERD requested Kenya to not only give effect to the Durban Declaration and Programme of 
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Action, but to also include information on steps taken to implement it.88  It is perhaps 
premature at this stage to confirm a causal link between NHRI reports to treaty bodies and the 
content of the concluding observations. It is a positive development that the wording of some 
of the concluding observations reflects proposals that have been put forward by NHRIs.  
 The third category of promotional activities identified is human rights education 
(HRE). As discussed in chapter 6, the Paris Principles recommend that NHRIs conduct 
human rights education. This study found that the KNCHR had also conducted HRE 
activities with respect to migrants’ rights, though, like the SAHRC, these were limited. The 
KNCHR has a public education and training unit, which has the dual mandate of 
implementing public awareness programmes and conducting human rights education.89 Thus, 
the KNCHR differs from the SAHRC in terms of the institutional structure supporting HRE. 
Whereas the SAHRC’s HRE function falls broadly within its advocacy and communication 
unit, the KNCHR has definitively fulfilled this duty by the creation of a specific unit tasked 
with the human rights education function.  
 This precise delegation is indicative in the number of training manuals, handbooks, 
and curricula that the KNCHR has developed on a wide range of rights. It has also developed 
a toolkit for alternative dispute resolution including guidelines, a manual, and a training 
curriculum.  The KNCHR has partnered with three local Kenyan universities’ law schools to 
develop and oversee the implementation of a human rights curriculum for institutions of 
higher learning.90 With respect to migrants’ rights, the KNCHR has developed a handbook 
and curriculum for migration and human rights. This curriculum will be used by the Kenya 
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Institute for Migration Studies at the University of Nairobi.91  
Though the KNCHR reported that it conducted training on refugee rights, and hosted 
human rights clinic with refugees and asylum seekers, there is limited documentation of these 
activities. In addition, the focus of the materials developed for human rights education has 
been broad with little attention paid to refugees and asylum seekers. For example, the 
handbook on migration and human rights mentions refugees and asylum seekers as a specific 
category of forced migrants but does not provide any details on their rights or protection 
issues that affect them.92 The handbook also does not refer to the 1951 Refugee Convention 
as one of the legal frameworks for protection choosing instead to focus on the International 
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their 
Families.93 Commenting on the focus on migrants, one participant stated: 
There is interest among NHRIs on issues affecting refugees. There was considerable 
debate around how to conceptualise interventions in Africa in relation to migrants. 
Given how broad the issue is, the initial thought was to focus on refugees. But the 
NHRI driving this discourse is in the North [North Africa]. It appears to be under 
pressure from Europe to find solutions but Europe is interested in a migrant discourse 
not a refugees’ discourse. So, the final wording of the proposed regional project in 
Africa is a compromise. We managed to include the question of refugees in detention 
facilities.94 
 
The core aspects of the KNCHR’s migration and human rights focus area fall under the 
Better Migration Management Programme, which is funded by Germany and the EU and is 
implemented in the context of the Global Compact on Migration.95 Its content and outputs 
have been heavily influenced by the donor objectives.96 This confirms the assertion made 
above that the current NHRI activities with respect to forced migration or displacement in 
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Africa are not necessarily NHRI-driven, due to the source of the funds. Thus, while migration 
as an area of focus for NHRIs is gaining traction, there is the possibility that refugee rights 
will be overshadowed as a result of the implementation of a broad approach to addressing the 
rights of migrants. As noted in the discussion in section 3.4 of this thesis, the specific areas 
for NHRI responsibility within the Global Compact for Migration apply equally to refugees 
and asylum seekers, but the KNCHR practice reinforces the focus on migrant’s rights to the 
exclusion of refugee rights. The evolving norms for NHRI engagement thus focus on 
migrants’ rights broadly and the normative gap for NHRI engagement with refugee rights at 
the international level will not be sufficiently addressed should NHRI practice continue to 
focus on migrants’ rights.  
The absence of refugee specific human rights education material reflects a significant 
gap in the opportunity to promote a culture that respects the rights of refugees and asylum 
seekers in Kenya. The inculcation of a security approach to dealing with asylum among 
public officials attests to the importance of the human rights education function particularly 
with respect to duty bearers. There is also an opportunity for the KNCHR to encourage 
responsibility and accountability for effective promotion and protection of the rights of 
refugees and asylum seekers by targeting the public. This approach is supported by the results 
of a survey conducted in 2018 on Kenyans’ perceptions on refugees, which found that 
national security was not a primary concern despite the government’s assertions.97 The 
emphasis of national security concerns, as discussed in section 7.3 above, may also have had 
a significant impact on how “public” the KNCHR can be about its refugee-related activities 
that do not constitute serious breaches of international obligations. However, despite the 
focus on migration broadly, the human rights education activities that the KNCHR has 
implemented on migration and human rights, provides a basis for the KNCHR to develop 
                                                





refugee-focused human rights education outputs.  
The final category of promotional activities is raising awareness about human rights. 
As mentioned in section 6.4.1, human rights awareness-raising serves to promote a broader 
understanding and observance of human rights principles and standards.98 This study found 
that the KNCHR has implemented awareness-raising activities targeting refugees and asylum 
seekers. Unlike the SAHRC’s Roll Back Xenophobia campaign, the KNCHR has not 
implemented such a broad-reaching activity. Its reported activities have been with urban 
Somali refugees and asylum seekers, given that it has identified them as particularly 
vulnerable to discrimination, arbitrary arrests, detention, and bribery.  
The campaign reaching out to Somali refugees and asylum seekers was aimed at 
raising awareness of the KNCHR’s mandate, increasing awareness of rights among refugees 
and asylum seekers, increasing access to the KNCHR’s complaints handling process and was 
part of the process of implementing its improved referral system.99 There is currently no 
formal report on this activity except for a brief reference in its annual report, which noted an 
increase in the number of complaints from refugees and asylum seekers as a result.100   
 
7.4.2 NHRI Protection activities  
The protection activities that NHRIs undertake include complaints handling, investigations, 
and monitoring.101 This study found that the KNCHR conducts protection activities. In terms 
of complaints handling, the KNCHR receives complaints from refugees and asylum 
seekers.102 The KNHRC categorised these complaints as group rights’ violations, but does not 
always provide a complete breakdown of the number of complaints that relate specifically to 
refugees and asylum seekers. For instance in 2017, it reported that 342 or seven per cent of its 
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caseload constituted complaints on violations related to group rights with refugees and 
asylum seekers forming the bulk of these complaints.103  In 2013, its report only provided the 
total number of group rights’ complaints handled, which were 218.104 However, in 2015 and 
2014, it reported on the number of complaints that related specifically to refugee rights as 80 
and two respectively.105  
Most of these complaints are referred to the Refugee Consortium of Kenya (a local 
legal aid CSO) or the Refugee Affairs Secretariat.106 The KNCHR, depending on the nature 
of the complaints, may also provide legal advice, recommend alternative dispute resolution 
measures, or conduct further investigations.107 This study found that neither the Gender 
Commission nor the Commission on Administrative Justice reported handling complaints 
related to refugees or asylum seekers.  
 The KNCHR also litigates on matters related to refugee rights. For instance, in Kituo 
Cha Sheria & Kenya National Commission on Human Rights v Attorney General & 3 others 
(Kituo Cha Sheria v Attorney General), the KNCHR and a local CSO, Kituo Cha Sheria 
(Legal Advice Centre) challenged the constitutionality of a series of government decisions 
with respect to refugees and asylum seekers in Kenya. The court found that the government’s 
decisions to close the Dadaab refugee camp without first consulting stakeholders, and to 
forcibly repatriate Somali refugees and asylum seekers, was unconstitutional.108 The court 
also found that the proposed repatriation of all refugees in Dadaab camp to Somalia was a 
violation of the principle of non-refoulement.109 Furthermore, the court held that the 
Government’s decision to disband the Department of Refugee Affairs was ultra vires and 
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thus null and void.110The KNCHR’s action led to the suspension of the implementation of 
these government directives and forcible repatriation of Somali refugees and asylum seekers.  
While participants concurred about the importance of the KNCHR’s complaints 
handling mechanism, there were perceived challenges about its utility for the protection of 
refugee rights. The first challenge was that of reporting and doing so in a manner that allows 
for meaningful interpretation of data.111 This study found that the KNCHR had only begun to 
consistently include in its annual reports reference to handling complaints from refugees and 
asylum seekers from 2013. There was no indication of refugee or asylum seeker complaints 
handled between the year of its initial establishment (2002) and 2012.  
Furthermore, the method of reporting, as mentioned above, does not utilise a standard 
format and the information provided lacks detail. This makes it difficult to determine the 
nature of the complaints and to draw conclusions about the situation of refugees and asylum 
seekers in Kenya. This conclusion is similar to that drawn with respect to the NHRIs in South 
Africa, where this study found challenges with reporting methods that the NHRIs employed. 
In addition, the KNCHR refers many of the cases it receives to its referral partners. There was 
no evidence to indicate the reasons for the referrals or documentation of the follow-up on 
each complaint that it has referred out. 
None of the participants had utilised the complaints handling mechanism and not 
many participants were aware about specific cases handled, except for those highlighted in 
the media. 112 It was thus difficult to determine the perceptions that participants had with 
respect to the KNCHR’s use of the complaints handling mechanism. However, the NANHRI 
had conducted a mapping survey of African NHRI complaints handling systems, which 
identified several factors that had an impact on the KNCHR’s ability to utilise this 
                                                
110 Section 6 of the 2006 Refugee Act established the Department of Refugee Affairs. Its dissolution would 
require an amendment to the Refugee Act. The DRA has since been replaced by the Refugee Affairs Secretariat.  
111 Rachel E Barkow, ‘Insulating Agencies, 59. 
112 These cases were the Kituo Cha Sheria v Attorney General and the CORD, KNCHR & another v Republic of 





mechanism. These included: legal proceedings against the KNCHR; attempts by politicians to 
undermine its credibility; and attempts by politicians to direct the work of the Commission.113 
Finally, complaints handling is influenced by how accessible the NHRI is to the 
public. While, the KNCHR has several offices in addition to its headquarters, its offices are 
regional and do not cover all the major administrative hubs. This has hampered physical 
access to the institution, but the institution implements outreach activities, which serve to 
increase the public’s access to its services. For example, the KNCHR conducts numerous 
human rights clinics and has established human rights desks (Huduma desks) in strategic 
areas in Kenya to increase its accessibility especially to refugees and asylum seekers. It has 
also enhanced its referral system to ensure complaints are referred to appropriate institutions 
where it determines that the complaint is inadmissible.  This system includes a follow-up 
process for each case that has been referred out to partners.114 These strategies are discussed 
in detail in section 7.6 below, which addresses NHRI visibility.  
The second category of protection activities is investigations. Investigations usually 
seek to address systemic human rights concerns or those that affect a large segment of the 
population. Like the SAHRC, the KNCHR has utilised this function to address systemic 
human rights violations. It has however, not conducted any public inquiries related directly to 
addressing violations of refugee rights, though several of its inquiries made findings, which 
had implications for refugees and asylum seekers. For example, it conducted an inquiry into 
statelessness in Kenya and another on access to national identity documents. The inquiry on 
identity documents included findings that eventually informed policy and improved access to 
identity documentation for refugees and asylum seekers.115 However, the inquiry into 
statelessness was not conceptualised to include investigating the situation of refugees and 
asylum seekers, who are or at risk of becoming stateless, despite evidence suggesting that 
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statelessness among refugees is a problem.116 This shortcoming may be due to the absence of 
a coherent approach to addressing refugee rights or as the socio-political context implies, 
challenges faced when engaging with refugee rights.   
It is worth noting that Burdekin and Brodie have found that the public inquiry 
function is as one of the most useful tools that an NHRI can utilise to address systemic 
human rights violations.117 The fact that the KNCHR has identified refugee rights as priority 
rights and acknowledges that the challenges are primarily systemic, is one hurdle that has 
been overcome. The challenge remains to identify ways to effectively integrate refugee rights 
within its protection function and the public inquiry function would be useful in this regard.   
 
7.5 Capacity constraints negatively impact on the extent to which the NHRIs can 
effectively promote and protect refugee rights  
This study found that capacity constraints have had a negative impact on the extent to which 
the KNCHR’s can effectively promote and protect refugee rights. The KNCHR reported a 
consistent decrease in funding every year since its establishment, despite an increase in its 
monitoring obligations, including as the designated monitoring mechanism under the CRPD: 
“Our [2019] budget was cut by 80%. This essentially means that we have money to pay for 
salaries and barely anything is left for substantive work.”118  This has affected 
implementation of programmes, recruitment and has led to a heavy reliance on donor funding 
to support its core administrative functions and some key programmes. For example, one of 
its senior staff members, the Senior Legal Advisor, is seconded from an international NGO 
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and is tasked with providing oversight over the KNCHR’s refugee-related activities.119  
Additionally, the KNCHR relies heavily on donor funding to implement its migrants’ rights 
programme and this has resulted in a broad focus on migrants’ rights to suit donor project 
goals. 
The findings also show that an NHRI’s organisational structure has had an impact on 
its capability to engage substantively with asylum-related matters. The KNCHR’s, 
organisational structure differs from that of the SAHRC, as discussed in chapter 6, section 
6.5. In the KNHRC, a Commissioner is tasked with convening the Public Education and 
Training and Research Units. The Research Unit overseas matters related to migrants rights 
and has a staff member tasked with dealing with migrants rights including refugee rights. 
Additional support is through the senior legal advisor. Both these staff members have 
competence in refugee law.120 Considering Hyman and Kovacic’s argued that one of the 
factors that affects an institution’s ability to effectively implement its mandate is its 
investment on capacity. 121  This requires that the necessary technical skills are available to 
implement its mandate. Thus, the KNCHR’s allocation of technical skills to address refugee 
rights reflects more coherence than the SAHRC and may provide better results. This reflects 
the norms about the need for NHRIs to operate with the requisite technical capacity.122 
However, the implications of this on the effectiveness of the KNCHR to engage with refugee 
rights is not as simple as the above statement suggests. For instance, it is difficult to gauge 
the impact on its effectiveness, as its engagement with the refugee protection regime has been 
primarily through negotiations with government officials in the background as reflected in the 
discussion in section 7.3 on the socio-political context. In addition, having one permanent 
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staff member tasked with addressing refugee rights and all other rights issues that arise from 
displacement and irregular migration, is not sufficient to effectively meet the demands of 
addressing these rights.  As noted by KNCHR: “There’s only one staff member, a human 
rights officer tasked with handling matters relating to migrants, internally displaced persons, 
statelessness and refugees. It’s a huge task.”123  
Furthermore, this study found that the focus area on migration has not translated into 
mainstreaming of migrants’ rights into the other areas of the KNCHR’s work, which is 
similar to the situation with the SAHRC. A review of the KNCHR’s reports highlighted that 
the issues affecting refugees or asylum seekers were not incorporated in other aspects of its 
activities. These also appeared to be dealt with in an ad hoc manner. Service provider 
participants also felt that capacity constraints limited the NHRIs’ effectiveness. For instance, 
one participant stated: “The Kenyan NHRI has been forced to spend valuable time pursuing 
donor funding, which means a considerable amount of their limited resources are spent on 
developing proposals and not on actual programme work.”124 Thus, the KNCHR also faces 
the challenge of developing and implementing a coherent approach to addressing refugee 
rights within its programmatic activities, to ensure the strategic inclusion of refugee rights in 
the relevant aspects of its work.  
 
7.6 NHRIs are invisible and are not prioritising the promotion and protection of 
refugee rights  
“If they exist, then what work are they doing for refugees?”125 
This study found that the NHRIs in Kenya were perceived to be not only invisible within the 
refugee protection regime, but that they were also not prioritising refugee rights as reflected 
in this statement: “The KNCHR has not been allocated a space within the refugee discourse 
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here. I’m not certain how much noise it has made about it, but its voice is definitely necessary 
especially given the importance of adopting a human rights-based approach to handling the 
issues.”126 Considering the discussion on invisibility in chapter 6 of this thesis, the 
complexities of invisibility manifest within the Kenyan refugee protection regime. In Kenya, 
the question “invisible in what way” is reflected in the determination of the key actors within 
the refugee protection regime. The delineation of implementing partners by the UNHCR, led 
to the obvious absence of stakeholders such as NHRIs.  The question “why” as Polzer and 
Hammond argue is about “the power to decide who receives resources, who has the 
legitimacy to make their voices heard, or who can be harmed or ignored without 
consequences.”127 As the securitisation of asylum has become more entrenched, the NHRIs 
have increasingly had their space for engagement minimised and resources to undertake 
crucial work with respect to rights promotion and protection reduced to such an extent that it 
has become difficult to undertake any work on refugee rights. These factors have then led to 
the NHRIs being invisible to stakeholders within the refugee protection regime.  
The perceived NHRI absence within the refugee regime in Kenya was also attributed 
to the lack of understanding of the roles that NHRIs play as indicated in this statement from a 
service provider participant:  
I think there hasn’t been a proper appreciation of the role that NHRIs can play in this, 
because CSOs have been involved. They [NHRIs] might have a direct interaction on 
the ground and they still have access to the UN agencies, for example, but I think 
broadly it’s still the lack of an appreciation of what NHRIs can facilitate and how they 
can assist in this, given the rather broad mandate that they have.128  
 
Triggs identified the lack of understanding of the role that NHRIs play in advancing human 
rights as a challenge that many NHRIs faced. 129  She further argued that this lack of 
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understanding might contribute to low levels of engagement with NHRIs and in turn 
perceptions that the NHRI is invisible or not engaging effectively with human rights. The 
evidence from this study supports Triggs’ assertions.  The primary contributing factors in 
Kenya are the socio-political context and the lack of recognition of any of the NHRIs within 
the UNHCR’s partnership framework with respect to refugee protection in Kenya.130 As one 
service provider participant stated: “The KNCHR faces a particular challenge because its role 
is not understood. It [the KNCHR] has not been provided with the space that could enhance 
its role given its broad mandate in advancing refugee rights. The refugee protection regime in 
Kenya has, as a result, evolved largely to the exclusion of the KNCHR and the other 
NHRIs.”131  
For example, a UNHCR-funded assessment of the capacity for refugee protection in 
Kenya conducted in 2006, identified the KNCHR as a constituent part of the national and 
administrative refugee framework but did not indicate its role or function within this 
framework, merely noting that it also had “responsibilities and an interest in refugee 
affairs.”132 The UNHCR also wrongly identified the KNCHR as part of the Ministry of 
Justice and Constitution Affairs rather than an independent State institution.133 The situation 
for the NHRIs in Kenya also reflects Ferris’ concerns about UNHCR’s dominant role within 
a domestic refugee protection regime. Ferris in her study on the role of domestic actors and 
refugee rights protection, determined that the UNHCR’s dominance within a domestic 
refugee protection regime would have a detrimental impact on the opportunities for 
engagement by actors such as NHRIs.134 
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 The findings also indicated that refugees in Kenya had a low level of awareness of the 
NHRIs and their role within the refugee protection regime, as summed up by the opening 
quote by a refugee participant: “If they exist, then what work are they doing for refugees?”135  
This finding contrasts with the KNCHR’s perception as it indicated that the designation of 
migrants’ rights was a reflection of its prioritisation of all migrants’ rights including refugee 
rights. The KNCHR reported that it has also implemented specific strategies to enhance its 
visibility within local communities and especially among refugees and asylum seekers in 
Nairobi. To achieve this, the KNCHR partnered with the Ministry of Devolution to create 
human rights desks in community centres in Nairobi. The primary aim of the collaboration 
was to increase accessibility to its complaints handling services through the government run 
one-stop centres for civic services (referred to as Huduma (“Assistance”) Centres).  
 The KNCHR established a desk in three of these Huduma centres in Nairobi, one of 
which was in Eastleigh, a suburb that hosts the largest population of urban Somali refugees 
and asylum seekers.136 The KNCHR conducts legal aid clinics at these sites and holds public 
awareness meetings to educate the community about its mandate and refugee rights.137 These 
activities are conducted in partnership with the CSOs that form part of its referral network to 
facilitate the expeditious referral of complaints that the KNCHR considers inadmissible.138 
The KNCHR reported that the Eastleigh human rights desk accounts for the highest number 
of complaints received that relate to the violation of rights reported by refugees and asylum 
seekers.139  
It is difficult to determine the effectiveness of this approach, as this study did not find 
any evaluation of the impact of the use of the Huduma desks. However, since the creation of 
the desks, the KNCHR reported an increase in numbers of refugees and asylum seekers 
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seeking assistance through its offices.140  Anecdotally, it could thus be inferred that there has 
been an increase in the awareness of rights among the refugees and asylum seekers within 
that community, and an increase in the knowledge about means through which redress could 
be sought.  
As discussed earlier, the KNCHR asserted that its perceived lack of engagement with 
refugee matters could not be deemed as a lack of engagement with refugee protection on its 
part. Rather, that the hostile environment in which it operated, in with respect to asylum 
matters, necessitated that it employed strategies that were not viewed as adversarial to the 
government. These included “quiet” diplomacy and the establishment of and use of networks 
of ‘friends’ within parliament and relevant state organs. While these strategies may serve to 
achieve particular goals, they may impact negatively on the NHRI’s actual and perceived 
legitimacy and independence.141  
 
7.7 Opportunities to enhance NHRIs’ engagement with refugee rights 
All participants concurred that there were opportunities available that could enhance NHRIs’ 
engagement with the promotion and protection of refugee rights in Kenya. These were 
increasing NHRI institutional capacity, increasing accessibility and enhancing visibility, 
enhancing relationships with CSOs and the UNHCR, and enhancing regional cooperation on 
asylum-related matters.   
 Increasing institutional capacity to handle refugee matters was highlighted as 
particularly critical for the NHRIs. This is with respect to increasing funding, increasing 
human resources and building technical skills on refugee or asylum law. As discussed with 
respect to the South African NHRIs, building institutional capacity would require the use of 
specific strategies, including utilising mechanisms already at the disposal of the NHRIs. For 
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the KNCHR, its designation as a national monitoring mechanism under Article 33 (2) of the 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities could be a vehicle for monitoring the 
rights of refugees and asylum seekers who have disabilities. This would also apply should the 
KNCHR be designated as the National Preventive Mechanism (NPM) under the OPCAT, 
which Kenya is yet to ratify.  However, the KNCHR has additional functions and powers 
mandated through the Prevention of Torture Act, 2017 (Sections 12(1)-(3), 13(1)(b) and 25 
(1)-(2)) which provide the current avenue for investigating torture-related complaints and 
reporting on the situation of refugees and asylum seekers in relation to torture prevention.  
Importantly, and as argued by Welch, such an approach may have minimal impact on 
budgetary or human resource allocation for the KNCHR and this would allow for greater 
accountability for the realisation of refugee rights at even the international levels through the 
treaty bodies.142 NHRIs could also operationalize the legislative requirement to ensure a 
cohesive approach to addressing human rights among the three institutions.143 This would 
enhance the NHRI’s capacity to, for instance, ensure that systemic issues affecting asylum in 
Kenya are addressed strategically by all three NHRIs. 
 The second opportunity for consideration for enhanced NHRI engagement with 
refugee protection related to accessibility and visibility. As indicated above, in terms of 
physical access, the KNCHR has regional offices located in urban areas, but it does not have 
physical presence within rural communities or in many communities where the most 
vulnerable reside. However, the efforts that the KNCHR has made to overcome this, by 
negotiating with local governments to create human rights desks in places where civic 
services are offered is a good attempt at remedying the challenges of physical accessibility. 
The KNCHR has also integrated short message services (SMS) into its electronic complaints 
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handling platform.   This has resulted in an increase in the number of cases lodged with the 
institution.144 These practices may be adapted by the SAHRC and other NHRIs to overcome 
challenges with accessibility.   
 Enhancing relationships with CSOs was perceived as another opportunity for the 
KNCHR to enhance their engagement with refugee rights. This study found that the KNCHR 
has good working relationships with CSOs, but that these networks needed to be strengthened 
for more substantive engagement to occur. The findings indicate that the KNCHR 
collaborated with CSOs primarily with respect to complaints handling. For instance, in the 
two refugee related cases, Kituo Cha Sheria v Attorney General and CORD, KNCHR & 
another v Republic of Kenya & 10 others, in which the KNCHR challenged the 
constitutionality of government decisions, were initiated in collaboration with CSOs and 
highlight the importance of strong partnerships between the KNCHR and CSOs. However, 
none of the websites of the CSOs that provide legal aid services to refugees and asylum 
seekers referred to the KNCHR as a possible avenue for redress for human rights 
violations.145 Except for its awareness-raising activities with respect to the human rights 
desks, this study found no evidence to indicate the KNCHR’s involvement in other refugee-
related promotional activities implemented on its own accord, or in partnership with CSOs. 
This may point to the absence of sustained substantive engagement between the KNCHR and 
CSOs addressing refugee rights.    
 Similarly, some participants felt that there was need for the KNCHR to enhance its 
relationship with the UNHCR. This study found that the relationship between the UNHCR 
and the NHRIs in Kenya is also perceived to be weak, as reflected in this participant’s 
assertion that: “the UNHCR in Kenya needs to review how it interacts with the KNCHR. It 
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cannot be that it works with NGOs, sometimes the Gender Commission but the KNCHR is 
nowhere to be seen.”146 
As discussed in chapter 4, the UNHCR has played a prominent role within the RSD 
process in Kenya, which has perhaps necessitated the formation of more robust engagement 
with civil society stakeholders. However, the engagement with stakeholders has occurred to 
the exclusion of the KNCHR and other NHRIs, as the UNHCR does not consider these 
institutions as implementing partners.147  The KNCHR is UNHCR’s implementing partner 
only with respect to statelessness and internally displaced persons and not in relation to 
refugees and asylum seekers.148 This has led to a significant gap in institutional collaboration 
between the two entities with respect to refugee rights, as indicated by this participant’s 
observation: 
I think that we need to demystify the interaction with the UN at country level to be 
honest because you’ll find that they’ll deal directly with some local NGOs or CSOs 
and then the central government and not with other important actors like the KNCHR 
and …that is a lost opportunity. NHRIs have regional and sub-regional blocs and 
crosscutting issues can be addressed through these blocs. This might assist the 
UNHCR greatly in its work not only at country level but also within the region.149  
Thus, even though the UNHCR was amicus curiae in the KNCHR and Kituo cha Sheria v the 
Attorney General when Kenya threatened to close one of its refugee camps, this was not 
based on a substantive relationship, such as for instance on litigation support to the NHRI.150 
While this implies that the institutions are not averse to working together on matters related 
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to refugees and asylum seekers, the UNHCR and the KNCHR did not collaborate on 
subsequent litigation related to refugee rights.  
The fact that there exists a clear demarcation about which persons of concern the 
UNHCR is willing to engage with, with respect to the KNCHR, is perhaps an indictment of 
the influence of the political context it operates in. This could also be symptomatic of the 
relationship that NHRIs have with the UNHCR at the international level. Unlike the robust 
interaction that has evolved between the NHRIs and the treaty bodies, the Human Rights 
Council, the OHCHR, and the UNDP, there is no formalised interaction between NHRIs and 
the UNHCR at the international level.151 This is despite the UNHCR having expressly 
recognised NHRIs’ importance in “protecting and monitoring respect for the rights of 
asylum-seekers and refugees” including in specific situations such as combatting racism and 
xenophobia against refugees.152 The evidence that the KNCHR is engaging substantively with 
the promotion and protection of refugee rights, in spite of the hostile political context within 
which it operates in, requires that the UNHCR considers a formal role for the KNCHR to 
promote the realisation of refugee rights.153  
 Lastly, some participants suggested that cooperation among NHRIs within the region 
would enhance the promotion and protection of refugee rights. The KNCHR is already 
involved in various capacities at the regional level. It is a member of the East African 
Network of NHRIs. It has within this network contributed to the development of an early 
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warning system for conflict prevention.154 It is also a member of the Network of African 
NHRI’s working group on migration.155 This working group promotes NHRI engagement 
within migration processes among African NHRIs, within the AU and at the global level with 
the view to promote a common NHRI approach to addressing migration issues.156 The 
working group also provides oversight for the regional NHRI network’s Migration in Africa 
project, which includes developing guidelines for NHRIs to monitor refugees and asylum 
seekers in places of detention.157 In addition, the KNCHR is a member of the technical team 
drafting the East African Refugee Management Policy.158 These processes provide important 
platforms to build capacity and to generate good practice that the NHRIs can adapt to ensure 
effective engagement with refugee protection.  
There is a dearth of evidence of the Kenyan NHRIs’ engagement with the regional 
AU human rights mechanisms in general or specifically on refugee rights. As discussed in 
chapter 6, despite efforts to foster the relationship between NHRIs and the AU mechanisms, 
the engagement between these institutions lacks substantive and sustained engagement. 
Certainly, the recent amendment to the African Commission’s rules of procedure to include 
specialised human rights institutions such as the Gender Commissions and Ombudsman 
institutions widens its scope of engagement with NHRIs and may serve as an impetus for 
renewed collaboration. This may be of particular relevance within the Kenyan context as the 
Commission on Administrative Justice is mandated to oversee the implementation of 
decisions of international tribunals including that of the African Commission.   
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7.8 Conclusion  
The findings show that in Kenya, the NHRI with the broadest mandate has had the most 
engagement with the refugee protection regime. This study also found that the two NHRIs 
with specialised mandates in Kenya, that is the Gender Commission and Commission on 
Administrative Justice, were almost completely absent within the refugee protection regime 
in Kenya. This is despite evidence showing that there was an implementation and protection 
gap with respect to issues that fell within their mandates, including on the gendered aspects of 
asylum with respect to the Gender Commission and maladministration and corruption in 
relation to the Commission on Administrative Justice. 
In addition, this study found that there are critical underlying issues that have affected 
the extent to which NHRIs in Kenya could effectively engage within the refugee protection 
regime. The discussion on the impact of the socio-political context on the promotion and 
protection of refugee rights highlights the limitations that the Kenyan government has placed 
on state institutions with respect to dealing with asylum related matters. This has had a 
significant impact on the nature and extent of the KNCHR and potentially the other NHRIs’ 
engagement with the promotion and protection of refugee rights. While the socio-political 
factors that have had an impact on the NHRIs are similar to those identified in the South 
African context, their manifestations in Kenya varied. In Kenya, this study identified an 
emphasis on the securitisation of asylum. However, in South Africa, xenophobic attitudes 
were identified as the most pertinent socio-political issue that affected the extent to which 
NHRIs could engage with the refugee protection regime and influence change. 
In addition, challenges related to institutional capacity, having strong and sustained 
relationships with CSOs addressing refugee rights and with the UNHCR, require attention - 
to ensure an enhanced NHRI engagement with refugee rights. The KNCHR has also 





general, not only in Kenya but also within the region. This provides an important avenue to 
heighten NHRI’s engagement with refugee rights and the development of coherent or 
common approaches for African NHRIs to address these rights.   
Finally, this study has illustrated that despite a constraining operational environment, 
NHRIs can develop strategies to ensure that their mandate to promote and protect refugee 
rights is realised. In this regard, this study highlighted the KNCHR’s willingness to adapt to 
the environment it operates in by use of specific strategies. These include: interpreting its 
mandate very broadly; use of “quiet” diplomacy and establishing friendly networks within 
parliament and among public officials; creating human rights desks in civic centres located 
within areas where large numbers of refugees and asylum seekers reside; enhancing its 
referral networks with actors providing assistance to refugees and asylum seekers; and using 







Conclusions and Recommendations 
8.1 Summary of findings  
This study examined the extent to which NHRIs in South Africa and Kenya are protecting 
refugee rights. The purpose was to answer four questions: do NHRIs in South Africa and 
Kenya have the capacity and capability to effectively promote and protect refugee rights?; to 
what extent are NHRIs in South Africa and Kenya addressing refugee rights in their 
respective States?; are there any challenges or barriers that impact on the NHRIs’ 
responsibility to effectively promote and protect refugee rights in South Africa and Kenya 
respectively?; and how can the NHRIs in South Africa and Kenya strengthen their capacities 
to effectively promote and protect refugee rights? 
To understand their role, this study first set out to define NHRIs and to locate them 
within the international human rights system. The findings show that NHRIs have evolved to 
become distinct features of the international human rights system and have played an integral 
role in the diffusion of international human rights norms and standards at the domestic levels. 
It shows that increasingly, international human rights mechanisms consider NHRIs’ role as 
broader than simply reporting on the domestic human rights situation. These mechanisms 
now pursue substantive engagement with NHRIs to develop strategies to enhance the 
promotion and protection of groups or particular rights such as children’s rights, disability 
rights, rights of older persons, women’s rights, prevention of torture, and business and human 
rights. 
Academic scholarship on NHRIs has also evolved in tandem to give particular 
attention not only to their evolution and global spread, but also to their effectiveness as agents 
for human rights accountability. Although there are arguments for the reconceptualization of 





human rights lens, there is a gap in the concomitant advancement within the international 
refugee law regime discourse of a defined role for NHRIs. There has not been a precise 
recognition of NHRIs as the actors bridging the implementation gap between international 
refugee rights norms and standards and domestic practice.  
Nonetheless, arguments for reforming the international refugee protection regime now 
include discussions on defining a clear role for other actors within the protection regime. 
Such arguments have identified the normative and implementation gaps within international 
refugee law to situate the argument for a heightened role for actors such as NHRIs within the 
refugee protection framework. The thesis has argued that the consideration of NHRIs as key 
actors lies in the nexus between international refugee law and international human rights law. 
Carver goes further to state that “[i]f refugee protection is to be reconceptualised in human 
rights terms, these independent governmental actors [NHRIs] will have to play a central 
role.”159  
The challenge is that there is currently limited evidence available indicating the extent 
to which NHRIs can facilitate accountability within the international and domestic refugee 
protection regimes, and if they can do so effectively. This study therefore provided empirical 
evidence to support the argument that NHRIs are a necessary constituent of a refugee 
protection regime as they can ensure accountability for the promotion and protection of 
refugee rights. It has also shown that NHRIs have the capacity and capability to effectively 
promote and protect refugee rights.  
This study found that NHRIs in South Africa and Kenya have played a significant role 
in the promotion and protection of refugee rights through demanding accountability for the 
realisation of these rights at both domestic and international levels. The evidence presented 
indicated that those NHRIs with the broadest mandates had the highest level of engagement 
                                                





with refugee rights. Thus, in South Africa, while all three NHRIs included in the study have 
engaged in varying levels with refugee rights promotion and protection, the SAHRC’s 
engagement is more extensive. This ranged from reporting, investigations, litigation, 
submissions on policy and legislation, advocacy through awareness raising activities and 
direct engagement with relevant government actors. In Kenya, there was limited evidence to 
indicate that besides the KNCHR, the other two NHRIs included in this study had engaged 
with refugee rights promotion and protection.  The activities that the KNCHR undertook 
primarily related to the protection of refugee rights and included litigation, investigations into 
police misconduct, unlawful and arbitrary detention, and complaints handling.  
Furthermore, the study found that the NHRIs that had engaged with refugee rights did 
not limit their activities to either promotion or protection but utilised the breadth of their 
mandates to broadly address refugee rights. This was more apparent in the South African 
context where all three NHRIs had conducted promotion and protection activities. In Kenya, 
though the Gender Commission participated in UNHCR workshops, it was not apparent what 
the nature of the workshops was. However, the KNCHR’s activities were both protection and 
promotion related as indicated above. The promotion activities included raising awareness 
about refugee rights, its role with respect to the promotion and protection of these rights and 
submissions on relevant policy and legislation.   
This study has also demonstrated that there are operational and contextual factors that 
impede the NHRIs’ capacity and capability to effectively advance refugee rights, but that 
these challenges and barriers could be circumvented through adaptation and liberal 
interpretation of their human rights mandate. The operational and contextual factors 
identified in South Africa and Kenya were similar, but their manifestations differed. In South 
Africa, an urban refugee policy prevails, and refugees are allowed to integrate locally. The 





implementation is beleaguered with challenges. These include maladministration, corruption, 
poor access to basic services and xenophobia. Thus, the NHRIs’ activities have generally 
focused on addressing these issues, but there has been limited emphasis on addressing the 
systemic challenges that the refugee protection regime faces. In addition, despite the 
opportunities for collaboration, the NHRIs tend to operate in isolation of each other.  
In Kenya, the refugee policy has evolved from an urban policy that emphasised local 
integration to one that has become increasingly restrictive and highly securitised. Kenya 
employs an encampment policy with limited freedom of movement for refugees and asylum 
seekers. Unlike, South Africa, most refugees are considered prima facie refugees and status 
determination is usually pursued where resettlement to a third country is considered. Until, 
2011, the UNHCR implemented the refugee policy with limited direct involvement from the 
Kenyan government. The result was that the parameters for engagement with the refugee 
regime were defined by the UNHCR. These were favourable to some but not all stakeholders, 
as those not identified as UNHCR’s implementing partners operated on the margins of the 
refugee protection regime.  It is within this peripheral zone that the NHRIs fall.  
Therefore, the NHRIs in Kenya operate within a context that has not been formally 
defined a role for their engagement, despite the recognition by the UNHCR that NHRIs have 
a role to play in ensuring the protection of refugee rights. In addition, the securitisation of 
asylum in Kenya has further curtailed the NHRIs’ capacity to engage with refugee rights. The 
Kenyan government increasingly views asylum through a terrorism lens especially where 
Somali refugees and asylum seekers are concerned.  Asylum is thus viewed as a national 
security matter and not a humanitarian or human rights concern. Despite these contextual 
limitations, the KNCHR has engaged substantively with refugee rights promotion and 
protection. The other NHRIs included in the study have not. The KNCHR has adopted a 





challenging refoulement, the encampment policy, and arbitrary and illegal detention of 
refugees and asylum seekers.  
Other operational challenges that some of the NHRIs face included resource 
constraints, inadequate specialist expertise on refugee law, effective reporting to influence 
change and the absence of strategic collaboration amongst the NHRIs and other stakeholders 
on refugee rights promotion and protection. The study also identified ways through which the 
challenges and barriers could be overcome. These included building relationships with rights’ 
holders and other stakeholders such as CSOs, other NHRIs, and regional human rights 
mechanisms and processes. The opportunities at the regional level, which are under explored, 
are of particular importance for NHRIs. Recent developments, including the development of 
guidelines for NHRIs for follow up on the implementation of the decisions of the African 
Commission, the revision of the African Commission’s rules of procedure and the resolution 
granting affiliate status to NHRIs to include specialised NHRIs and ombudsman institutions, 
offer additional avenues for enhanced engagement at the regional level.  
 
8.2 Main conclusions 
The following conclusions are drawn based on the findings of this study.  
8.2.1 NHRIs have the capacity and capability to promote and protect refugee rights 
and do not require an explicit refugee rights’ mandate to do so 
This study found that the primary NHRIs in South Africa and Kenya have contributed to the 
development of a domestic refugee protection regime compliant with international norms and 
standards. The lack of an explicit reference, within their mandates, to promote refugee rights 
has not hampered the NHRIs’ efforts in dealing with these rights. The NHRIs have also 





Africa and Kenya failed to meet their obligations to ensure access to rights for refugees and 
asylum seekers.   
Therefore, NHRIs can act as facilitators for the diffusion of international norms and 
standards at the domestic level. In addition, the NHRIs’ promotion and protection mandates 
prescribed by the Paris Principles provide sufficient means to effectively contribute to the 
advancement of refugee rights. NHRIs do not require an express mandate to promote and 
protect refugee rights, nor do they need to reinterpret their mandates to deal with refugee 
rights. In fact, in their activities, none of the NHRIs in this study that had engaged with 
refugee rights delineated international human rights norms and standards from international 
refugee law norms and standards. Their activities were undertaken because of interpreting 
their mandate “to promote and to protect” to include the human rights of all persons within 
the country regardless of their status.   This implies that the NHRIs have adopted in practice 
an approach to refugee rights promotion and protection in line with Chetail’s argument that 
the interactions between the two fields of international law “have become so intimately 
interdependent and imbricated that it is now virtually impossible to separate one from the 
other.”160 
However, the lack of an explicit mandate has perhaps justified the intrusion by the 
State in the refugee rights’ work that the NHRIs undertake, especially in Kenya where 
‘aliens’ generally fall under the national security sphere. The SAHRC has also faced 
questions in Parliament about why it engages with refugees and asylum seekers. Scholarship 
has also shown that where an NHRI has an explicit mandate to promote the realisation of 
socio-economic rights, the NHRI displays a greater commitment to promoting such rights and 
dedicates significant resources to do so with positive results. A survey on NHRIs and 
migrants rights showed that a significant number of NHRIs across the globe were engaged 
                                                
160 Vincent Chetail, “Are Refugee Rights Human Rights? An Unorthodox Questioning of the Relations between 
Refugee Law and Human Rights Law,” in Ruth Rubio Human Rights and Immigration, Oxford: Oxford 





with migrants’ rights (including refugee rights).161 The results from the survey also noted that 
the primary reason for the lack of NHRI engagement with any category of migrants’ rights 
was the lack of an explicit mandate to do so.  
The findings from this study provide the basis for a different assertion. They indicate 
that a broad human rights mandate provides leeway for an NHRI to interpret its mandate 
broadly to include engagement with rights not explicit within its mandate. Therefore, the lack 
of an explicit mandate does not necessarily limit an NHRI’s capacity and capability to 
promote and protect refugee rights. Notwithstanding the challenges faced, as stated above, 
the SAHRC and the KNCHR have argued that the constitutional imperative to protect the 
rights of all persons provides sufficient basis to engage with refugee rights’ promotion and 
protection.  
However, ensuring effectiveness of such engagement requires consideration of 
various other factors, key among which is expertise in refugee law. The interconnectedness 
between the two branches of international law requires that NHRIs build expertise on refugee 
law and mainstream this into practice. The importance lies in the fact that the challenges with 
accessing refugee rights arise primarily during the refugee status determination process and 
the subsequent access to rights that the status determination provides. In addition, the 
UNHCR has tended to engage primarily with stakeholders with refugee rights’ expertise to 
the exclusion of those with the general human rights remit.  
As such, the peer review process that NHRIs are periodically subjected to, when 
establishing compliance with the Paris Principles, might be the opportunity to urge NHRIs to 
engage with refugee rights.  This could comprise recommendations to interpret mandates 
broadly in line with the Paris Principles’ requirement that NHRIs pay due regard to the rights 
of refugees and other groups deemed vulnerable to human rights violations. Another avenue 
                                                





to encourage this could be through the regional African NHRI network-NANHRI. The 
NANHRI’s primary mandate is NHRI capacity building for effective delivery on their 
mandates. While there is a regional programme being implemented through the NANHRI, 
this is a broad migration-based programme with limited integration of refugee rights issues.  
The scope of NANHRI’s work on migration could be expanded to include promotion 
of refugee rights’ specific activities for NHRIs. These could be drawn from those agreed to 
by NHRIs as reflected in the Kigali Declaration on the Role of NHRIs in the Protection of 
Refugees, IDPs and Stateless Persons (see discussion in Chapter 3). The Kigali Declaration 
sets out ambitious activities for NHRIs to implement efforts to enhance the realisation of 
refugee rights ranging from enhancing early warning systems for conflict prevention to 
promotion of refugee rights and preventing non-refoulement. Though ambitious, the activities 
are specific and can be integrated into the activities that NHRIs already undertake.  
Therefore, while the thesis concludes that NHRIs have the capacity and capability to 
engage with refugee rights even in the absence of an explicit mandate to do so, it is 
acknowledged that a more nuanced role for NHRIs within the refugee protection regime, 
must be accompanied by efforts to ensure that NHRIs have a clear understanding of refugee 
rights and what the promotion and protection of these rights entails.  
 
8.2.2 The extent of NHRI engagement with refugee rights varies based on how broad 
or narrow its human rights mandate is  
This study found that the NHRIs with a broad promotion and protection mandate display a 
higher level of engagement with refugee rights’ promotion and protection. These were the 
NHRIs fully compliant with the Paris Principles i.e. the SAHRC and the KNCHR.  The 
specialised NHRIs in South Africa displayed significantly lower levels of engagement with 





It is therefore important that NHRIs with the broad mandates are identified as the key 
accountability mechanisms as their mandates grant them wider scope for engagement. 
However, due regard must be given to the role of NHRIs with specialised mandates, such as 
the gender commissions and the ombudsman institutions, because their mandates provide for 
nuanced attention to the rights of those refugees and asylum seekers with higher levels of 
vulnerability to violence, exploitation and discrimination, and addressing corruption and 
maladministration in the asylum system. The role of specialised NHRIs is increasingly being 
explored, including within the context of the promotion and protection of refugee rights. For 
instance, Carver’s assessment of NHRIs and protection of refugee rights in the Balkans 
provides important evidence of the impact that such institutions can have on the ground. The 
NHRIs included in his assessment were Ombudsman institutions with a human rights 
mandate.  
Furthermore, the recent amendments to the African Commission’s working methods 
reflect the growing recognition that NHRIs with narrow mandates can contribute to the 
advancement of human rights in the region. The African Commission amended its rules of 
procedure and adopted a resolution granting NHRIs affiliate status, which included 
specialised human rights institutions. These institutions can now participate in the African 
Commission’s work and play a role in influencing the States’ duty to implement their human 
rights obligations. 
Additionally, the GANHRI increasingly requests ombudsman institutions to interact 
with the UN human rights mechanisms and processes even where the institution does not 
have the explicit responsibility to do so.162   Devenish et al, have also identified specific ways 
through which ombudsman institutions can protect the rights of refugees and other persons 
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who are displaced or stateless.163 These included conducting refugee rights awareness 
activities, addressing systemic failures within the asylum systems, supporting other NHRIs 
and building effective referral mechanisms and partnership between the Ombudsman and 
other stakeholders working with refugees, asylum seekers and IDPs.  
While these developments have focused on the ombudsman institutions, the 
arguments for engagement equally apply to the gender commissions as their remit for gender 
equality is crosscutting.  In addition, there are specific aspects of the asylum experience that 
necessitate the specialist expertise that resides in gender commissions. The gendered aspects 
of asylum are not often addressed and refugees and asylum seekers who face heightened 
vulnerabilities based on gender exist in a precarious situation. Therefore, the NHRIs, 
regardless of scope of mandate can work collaboratively to develop strategic methods for 
engagement with refugee rights promotion and protection.   
One of the thesis’ key findings was that limited collaboration among the NHRIs 
played a role in the absence of a strategic approach to addressing refugee rights.  The study 
also found that many of the refugee rights’ violations faced by refugees stemmed from 
systemic issues including corruption, maladministration, and xenophobia. Studies have 
shown that NHRIs have the capacity to influence State compliance with international human 
rights norms especially where they challenge systemic human rights violations.164 Evidence 
further suggests that an inquiry as an NHRI methodology for accountability is perhaps the 
most useful means to address systemic human rights violations.165 Thus, taking the above two 
findings into account, the NHRIs could utilise the broad range of their powers to implement 
joint strategic interventions for instance through inquiries to address the systemic issues that 
affect the realisation of refugee rights.   
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Stronger institutional links among the various categories of NHRIs could also foster 
the development of better approaches to addressing the rights of refugees and asylum seekers 
who are marginalised or vulnerable to violence, exploitation, and discrimination.  For 
instance, adopting an intersectional approach to human rights work would allow for critical 
assessment of the situation of invisible or marginalised groups without, as Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 
asserts, “creating or reproducing hierarchies of vulnerability.”166  
 
8.2.3 NHRIs face challenges and barriers that impact on their responsibility to 
effectively promote and protect refugee rights 
This study identified specific challenges and barriers that had a negative impact on the 
NHRIs’ engagement with refugee rights promotion and protection. Firstly, the NHRIs have 
not adopted a coherent approach to address refugee rights even where an NHRI has defined 
such rights as priority rights. While the NHRIs in this study acknowledged significant 
implementation and protection gaps related to the promotion and protection of refugee rights, 
this did not guarantee that an effective approach would be utilised to address these rights. The 
implementation of activities related to advancing refugee rights remained peripheral to other 
NHRI activities. In addition, the approach utilised was broad, focusing on migrants and not 
necessarily on refugees and asylum seekers. Such a broad approach does not address the 
problem posed by the conflation of migrants (economic, undocumented) and refugees and 
asylum seekers who meet a specific legal definition as provided by national, regional, and 
international refugee law.  
Secondly, NHRIs face considerable contextual impediments to effectively engage 
with the State on asylum matters.  This study showed that while the refugee protection 
frameworks in place in South Africa and Kenya meet the minimum international norms and 
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standards, the enjoyment of rights had been curtailed by several contextual factors. These 
factors have in turn influenced the nature of and degree to which the NHRIs address refugee 
rights. The NHRIs in this study displayed a high level of willingness to address refugee rights 
even where circumstances were difficult. The securitisation of asylum, high levels of 
xenophobia and a general lack of political will have hampered NHRI efforts but have not 
prevented the NHRIs from demanding accountability.   
Lastly, there is a dearth of research on NHRIs and their contribution to the promotion 
and protection of refugee rights. This is compounded with the fact that NHRIs generally lack 
adequate documentation and knowledge management systems to accurately capture the 
breadth of the activities that they undertake generally but specifically on the rights of 
refugees and asylum seekers and other categories of migrants. While there is evidence of 
their role in the adoption of non-restrictive domestic refugee protection frameworks, it is 
difficult to ascertain the impact they have had on the overall realisation of refugee rights. It is 
certainly evident from the findings that the skewed reliance on CSOs for the promotion and 
protection of refugee rights points to the need for NHRIs to heighten their role within the 
refugee protection regime.  
 
8.2.4 There are opportunities available for NHRIs to enhance their capacity to 
effectively promote and protect refugee rights 
The findings from this study indicate that there are avenues through which NHRIs could 
enhance their capacity to effectively promote and protect refugee rights. One important area 
would be building a relationship with the UNHCR at both the domestic and international 
levels. There is currently no recommended process for formal engagement with the UNHCR 
at either the domestic or international levels. The anecdotal evidence of the impact of the 
enhanced relationship between NHRIs and UN treaty bodies on accountability for human 





the UNHCR, as the custodian of the 1951 Refugee Convention.  This would contribute to the 
development of norms for NHRI engagement within the international refugee protection 
regime.  
The UNHCR is also the vehicle through which developments within the international 
refugee protection regime are channelled. In this regard, the UNHCR has played the pivotal 
role in implementing the New York Declaration for refugees and migrants and the resultant 
Global Compacts.  The Global Compacts on Refugees and Migration processes offer another 
avenue to create a normative framework for NHRI engagement with refugee rights. As 
discussed in this thesis in chapters 1, 6 and 7, NHRI involvement in these processes is 
weighted in favour of the promotion and protection of migrants’ rights and not refugee rights. 
This is perhaps due to the fact that NHRIs’ role in realising migrants’ rights is recognised 
expressly within the Global Compact for Migration and the resultant implementation 
processes have proceeded in line with this recognition.  
In theory, the lack of recognition of NHRIs within the Global Compact on Refugees 
processes should not hinder the NHRIs from engaging with these rights, as the underlying 
principle in the implementation of the Compact is “multi-stakeholder cooperation and 
partnerships.”167 However, the evolving practice indicates otherwise, and there is a risk that 
promotion and protection of migrants’ rights will overshadow the promotion and protection 
of refugee rights. Thus, NHRIs need to promote the adoption of a complementary approach in 
the implementation of the Compacts, at least to attempt to create a normative framework for 
NHRI engagement with refugee rights at the international level. 
The NHRI networks at sub-regional, regional, cross-regional and international levels 
have been identified as avenues through which good practice can be shared, adapted and 
implemented. For instance, the East African NHRIs are utilising the East African NHRI 
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network as the platform to contribute to the regional policy on refugee management. The 
African NHRIs’ also set out specific activities that they ought to undertake following the 
adoption of the Kigali Declaration on refugees, IDPs and statelessness. There has not been 
any reported follow-up on these activities, yet their implementation would also foster the 
creation of a normative framework for NHRI engagement with these rights at the regional 
level.  In addition, the AU’s mechanism and processes related to refugee rights are available 
to NHRIs.  
The ACHPR and its mechanisms and processes offer some of the most viable avenues 
for engagement for refugee rights promotion and protection. There have been commendable 
efforts made to include African NHRIs within its processes and mechanisms. These avenues 
can be explored to encourage NHRIs to develop coherence in addressing refugee rights 
including in determining modalities for engagement with the regional human rights system 
with respect to refugee rights. In this regard, building partnerships with the African 
Commission’s Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Refugees, Asylum Seekers, Internally 
Displaced Persons and Migrants would be imperative to enhance NHRIs’ role in the 
promotion and protection of refugee rights.  
At the domestic level, credible CSOs, many which have closer ties with refugees and 
asylum seekers, could serve important roles in enhancing the NHRIs’ visibility among rights 
holders and complement the NHRIs’ capacity to address refugee rights.  
8.3 Recommendations for further research 
This study found that NHRIs are engaging with refugee rights to a degree that justifies their 
role as important actors in bridging implementation and protection gaps. These findings are 
however limited to NHRIs in South Africa and Kenya and cannot be ascribed to all NHRIs 
beyond those included in this study. Further evaluation research is needed that would 





regime and their efficiency as accountability mechanisms. Carver’s proposed framework for 
measuring NHRI effectiveness may be useful in developing a tool to undertake research that 
would expand the scope of this study.168 Such evidence would provide a strong basis to 
support the argument for the inclusion of NHRIs as key actors within the refugee protection 
regime.  
In addition, the findings highlighted that there was limited attention given to refugees 
and asylum seekers who were especially vulnerable to discrimination, exploitation and 
violence including women, children and sexual minorities.  Therefore, further research on the 
role that NHRIs could play in the application of an intersectional approach to promoting and 
protecting the rights of such particularly vulnerable groups within the refugee and asylum 
seeker categories is necessary. This could build on emerging research on the intersectionality 
between refugee status and various forms of vulnerability such as the work of LaViolette.169  
The relationship between NHRIs and the courts also warrants further research. As 
Dauvergne states, few international legal texts are interpreted more frequently at the domestic 
level than the Refugee Conventions.170 There is an abundance of jurisprudence, across the 
globe, with respect to refugee law.171 As this study has found, NHRIs are utilising their 
litigation powers to seek remedies from the courts, where refugee rights violations occur. 
They also serve as amicus curiae and provide legal advice or referrals for legal aid where 
victims of human rights violations choose to access courts for remedies.  
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This study highlighted the impact that NHRIs had in the cases that they initiated. In 
South Africa, the SAHRC’s intervention led to the eradication of the practice of detaining 
refugees and asylum seekers at the Lindela immigration detention facility. In Kenya, the 
KNCHR successfully challenged the constitutionality of the encampment policy and 
prevented refugees and asylum seekers from refoulement. There are, however, limited studies 
on NHRIs and their interactions with the courts - only one journal article was identified on 
this subject.172 NHRIs and the courts play a role in the implementation of human rights and 
serve complementary roles in this regard. A simplistic view of the interaction between the 
NHRIs and the courts, based on this study’s findings would be misguided, hence the need to 
consider further research on the subject. This would take into consideration for instance, the 
types of interactions that occur between the institutions with respect to refugee rights or the 
influence that the NHRIs and the courts can have in the realisation of refugee rights – i.e. in 
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3rd September 2018 
The Director, 
 
Dear …,  
RE: PERMISSION TO CONDUCT INTERVIEWS FOR DOCTORAL 
RESEARCH STUDY 
 
My name is Vivian John-Langba. I am a PhD student in the Faculty of Law at the 
University of Cape Town, South Africa. For my doctoral research, I am 
conducting a study on refugee protection in South Africa and Kenya. The aim of 
this study is to explore the nature and extent of the role of national human rights 
institutions (NHRIs) within the refugee protection regimes using South Africa and 
Kenya as case studies.  
 
I would like to request permission to recruit individuals from your organisation 
for key informant interviews. These would be individuals knowledgeable about 
refugee protection in South Africa.  
 
The timeline for my fieldwork is [insert date]. I would be grateful if I could 
receive feedback by [insert date] about the possibility of conducting the 
interviews. 
 
Attached herewith is the ethical approval letter for the study from the Research 
Ethics Committee of the University of Cape Town, South Africa. [Attached as 
well is the research authorisation from NACOSTI]. If you require any 
additional information or clarification, please contact me on: …. or email: …… 
 










Appendix 4: Information Sheet and Consent Form 
 
INFORMATION SHEET AND CONSENT FORM 
RESEARCH PROJECT TITLE: THE ROLE OF NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
INSTITUTIONS IN PROMOTING AND PROTECTING THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES: 
THE CASE OF SOUTH AFRICA AND KENYA 
My name is Vivian Nasaka John-Langba and I am a PhD candidate from the University of Cape Town 
in South Africa. I am trying to understand how national human rights institutions such as the Human 
Rights Commission support and defend the rights of refugees and the challenges that these institutions 
may face in doing their work. In order to do this, I will be conducting interviews on this topic for my 
PhD research and I would like to invite you to participate in the interviews.  
If you decide to participate in the interview, you will only be asked questions about national 
human rights institutions and their work with refugees; what you may understand about their work; 
the activities that you may have participated in; your opinion about the effect that their work may 
have had on the situation of refugees and your views about challenges that they may face when doing 
this work. I will not ask you questions about your name, contact details, job title or immigration status 
and any other personal information. There will not be any financial costs involved for participating in 
the study and you will not receive any payment for your participation in the interview.  
The interview will take about 90 minutes. The interviews will be audio-recorded so I do not 
have to take too many notes during the interview. If you do not want to be recorded then the interview 
will continue without a recording being done. You do not have to participate in the interviews; the 
choice has to be yours. You may also withdraw your participation at any point without this affecting 
any advice or assistance you may be receiving from another organization or government institution. 
Your participation will not have a direct benefit to you. However, the information collected will be 
used to suggest ways that national human rights institutions can improve the protection of refugee 
rights in this country.   
All the information collected will be kept safe and only my PhD supervisor and I will be able 
to access this information. The information collected during the study will be reported on, but the 
report or publication will not have any information to show that you provided the information.   
Do you agree to participate in this study? 
o Yes   ☐	No 





o I confirm that I have read and understood the information sheet for the above study. I have 
had the opportunity to consider the information, ask questions and have had these answered 
satisfactorily  
o I understand that my participation is voluntary and I am free to withdraw at any time without 
giving reason and without any consequence 
o I understand that any information that I provide may be used in future reports, articles or 
presentations by the researcher 
o I understand that my name will not appear in any reports, articles or presentations 
o I agree to have the interview recorded for purposes of transcription  
 
-------------------------------- ------------------------------------     
Date      Signature/Thumb print of participant 
 
___________________ _______________________  _______________________ 
Researcher     Date   Signature  
 
‘If you have concerns about the research, its risks and benefits or about your rights as a research 
participant in this study, you may contact the Law Faculty Research Ethics Committee Administrator, 
Ms Lamize Viljoen, at +27 (0) 21 650 3080 or at lamize.viljoen@uct.ac.za.  Alternatively, you may 
write to the Law Faculty Research Ethics Committee Administrator, Room 6.29, Kramer Law 









Appendix 5: Interview Guide for Refugees 
 





INTRODUCTION (Interviewer instruction: Go through the introduction even if repeating what 
was said during recruitment) 
a) Thank you for agreeing to have this interview. 
b) I am Vivian Nasaka John-Langba a PhD student from University of Cape Town Faculty of 
Law I am conducting research to determine the extent to which national human rights institutions are 
promoting and protecting the rights of refugees.  
c) Please feel free to talk openly. If you feel uncomfortable talking about something, or would 
rather not answer a question, please tell me.  You do not have to answer questions if you do not want 
to. 
d) Time: The interview will take up to an hour and half. If you need to take a break, please 
inform me and we can stop 
e) Confidentiality and anonymity: Everything said in this interview will be treated as 
confidential. Only my supervisor and I will have access to your responses.   When I report on the 
findings, I will make sure that information you provide will not be linked back to you.    
f) Recording: Do you mind if I record this interview?  It’s only for research purposes.  That 
way I don’t have to write down lots of notes while we talk.  Nobody except my supervisor and I will 
listen to the recording.  [Interviewer instruction: Wait for the participant’s response.]  Ensure to 
speak clearly so that I can hear what was said on the tape. 
g) Test recording:  Before we start, I would like to make sure that the tape recorder is working 
properly.  (Interviewer instruction: Start the recording: say your name and the date, and 
something light-hearted – like an observation about the weather today. Ask the respondent an 
innocuous question to get their voice –or ask about their age and occupation sitting in their 
natural position where they will sit for the interview.  Stop the recording and play back to make 
sure it is working and that you can hear both your voices.) 
 
Interviewer instruction: Start recording: Remember to press record again before interview 
starts.  Once again, state the date and place, your name and the respondent’s occupation. Make 
sure that tape recorder is positioned so that your voices are still audible, even when looking 
down at the paper. Write down as much of the answers as possible in the spaces provided. 
1. How did you first hear about the national human rights institution (s) you have interacted 









2. Have you ever approached such institutions for assistance? [Probe: If yes, what type of 
assistance? Did you lodge a complaint? What was your complaint about? Did you receive the 
assistance you sought? From your experience or that of a refugee you know, would you 





3. What activities hosted by any of these institutions have you participated in? [Probe: What type 
of activity-Refugee Day? Community engagement? Anti-xenophobia activity? Was it the only 
activity? If not which other activity? Do you know of any other refugee or asylum seeker who 





4. Did your find the activity useful? [Probe: Was there important information about refugee 
rights that you received at the event?] 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________In your opinion, do 
you think that the institution you interacted with is adequately promoting and protecting the 
rights of refugees? [Probe: Are you aware of anything being done for refugees in general? Is 
there continuous engagement with the community or its leaders? Are you aware of anything 
being done for refugee women, children, persons with disabilities or the elderly? Do you 
know someone within the institution that you can approach when you have a concern related 






5. What do you think these institutions should do to improve their work in relation to refugees? 
[Probe: Do you think the refugee community you come from knows about these institutions 





I have now come to the end of the interview.  
 
1. Do you have any additional comments about national human rights institutions and their role 














Interviewer instruction: Thank the participant at the end of the interview 
 
OBSERVATIONS/NOTES on interview (E.g. was interview interrupted, delayed, 













Appendix 6: Interview Guide for Service Providers 
 
KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR STAFF FROM ORGANISATIONS THAT 






INTRODUCTION (Interviewer instruction: Go through the introduction even if repeating what 
was said during recruitment) 
 
a) Thank you for agreeing to have this interview. 
 
b) I am Vivian Nasaka John-Langba a PhD student from University of Cape Town Faculty of 
Law I am conducting research to determine the extent to which national human rights institutions are 
promoting and protecting the rights of refugees.  
 
c) Please feel free to talk openly. If you feel uncomfortable talking about something, or would 
rather not answer a question, please tell me.  You do not have to answer questions if you do not want 
to. 
 
d) Time: The interview will take up to an hour and half. If you need to take a break, please 
inform me and we can stop 
 
e) Confidentiality and anonymity: Everything said in this interview will be treated as 
confidential. Only my supervisor and I will have access to your responses.   When I report on the 
findings, I will make sure that information you provide will not be linked back to you.    
 
f) Recording: Do you mind if I record this interview?  It’s only for research purposes.  That 
way I don’t have to write down lots of notes while we talk.  Nobody except my supervisor and I will 
listen to the recording.  [Interviewer instruction: Wait for the participant’s response.]  Ensure to 
speak clearly so that I can hear what was said on the tape. 
 
g) Test recording:  Before we start, I would like to make sure that the tape recorder is working 
properly.  (Interviewer instruction: Start the recording: say your name and the date, and 
something light-hearted – like an observation about the weather today. Ask the respondent an 





natural position where they will sit for the interview.  Stop the recording and play back to make 
sure it is working and that you can hear both your voices.) 
 
Interviewer instruction: Start recording: Remember to press record again before interview 
starts.  Once again, state the date and place, your name and the respondent’s occupation. Make 
sure that tape recorder is positioned so that your voices are still audible, even when looking 




1. How long have you worked in this position? [Probe: Any relevant background and 






2. What is your organisation’s mandate? [Probe: How does it relate to promoting and protecting 






3. Has your organisation participated, organized or implemented any interventions in the last 5 
years relating to refugees? [Probes: Legislation; Policy; Conditions of detention; Strategic 
litigation; Did you collaborate with any of the state institutions established to promote and 
protect human rights in any of the interventions mentioned above? If yes, in what manner. If 






Next, I would like to ask you some questions about your institution’s relationship with 
national human rights institutions 
 
4. Within the context of refugee protection, which national human rights institution(s) does your 
organisation partner with or have a formal working relationship? [Probes:  How useful is 
such a formal relationship in promoting and protecting the rights of refugees? Is there a focal 
point person within the institution on refugee matters that you liaise with? How often do you 










5. Do you think national human rights institutions have made an impact in the promotion and 
protection of refugee rights in this country? [Probe: Do you feel that there are higher levels 
of awareness on refugee rights? Are pertinent issues such as xenophobia, discrimination, 
access to basic services, irregular detention being addressed by the NHRI(s)? How about the 
rights of refugee women, children, persons with disabilities and the elderly? Are 
recommendations on refugee rights from organisations such as yours being taken on board by 








6. From your experience, do you think that NHRIs have the capacity to effectively address the 
rights of refugees? [Probe: Do they have the expertise, resources- both human and financial, 







7. From your experience, what challenges or barriers do national human rights institutions 
usually face when addressing the rights of refugees? [Probe: Are NHRIs trusted to deliver on 








8. In your opinion, in what ways could national human rights institutions influence 
implementation of policies to ensure effective promotion and protection of the rights of 
refugees and asylum seekers? [Probe: engagement with government, human rights education 
and training of first line service providers such as police, healthcare service providers, 






I have now come to the end of the interview.  
 





















11. Is it okay to contact you again for further information and or clarification on what we have 
discussed? 
 
Yes         
 
No      
 
Interviewer instruction: Thank the participant at the end of the interview 
 
OBSERVATIONS/NOTES on interview (E.g. was interview interrupted, delayed, 















Appendix 7: Interview Guide for NHRIs 
 
IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR NHRI STAFF-Final 
Date: 
Country: 
INTRODUCTION (Interviewer instruction: Go through the introduction even if repeating what 
was said during recruitment) 
a) Thank you for agreeing to have this interview. 
b) I am Vivian Nasaka John-Langba a PhD student from University of Cape Town Faculty of 
Law I am conducting research to determine the extent to which national human rights institutions are 
promoting and protecting the rights of refugees.  
 
c) Please feel free to talk openly. If you feel uncomfortable talking about something, or would 
rather not answer a question, please tell me.  You do not have to answer questions if you do not want 
to. 
 
d) Time: The interview will take up to an hour and half. If you need to take a break, please 
inform me and we can stop 
 
e) Confidentiality and anonymity: Everything said in this interview will be treated as 
confidential. Only my supervisor and I will have access to your responses.   When I report on the 
findings, I will make sure that information you provide will not be linked back to you.    
 
f) Recording: Do you mind if I record this interview?  It’s only for research purposes.  That 
way I don’t have to write down lots of notes while we talk.  Nobody except my supervisor and I will 
listen to the recording.  [Interviewer instruction: Wait for the participant’s response.]  Ensure to 
speak clearly so that I can hear what was said on the tape. 
 
g) Test recording:  Before we start, I would like to make sure that the tape recorder is working 
properly.  (Interviewer instruction: Start the recording: say your name and the date, and 
something light-hearted – like an observation about the weather today. Ask the respondent an 
innocuous question to get their voice sitting in their natural position where they will sit for the 
interview.  Stop the recording and play back to make sure it is working and that you can hear 
both your voices.) 
 
Interviewer instruction: Start recording: Remember to press record again before interview 
starts.  Once again, state the date and place, your name and the respondent’s occupation. Make 
sure that tape recorder is positioned so that your voices are still audible, even when looking 







1. How long have you worked on refugee matters? [Probe: Any relevant background or 






2. What is your institution’s mandate? [Probe: How does it relate to promoting and protecting 
the rights of refugees; Since the institution’s establishment has the NHRI dealt directly with 
matters relating to the refugees and asylum seekers? Is this on an ad hoc basis? Do you 
receive complaints from refugees? Do you know the number in the past five years and what 






3. Are there any strategies that this institution has developed to advance the rights of refugees 
and asylum seekers? [Probe: Are there any working groups? Is this an area that is 
prioritized? Is there a focal point person working on refugee rights? If not, what are the 






4. Has your institution organized/participated in/implemented any interventions in the last 5 
years relating to refugees? [Probes: Legislation; Policy; Research, Conditions of detention; 
Strategic litigation; Did you collaborate with any of the state institutions established to 
promote and protect human rights in any of the interventions mentioned above? If yes, in 






5. Do you consider the current domestic refugee protection framework sufficient to address the 
rights of refugees? [Probes: Did you play a role in the development of the legislation and 
policy? In your opinion, are there specific gaps in the law and policy? How do these gaps 
affect your work with refugees? What’s your view on how the Government is implementing 
the policy? In what way would you recommend that the policy or relevant legislation be 











6. In your opinion, has your institution in its oversight role contributed towards the effective 
implementation of this country’s policy towards refugees? [Probe: What avenues do you use 
to highlight the status of refugee protection? Do you engage with regional and international 
human rights mechanisms on refugee related matters? Do you contribute to any regional or 






7. Are there any challenges or barriers that you have faced in relation to your work with 
refugees? [Probes: What do these challenges relate to-monitoring role? Resistance from 
authorities to engage in refugee matters? Limited resources to effectively implement 
programmes? Difficulty in accessing refugee communities? Lack of awareness of your role 
broadly and specifically among refugee communities? How have you addressed these 






8. In your opinion, how can your institution’s capacity to address refugee rights be 
strengthened? [Probe: increase in human and financial resources? Increase community 







9. Are there any opportunities that NHRIs can seize to strengthen their capacity to effectively 
promote and protect the rights of refugees? [Probe: Opportunities for strategic engagement, 
political climate/political will, private sector engagement, collaboration with higher 
educational institutions, partnerships with local human rights NGOs; Do you think there have 








10. I have no further questions. Is there anything else you would like to discuss before we finish 











11. Is it okay to contact you again for further information and or clarification on what we have 
discussed? 
 
Yes         
 
No      
Interviewer instruction: Thank the participant at the end of the interview 
 
OBSERVATIONS/NOTES on interview (E.g. was interview interrupted, delayed, 














Appendix 8: List of Participants 
 Interviewee 
Coded identity 




1 Service provider 1 Durban  South 
Africa 
26/09/2018 In-person  
2 Service provider 2 Johannesburg South 
Africa 
18/09/2018 Telephonic 
3 Service provider 3 Durban South 
Africa 
18/11/2018 Telephonic 
4 Service provider 4 Cape Town South 
Africa 
27/11/2018 Telephonic 
5 Service provider 5 Cape Town South 
Africa 
19/11/2018  
6 Service provider 6 Durban South 
Africa 
03/12/2018 In-person  
7 Service provider 7 Nairobi  Kenya 14/03/2019 In-person 
8 Service provider 8 Nairobi  Kenya  13/03/2019 Telephonic 
9 Service provider 9 Nairobi Kenya 7/03/2019 In-person 
10 Refugee 1 Durban South 
Africa 
15/09/2018 In-person 
11 Refugee 2  Durban  South 
Africa 
21/09/2019 Telephonic  
12 Refugee 3 Cape Town South 
Africa 
17/10/2018 Telephonic 
13 Refugee 4  South 
Africa 
17/10/2018 Telephonic  
14 Refugee 5 Nairobi Kenya 8/03/2019 In-person 
15 Refugee 6 Nairobi Kenya 8/03/2019 In-person 
16 Refugee 7 Nairobi Kenya  9/03/2019 In-person 





18 NHRI 2 Johannesburg  South 
Africa 
3/09/2019 Telephonic  
19 NHRI 3  Nairobi Kenya  7/03/2019 Telephonic  
 
 
